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Abstract
South Sudan introduced a nation-wide geographically focused contracting ap-
proach with funding from 3 main donors, to rapidly scale-up access to health ser-
vices starting mid-2012. The overall aim of the thesis is to assesses its effect and
impact on maternal and child health. In the first paper, I provide extensive back-
ground on the history of health services delivery in South Sudan prior to assessing
progress in increasing health facility utilization among women and children under-
five, using routine health facility data. I thus compare the period (2011-2013) to the
policy period (2013-2015) at national and sub-national level using Prais-Winsten
and Cochrane-Orcutt regression and find significant increases in health facility uti-
lization. Given the overall increase in health facility utilization, the second paper
assesses impact of the policy on child mortality using a novel approach to construct a
synthetic South Sudan from a panel of lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs),
and using data from the World Bank Developmental Indicators (WDI) database.
On average, contracting out had a negative effect on the rate of decline of U5MR
during the policy period. These findings suggest limitations in the approach imple-
mented in South Sudan. The third paper further evaluates the contracting interven-
tion by evaluating three contracting approaches in Jonglei and Upper Nile States;
contracting-out (C-O) using non-governmental organizations (NGOs), contracting-
in (C-I) using county health departments (CHD) and performance-based contracting
(PBC) in select counties. Using difference-in difference (DD) and DD with propen-
sity score matching. I hypothesized that contracting-out to NGOs leads to higher
performance relative to contracting-in with CHDs, that performance-based contract-
ing incentivizes health workers, hence PBC counties have higher utilization relative
to non-PBC counties. Results are not as straightforward; there are no significant
differences in the double differences for ANC 4th visits, health facility deliveries,




Antonio J. Trujillo (Primary Advisor)
Associate Professor
Department of International Health
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Gerard Anderson (Thesis Chair)
Professor
Department of Health Policy and Planning
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Krishna Rao
Associate Professor
Department of International Health
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Mary E. Hughes
Associate Scientist
Department of Population and Family Health




Department of Health Behaviour
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
Courtland Robinson
Associate Professor
Department of International Health
Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public Health
iii
Acknowledgements
I would like to extend my gratitude to the Ministry of Health, Republic of South
Sudan without whom this work would not be possible. Specifically, Dr. Samson
Baba, Dr Alexander Dimiti and Dr. Richard Laku, who not only encouraged me
to undertake this evaluation but also wrote letters of recommendation when I was
applying to graduate programs. Dr. Laku was kind enough to extend access to the
District Health Information System (DHIS) database which underpins this research.
Dr. William Clemmer and Dr. Mounir Lado from IMA World Health provided
key project documents. Special thanks to Dr. Clemmer for his continuous en-
couragement, feedback and guidance with the initial proposal and throughout this
process. I would also like to extend my thanks to Mr. James Amum, from the
County Health Department (CHD) in Manyo who was kind enough to provide CHD
contract documents. Dr. Augustino Ting Mayai who gave critical feedback to the
initial draft of this thesis – which meant many more days of additional analysis, but
without which this thesis would be weaker.You all significantly extended the scope
of this work, and as a result, I was able to improve on the third paper.
To my colleagues over the years in South Sudan, Drasiga, Amule, Nellie, Keji,
Trueman, Juac, Fadil, Ibra, Koma, Dr Kenyi, Dr.Edward, and so many others. You
enriched my time in South Sudan. See you soon!
To Dr. Felix Loro Lado, who taught me what it means to be passionate about
the work that we do, to always keep in mind the people whom we serve, and to
passionately advocate for the least among us. I will be forever grateful for the
lessons you taught me, Dr. Felix. You were always the best of us, travel well to the
ancestors. May you rest in peace.
To my colleagues at the Dept. of International Health and the Dept. of Health
Policy, and specifically Ashley Sheffel, Ilona Varallyay, Amy Margolis, Jaya Gupta,
Katharine Shelley, Dolapo Fekeye, Jean Oliver, Prof. Darrel Gaskin, Felicia Roane,
iv
Prof. Janice Bowie, Prof. Courtland Robinson, without whom my academic expe-
rience would have been less rewarding. Cristina Salazar who was a strong advocate
on my behalf. Thank you so much!
My social support network during my time in Baltimore; Judy Njuguna, Camille
Brown, Deryck Pearson, Susan Aura, Patrick Huntley, Sarah Michaels, Alonzo
Howard. My Mt. Vernon crew; Alex Egner and Willa, meadow, Noah Patterson,
Grace Smith, Marta Spangler. My home will always be your home.
My cousins, Lalam, Orlando and Chacha. You have always been there through-
out all the good and the bad. I appreciate you all.
Alsarah- I am so proud of you and always in awe of your awesomeness. Your
friendship means the world to me.
My thesis committee; Profs. Gerard Anderson, Krishna Rao and M.E. Hughes.
Thank you for your feedback and support. I am lucky to have had you as part of
this process. Special thanks to my thesis chair, Prof Anderson, for the extensive and
crucial feedback, guidance, for making time to meet with me starting from when I
first wrote the proposal, to the thesis. I aspire to be like you.
Last but not least- and it is hard to express my gratitude in words- my advisor,
Prof. Antonio Trujillo. I consider you a friend and more importantly, a mentor.
I have learned so much from you, you inspired me to think outside the box, you
pushed me to be a better researcher, to take classes outside of the School of Public
Health, you always made time to meet with me, and you shaped this thesis into what
it is. The best decision I made was to ask to be your advisee. I hold the advice you
give- to always ensure that your work is accessible, "so that my grandmother can
understand" and "always remember that the method is the servant not the master"
very close to my heart.
This thesis is dedicated to the women and children of South Sudan.
v
Table of Contents
Abstract . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Thesis Committee . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv
List of Figures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
List of Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
Introduction 1
1 Paper 1: Rebuilding health-systems to improve maternal and child
health in post-conflict countries. 12
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2 Background on South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
1.2.1 Pre-Conflict and Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
1.2.2 Effect on the health system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
1.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement transition period . . . . . . . . 24
1.3.1 Establishing a health system in the transition period . . . . . 25
1.3.2 Basic Package of Health and Nutrition Services (BPHS) . . . . 26
1.3.3 Health and demographic indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.3.4 Summary of the transition period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
1.4 Post-Independence Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.4.1 Contracting out Intervention in South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . 37
1.5 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.5.1 Outcome measures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
1.5.2 Data Source(s) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
1.6 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
1.7 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.7.1 Maternal health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
1.7.2 Child health . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
1.8 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.9 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2 Paper 2: Does contracting-out of primary health care services to
Non-State Providers reduce child mortality in South Sudan? A
vi
synthetic control analysis 88
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
2.2 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.2.1 Theoretical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
2.2.2 Contracting-out . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
2.2.3 Effect heterogeneity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
2.2.4 Previous Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
2.3 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
2.3.1 Synthetic Control Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
2.3.2 P-values and inference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
2.3.3 Data sources and measurement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
2.3.4 Sample specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
2.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2.4.1 Synthetic control analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2.4.2 Robustness checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.5 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.6 Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.6.1 Synthetic Control Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
2.6.2 Robustness test results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
3 Paper 3: Contracting primary health care services in South Sudan:
Does type of contract matter? 125
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
3.1.1 A brief history of contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
3.1.2 History of contracting in South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
3.2 Contracting in Jonglei and Upper Nile States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
3.2.1 Contracting-out with NGOs: C-O (NGO) Contracts . . . . . . 142
3.2.2 Contracting-in with CHDs: C-O (CHD) Contracts . . . . . . . 145
3.2.3 Performance-Based Contracting (PBC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation (M&E) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
3.2.5 Contract duration and early termination . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
3.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.3.1 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 150
3.4 Empirical Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
vii
3.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimator with propensity-score match-
ing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 155
3.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
3.5.1 Unadjusted means . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
3.5.2 Propensity score matching analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
3.6.1 Study Limitations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
3.6.2 Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 168




1.1 Key health and socio-economic and health indicators, Southern Sudan 23
1.2 USAID / OFDA / ECHO / BSF support as of December 2010 . . . 30
1.3 Early Childhood Mortality Rates, South Sudan . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.4 Comparison of select indicators, SHHS 2006 2010. . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.5 Geographically-Focused Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
1.6 Maternal Health Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
1.7 Maternal Health Indicators by Facility Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
1.8 Maternal Health Indicators by Donor Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
1.9 Child Health Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
1.10 Child Health Indicators by Facility Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
1.11 Child Health Indicators by Donor Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
A1 MoH Core performance monitoring indicators across the 3 health pro-
grams. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
A2 Maternal and Child Health Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
A3 Maternal Health Indicators by Facility Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
A4 Child Health Indicators by Facility Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
A5 Maternal and Child Health Indicators - World Bank . . . . . . . . . 85
A6 Maternal and Child Health Indicators - USAID . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
A7 Maternal and Child Health Indicators - HPF . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
2.1 Data sources and definition of measures. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
2.2 Under-Five Mortality Predictor Weights. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
2.3 Synthetic South Sudan Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
2.4 Comparison of U5MR pre-intervention predictor . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2.5 Impact of Contracting on U5MR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108
B1 Synthetic South Sudan Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
B2 South Sudan and Synthetic South Sudan U5MR . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B3 Predictor Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
B4 Synthetic South Sudan Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B5 Predictor Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
B6 South Sudan and Synthetic South Sudan U5MR . . . . . . . . . . . 124
ix
3.1 Select Health Indicators, SHHS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
3.2 C-O (NGO) Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
3.3 C-I (CHD) Contracts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 146
3.4 County Health Department PBC Payments (SSP) . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.5 Health Facility PBC Payments (SSP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
3.6 County Baseline Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151
3.7 Comparison of CHD and non-CHD counties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 153
3.8 Unadjusted Means by Contracting group and year . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.9 Unadjusted Means by PBF group and year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 159
3.10 Maternal Health Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
3.11 Child Health Indicators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
C1 Illustrative DD design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
C2 Health Facility Reporting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173
C3 Unadjusted Means by Contracting group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
C4 Unadjusted Means by PBF group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 176
x
List of Figures
1.1 A framework for post-conflict health systems rehabilitation. . . . . . . 19
1.2 Trends in maternal health indicators, 2011-2015 Sudan. . . . . . . . . 51
1.3 Trends in maternal health indicators, by facility type. . . . . . . . . . 55
1.4 Maternal health indicators, by donor. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
1.5 Maternal health indicators, by donor and health facility type. . . . . 60
1.6 Trends in child health indicators, 2011-2015 Sudan. . . . . . . . . . . 63
1.7 Child health indicators, by Facility Type. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
1.8 Child health indicators, by donor . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
1.9 Child health indicators, by donor and facility type. . . . . . . . . . . 72
2.1 Trend in U5MR rate, South Sudan compared to other LMICs. . . . . 107
2.2 Trend in U5MR rate, South Sudan and Synthetic South Sudan. . . . 108
2.3 Gap in U5MR rate, South Sudan and Synthetic South Sudan. . . . . 109
2.4 Trend U5MR excluding Liberia and Sierra Leone. . . . . . . . . . . . 110
2.5 Trend U5MR restricting to neighbouring countries. . . . . . . . . . . 111
2.6 Trend U5MR restricting to oil producing countries. . . . . . . . . . . 112
2.7 Gap in U5MR Placebo Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
2.8 Ratio of pre and post U5MR. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
2.9 Trends in U5MR rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
2.10 Trends in U5MR rate. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
3.1 Maternal health by contract group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
3.2 Child health by contract group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
3.3 Maternal health by PBF group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.4 Maternal health by PBF group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160
3.5 Maternal health by contract group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 174
3.6 Maternal health by PBF group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
xi
Introduction
. . . technical progress is more than just changes in the sophistication of drugs, devices and techniques of medicine.
It includes improvements in public health provision and private health practices which affect the adoption of the
best techniques. Recent research has either given little emphasis to technical progress — in part simply because
much of the research is cross-sectional and therefore ignores developments over time — or it has assumed the rate
of technical progress to be constant across countries. But countries differ in how close their health systems come to
utilizing the best technology or practice available: the catch-up with the technical frontier may be country-specific
(Jamison et al., 2016).
Summary
Numerous studies suggest that contracting increases health facility utilization,
with the underlying implication that this may also lead to improved health outcomes
(Lagarde and Palmer, 2009; Odendaal et al., 2018). This strategy is increasingly
used by governments in fragile and conflict-affected settings to rapidly accelerate
access to basic health services. This thesis provides a comprehensive history of the
emergence of the health system in South Sudan between 2005 and 2011. It also
provides an analysis of the effect of a nationwide contracting approach implemented
after independence in 2011 on health facility utilization and health outcomes. As far
as I am aware, this is the first evaluation of the contracting approach implemented
in the country.
The first paper describes the effect of a nation-wide contracting intervention on
health facility utilization by mothers and children, finding overall increases, with
variation at the sub-national level. This provides initial evidence of whether the
contracting intervention in South Sudan, which was largely implemented in two
phases, increased health facility utilization. The first phase of contracting (2005-
2011) had limited geographical scope and I compare results from the first South
Sudan Health and Household Survey (SHHS) conducted in 2006 to the 2010 survey.
The second phase, expanded the contracting intervention nation-wide. Due to lack
of subsequent surveys, I use routine health facility utilization data from the district
health information system (DHIS) to describe longitudinal trends in maternal and
child health facility utilization using time series graphs and ordinary least squares
1
regression with panel corrected standard errors to account for the time-series nature
of the data.
In the two subsequent papers, I explore the causal mechanism. The second paper
assesses the overall impact of contracting on under-five mortality using the synthetic
control method- a comparative case-study methodology used in the field of political
science - to construct a counterfactual South Sudan from a multi-country panel.
Results show that the rate of decrease of under-five mortality falls during the con-
tracting period, implying that improvements in health outcomes may not necessarily
follow observed increases in utilization, or a limitation in the implementation of the
approach.
In the third paper, I explore the mechanism by which contracts were designed and
implemented in one region, extending elements of contract theory, developed in the
field of economics to describe the within-country variation in its effect. This paper
seeks to resolve the question of whether the contracting intervention had limitations
in how it was implemented. Results suggest limited difference in health facility
utilization comparing contracting using government agencies relative to the private
sector. This is surprising as contracting with the private sector presumes increased
productivity within the health sector. My conclusion is that while contracting may
increase health facility utilization, further research is needed to understand how
contracts are designed and implemented in fragile and conflict-affected settings, if
we are to also achieve meaningful reductions in mortality. There is also need to
explore innovative ways of increasing the capacity and involvement of governments
in health services delivery. This is increasingly critical due to the increase in number




In the past decade, there has been a growing number of armed intrastate conflicts,
which have increasingly been concentrated in lower- and middle-income countries.
In 2014, for example there were 40 reported active conflicts with 30% (n=12) in
Africa, increasing to 52 in 2015 prior to reducing to 49 in 2016, 35% (n=17) of
which were in Africa (Allansson et al., 2017). Given current trends, it is estimated
that by 2030, more than half of the world’s poor will be living in countries affected
by conflict (OECD, 2015).
War and conflict negatively impact every facet of society and predominantly the
health system and health status of the affected population. The World Bank esti-
mated that fragile and conflict-affected countries experience one third higher infant
mortality rate, a life-expectancy that is shorter by 12 years and 20% higher ma-
ternal mortality compared to other low-income countries (Carvalho, 2006). During
the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) period (2000-2015), nearly two-thirds
of these countries failed to meet global goals to halve poverty and infant mortality,
despite simultaneously experiencing the highest burden (OECD, 2015).
This portends negative implications for meeting the 2030 Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs) to reduce poverty, ensure healthy lives and promote well-
being for all, unless increasing attention is paid to the health systems in fragile and
conflict-affected states. Governments in these settings encounter significant chal-
lenges in providing basic services to their populations, being constrained in financial
and technical capacity.
Health system strengthening and reconstruction in post-conflict settings has pri-
marily involved decentralizing the health sector, establishing a basic package of
primary healthcare services, and governments contracting out the delivery of health
services to non-governmental organizations in public-private partnerships, with fi-
nancing from external donors (Newbrander et al., 2011). Public-private partner-
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ships are often the only feasible approach by governments seeking to expand access
to health services in these settings.
Focusing on South Sudan, I present a comprehensive case-study of a country
transitioning from long-term conflict to post-conflict reconstruction and development
and building a health system from scratch, in hope that it may offer lessons for other
settings. This thesis is also grounded on my personal experience working with health
system strengthening programs in South Sudan both during the transition period as
well as post-independence. Thus, it is also driven by my own personal motivation to
understand the effect of these efforts on health facility utilization, and specifically
for women and children in South Sudan.
The experience of South Sudan is unique as the country has experienced three
distinct periods; the conflict period during which humanitarian aid was the only
source of basic services, a transitional period of reconstruction which also correlated
with an emergence from relief to developmental aid, and the period after indepen-
dence in 2011 which consolidated the gains of the transition period. During the
post-independence period there was a return to conflict in certain regions of the
country, allowing an analysis of the effect of conflict on health facility utilization.
The aim of the first paper is to provide a comprehensive case-study of the health
system in South Sudan, describing the emergence of a health system where none
previously existed, and describing the specific contract modalities implemented. The
post-independence period saw a nationwide implementation of a geographically-
financed aid architecture with three main programs funded by USAID, the World
Bank and a health pooled fund of primarily European Union countries. These three
programs relied on contracting the provision of a basic package of health services to
non-governmental organizations, essentially establishing three health systems. For
example, per capita spending for health ranged from USD$ 4.9 to US$ 10.4 and the
three programs also had differential implementing modalities.
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Overall, antenatal care first visits increase by 3,465 mean monthly visits per
year, (or 30% increase on average) between 2011-2015. However, contacts with the
health facility is not sustained; there is a drop-off in women completing their fourth
antenatal care visit or delivering in the health facility, both of which increase by
18% and 24% respectively suggesting either additional incentives may be necessary,
or that the quality of care dissuades women from further contacts.
Among children, the overwhelming reason for health facility utilization is for
malaria treatment, with fewer children completing the immunization protocol for
diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT). Between 2011 and 2015, malaria and diar-
rhoea cases increase by 11,632, and 5,77 per month representing relative increases of
36% and 38% respectively whereas mean monthly DPT 1st and 3rd dose, increase
by 4,153 and 3,528 (46% and 50%) from the 2011 baseline. The increase in number
of children receiving treatment for malaria and diarrhoea, which are major causes
of morbidity and mortality in South Sudan, coupled with increasing immunization
coverage may result in observable decrease in under-five mortality.
As paper 1 is mainly descriptive, I then explore the causal mechanism. Paper two
uses the synthetic control method (SCM) to estimate the effect of the geographically-
focused contracting-out policy on the under-five mortality rate (U5MR) in South
Sudan. SCM is a comparative case study methodology used in the fields of political
science and economics with limited application in health to date (Abadie et al.,
2010, 2015). SCM is used to construct a counterfactual, referred to as a synthetic
South Sudan, from a balanced multi-country panel of similar lower-and middle-
income countries. Data is obtained from the World Bank Developmental Indicators
(WDI) database, which represents the most accurate global development data for
217 countries, and covers 2000 to 2016 to assess progress over time.
During the pre-intervention period (pre-2013), U5MR for South Sudan and syn-
thetic South Sudan fall from a high of approximately 180 under-five deaths per 1,000
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live births to a low of 102 under-five deaths per 1,000 live births. This largely follows
the overall drop in U5MR observed in Sub-Saharan Africa during the MDG period.
The U5MR for synthetic South Sudan begins to diverge from that of South Sudan
mid- 2011; the percentage difference between South Sudan diverges from synthetic
South Sudan by 6% to 18% between 2012-2016, suggesting that the rate of decline
in U5MR slows post-independence. This is surprising given the observed increase in
children utilizing the health facility observed in paper 1. This further implies that
while health facility utilization increases as a result of the contracting policy, these
gains were not high enough to impact the overall U5MR.
In the first paper, I also observed that improvements in health facility utilization
differs across the three health programs and by type of health facility. Of the three
programs, the health pooled fund regions have the highest observed increases in
maternal and child health facility utilization while the World Bank sites, which are
also the most conflict-affected, have similar utilization to that of the USAID sites,
which are the least conflict-affected. This implies that while there may be observ-
able increases in utilization due to contracting nationally, within-country variation
in program implementation and contract design matters in curtailing child mortal-
ity. It may also suggest that the contracting approach in South Sudan may require
a redesign in order to attract competition among providers, improved incentives for
health workers and providers to achieve noticeable gains in health outcomes. Under-
standing the existing contracting modalities in South Sudan may provide additional
lessons in future designs of contracts.
The third paper therefore delves into the contracting approach in South Su-
dan, using contract-theory to assesses the effect of three contracting modalities;
contracting-out to NGOs, contracting-in with a government agency- the county
health department (CHD) - and performance-based contracting (PBC). Contract-
theory suggests that the provider or agent, in this case the CHDs and NGOs - must
be adequately incentivized and also recommends appropriate monitoring controls to
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reduce the problem of moral hazard (Smith et al., 1997; Committee et al., 2016).
As performance also depends on factors that may be largely beyond the provider’s
control (for example conflict), well-drawn contracts must also balance compensation
against risk-sharing. Hart and Holmström therefore recommend that contracts be
based not only on measurable outcomes ex post, but also on the providers’ effort
with compensation tied to level of effort.
The motivation behind this paper is that applying principles from contract-
theory to the contracting-out approach in lower- and middle-income settings may
illuminate effective ways of improving the delivery of health services, by taking into
consideration the environment in which contracts are drawn. I focus on the most
conflict-affected states (Upper Nile and Jonglei) as the contracting agency overseeing
this region has the most experience working in South Sudan, under the assumption
that the variation in contract types takes into consideration this experience. Using
difference-in difference (DD) and DD with propensity score matching, I hypothesize
that contracting-out to NGOs leads to higher performance relative to contracting-in
with CHDs, and that performance-based contracting incentivizes health workers,
hence PBC counties have higher utilization relative to non-PBC counties.
Results suggest that this is not as straightforward; there are no distinct dif-
ferences in performance comparing CHDs and NGOs. For example, while mean
antenatal care first visits falls by almost 50% in CHD counties, there are no signifi-
cant differences in ANC 4th visits and health facility deliveries. Similarly, there are
no statistically significant differences in the double differences for immunization and
diarrhoea treatment comparing the two sites. PBC also had no effect on utilization
relative to counties with no PBC incentive, perhaps due to inadequate incentives or
the design of the PBC approach overall. Thus, there is need to identify contextual
factors, the specific implementation activities of providers to identify ways of tying
compensation to level of effort, and appropriate incentives (reward) and penalty
mechanisms for both providers and health workers to effectively incentivize perfor-
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mance. While this may also be due to the conflict, the fact that the World Bank
program achieves similar health facility utilization relative to USAID sites suggests
that overall these approaches may have limited the effect of conflict. These results
also strengthen the case of utilizing government agencies in contracting as this may
be more cost-effective in the long run.
The thesis is important for several reasons. Humanitarian assistance provided by
non-governmental organizations (NGOs) is often the only source of health services
for most of the population in conflict-affected settings. This is often delivered in
form of vertical or disease-specific programs which have an immediate impact on
mortality and morbidity, are often limited in scope and impact, but which also con-
tribute to the fragmentation of the health sector (Waters et al., 2007; Kruk et al.,
2010; Philips and Derderian, 2015). There is growing recognition that health ser-
vice delivery in conflict-affected settings requires a longer-term approach to external
aid, and therefore a shift from short-term humanitarian approaches to longer-term
developmental aid. This requires strengthening the capacity of government institu-
tions to deliver health services even in presence of conflict. This paper provides an
example of a country that made tremendous gains in establishing a health sector.
There has also been growing recognition by multilateral and bilateral donors that
achieving complex and global progress on health and non-health goals necessitates
increasing investment in fragile and conflict-affected states (Andrew, 2005). This
was the basis of the New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (2011) which pro-
moted cooperation between donors, governments of fragile states (referred to as the
g7+) and civil society organizations to improve the effectiveness of aid. This neces-
sitates increasing investment in the health sector, guaranteeing financial resources
through a longer-term approach to donor funding and establishing monitoring and
accountability mechanisms (Newbrander et al., 2011; Haar and Rubenstein, 2012;
Kruk et al., 2010; Philips and Derderian, 2015). The health sector has the potential
of providing immediate observable benefits, often referred to as peace dividends,
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to conflict-affected populations which may promote peace and stability (Nussbaum
et al., 2012).
The New Deal prioritized building the capacity of government institutions to
deliver public services as a means of increasing trust and legitimacy of governments.
South Sudan, as one of the founding countries of the g7+ and one of seven pilot
countries that volunteered to implement the New Deal, affords an opportunity to
assess one aspect of its implementation, adding to the existing evaluations of the
New Deal process. The thesis also compares the effect of contracting using a govern-
ment agency and thus may contribute to further discussions on the need to expand
contracting approaches to the public sector, regardless of sources of funding.
There have also been calls for adding on to the existing evidence-base on health
systems reconstruction to inform future policy and practice specific to fragile and
conflict-affected settings (Bornemisza et al., 2009; Kruk et al., 2010; Witter, 2012).
By extending principles from contract-theory to the contracting-out approach in
lower- and middle-income settings, I hope to motivate discussions around the envi-
ronment in which contracts are drawn, the incentives mechanism underlying these
contracts in hope of increasing the efficiency of the contracting approach.
Lastly, I argue that as provider effort is directly tied to meeting performance
targets, understanding specific implementation modalities, coupled with the proper
design of the incentives structure and a flexible contracting design may allow for
innovative service delivery models especially in conflict-affected settings. Techni-
cal progress would therefore include improvements in public health provision and
facilitate adoption of the best techniques.
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Paper 1: Rebuilding health-systems to improve ma-
ternal and child health in post-conflict countries.
Abstract
South Sudan introduced a nation-wide geographically focused contracting approach with funding
from 3 main donors, to rapidly scale-up access to health services starting mid-2012. I provide
extensive background of health services delivery during the conflict and post-conflict prior to assessing
progress in increasing health facility utilization among women and children under-five, after the
implementation of the policy using routine health facility data. I compare the period (2011-2013) to
the policy period (2013-2015) at national level and sub-national using Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-
Orcutt regression, accounting for the time-series nature of the data. During the policy period mean
monthly antenatal care (ANC) 1st and 4th visits increase by 8,011 and 2,799, IPT-2 by 3,475 and
facility deliveries by a mere 980 (all p<0.01), relative to the pre-policy, representing increases of
30%, 17%, 24% and 16% respectively. Mean monthly utilization among children also increased
significantly; DPT 1 and DPT3 by 8,657 and 7,196, malaria and diarrhoea by 26,164, and 13,903
respectively, representing increases of 26% for immunization and 22% and 27% for malaria and
diarrhoea relative to pre-policy. Utilization patterns varied by level of health centers and units
(PHCCs/Us); pregnant women preferred their 1st ANC visit at PHCCs, and whereas PHCUs received
more children with malaria, and diarrhoea, DPT immunization was higher at PHCCs. Mothers thus
preferred PHCUs for care for their children but tended to receive services at the PHCCs themselves.
Conflict-affected areas experience reduced utilization with a dose-response related to level of conflict;
the higher the level of conflict, the higher the drop-in utilization and immunization services more
heavily impacted. Lastly, there are regional variations in utilization at the donor level.
Keywords— Health system strengthening; Primary health care services; Contracting;
Conflict-affected settings; Lower-and-middle-income countries; South Sudan
1.1 Introduction
War and conflict significantly impacts all facets of society and results in large num-
bers of civilian casualties. Conflict also limits progress towards attaining health targets
and poverty reduction. In the past decade, armed intrastate conflict has increasingly been
concentrated in lower- and middle-income countries, which are often least capable of mit-
igating the effects of conflict. In 2014, for example there were 40 reported active conflicts
with 30% (n=12) in Africa, increasing to 52 in 2015 prior to reducing to 49 in 2016, 35%
(n=17) of which were in Africa (Allansson et al., 2017).
In conflict - affected settings, the health sector is often a casualty; conflict accompanies
the destruction of health facility infrastructure, interruption of the supply of drugs and
essential medicines, and loss of human resource capacity (Waters et al., 2007; Witter, 2012;
Rutherford and Saleh, 2019). The resultant excess morbidity and mortality is caused by
the direct effects of the conflict, for example war-related deaths and injuries and higher
susceptibility to communicable diseases due to mass displacement, and indirect causes
from lack of access to preventive and curative health services, medicines and equipment
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and breakdown in water and sanitation infrastructure (Waters et al., 2007; Kruk et al.,
2010). Higher rates of maternal and child mortality frequently portend the destruction
of the health system with the highest rates observed in countries with a long history of
conflict. The breakdown in basic services overall is also a contributory factor; excess child
mortality for example, is exacerbated by food insecurity and lack of access to clean water
and sanitation in addition to lack of treatment for diseases such as malaria, pneumonia
and diarrhoea.
During the post-conflict period, reducing morbidity and mortality is a priority for
both donors and newly established governments as this is perceived to provide a ‘peace
dividend’ to the affected population. Stronger health systems may also increase the trust
and legitimacy of post-conflict governments through the accelerated provision of health
services and may thus improve the chance for sustainable peace. Identifying the successes
and limitations of health system strengthening approaches in post-conflict settings is thus
critical for policy and practice, especially given the increase in the number of global conflicts
and as countries emerge from conflict.
Using South Sudan as a case-study, I provide a comprehensive description of the health
system strengthening experience of a fragile and conflict-affected country. South Sudan
has had three distinct periods of health services provision; the conflict period during which
humanitarian aid was the only source of basic services, a transitional period of reconstruc-
tion which also correlated with an emergence from relief to development, and the period
after independence in 2011 which consolidated the gains of the transition period. I provide
extensive contextual background on the health system approaches implemented across the
three periods with the objective of informing future policy and practice.
In fragile and conflict-affected settings, humanitarian assistance provided by non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) is often the only source of health services for most
of the population. One of the primary goals of humanitarian aid is to reduce excess mor-
tality and morbidity therefore service delivery is often in form of vertical or disease-specific
programs which have an immediate impact on mortality. Humanitarian services are often
limited in scope; to specific geographical regions, defined by short-term funding and with
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limited resources for efforts that contribute toward health systems development (Waters
et al., 2007; Kruk et al., 2010; Philips and Derderian, 2015). Research suggests that verti-
cal programs and project-specific interventions contribute to the continuing fragmentation
of health systems, further weakening government capacity to play a stewardship role, and
also distorting national health priorities by prioritizing disease specific interventions. These
programs also place undue burdens on reporting and coordination in the public sector in
low income countries (Hafner and Shiffman, 2012). In fragile and conflict-affected settings,
the fragmented health sector is an additional challenge for governments’ efforts to coor-
dinate and provide stewardship to the health sector especially with financial and human
resource constraints.
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) established in 2000 shifted global focus
from disease-specific interventions to population-based reductions in morbidity and mor-
tality (Philips and Derderian, 2015). Two of the MDG goals, (MDG4 & MDG5) targeted
improvement of health outcomes for women and children; MDG4 to reduce child mortality
by two thirds and MDG5 to reduce maternal mortality ratio by three quarters between
1990 and 2015 (UNGA, 2000). There was recognition that this required strengthening
health systems to expand coverage of evidence-based interventions and additional invest-
ment in the health sector. For example, during the MDG period, estimates for scaling up
essential interventions for newborn and child health ranged from US$5·1 billion annually or
$1·23 per head to save 6 million child lives (Bryce et al., 2005), to $13.6 billion investment
over ten years for maternal and newborn health interventions (WHO, 2005) in additional
funding from external donors.
In 2005, donors and governments from developing and developed countries endorsed
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness in 2005 to improve the quality of aid and its
impact on development to accelerate progress toward the MDGS. Key commitments such
as ensuring country ownership of development policies and strategies, alignment of donor
priorities to these strategies, harmonization of donor funding, results-based management
of funds and mutual accountability were identified (OECD, 2008). By 2010, there was also
increasing acknowledgement that conflict and fragility were major obstacles to achieving
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the MDGs and that external aid should expand to strengthening the capacity of govern-
ments to deliver health services even in fragile and conflict-affected settings. This led to
the first International Dialogue for Peacebuilding and Statebuilding (IDPS) meeting, held
in Dili, Timor-Leste in 2010. This meeting brought together donors and countries affected
by conflict and fragility to establish principles for donor engagement and transition from
relief to development.
The Dili Declaration (2010) outlined peacebuilding and state-building stepping stones
to achieving progress on development, and as means to end or prevent conflict (Dili, 2010).
These included developing effective and accountable government institutions to facilitate
service delivery and prioritizing the needs of women and children. The declaration in-
cluded commitments from the g7+ countries1 to prioritize good governance specifically
decentralization aimed at bringing services closer to populations in-need, and expanding
basic services in for example education, health, water and sanitation, in addition to ad-
dressing and resolving internal conflict. The declaration implies that strengthening the
capacity of governments contributes to development and thus to safeguarding peace and
stability.
Stronger health systems have been tied not only to improvements in population health,
but also to increasing trust and legitimacy of governments in the post-conflict period
(Newbrander et al., 2011; Haar and Rubenstein, 2012; Kruk et al., 2010; Philips and
Derderian, 2015). This occurs through involving government and civil society organizations
in health services delivery, in ensuring equitable access to health services, and guaranteeing
financial resources through longer-term donor funding. As the number of conflict-affected
countries continues to grow, and with larger investments going to reconstruction and re-
establishment of essential services in fragile and conflict-affected settings, the need for
empirical evidence on transitions from relief to development remains increasingly pertinent
(Kruk et al., 2010).
Health system strengthening in fragile and conflict-affected settings has involved es-
1The g7+ is an open group of countries experiencing conflict and fragility. It was established in
2008 and formalized in 2010 and comprises the following countries: Afghanistan, Burundi, Central
African Republic, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Haiti, Liberia, Nepal,
the Solomon Islands, Sierra Leone, South Sudan and Timor-Leste
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tablishing a decentralized health system, pooling donor funds, implementation of a basic
(or minimum) package of health services (BPHS) through contracts with non-state ac-
tors. South Sudan provides an interesting case-study to describe the health system of a
country transitioning from conflict and from relief to developmental aid having applied
lessons from other post-conflict settings, primarily Afghanistan. The country emerged
from almost thirty years of conflict and the health system had to be built from scratch.
Starting in 2005, a nascent primary health care system emerged with the newly established
government contributing to health-care funding, strengthening its stewardship role of the
health-sector and essentially creating the building blocks of the health system with the
support of bilateral and multilateral donors.
Similar to other post-conflict settings, South Sudan has a decentralized health sys-
tem and has contracted-out health services delivery to NGOs using a basic package of
health services as the basis of contracts. The country implemented a geographically fo-
cused health financing architecture with donors supporting distinct geographical areas and
therefore provides a unique opportunity to compare program implementation modalities
and the effect on health facility utilization across the main donors involved in health sys-
tem strengthening efforts in fragile and conflict-affected settings. The experience of South
Sudan thus provides additional lessons for future efforts to rebuild health systems.
This paper is a descriptive case-study of health system development in South Sudan
and includes an analysis of the health gains post conflict. There are two main sections; the
first section is the pre-independence period which provides a comprehensive background of
the health sector prior to the conflict and during the transition from conflict and the post-
independence period which prioritized expanding access nationwide to consolidate gains
from the transition period. The paper proceeds as follows; I first provide the history of
South Sudan during the period of conflict and the effect of the conflict on health outcomes,
after which I describe the health programs established immediately after the signing of a
comprehensive peace agreement and during the transition from relief to development. This
essentially describes the emergence of a health system, where none previously existed. I
compare results from two national surveys in 2006 and 2011 to provide estimates of the
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effect of the transition period.
I then describe the period after the independence of South Sudan in 2011, which cor-
responded to the implementation of a geographically-focused health funding architecture
with three main donors to expand access to care. This period consolidates the gains of the
transition period with the design of a health financing architecture based on lessons learned
from that period. Finally, I analyze health facility utilization data between 2011-2015 to
describe the effect of the post-independence health system expansion using key maternal
and child health indicators due to lack of national level survey data. I hypothesize that
post-independence, there was a rapid acceleration of health facility utilization that is ob-
servable using data from health facility reporting. In addition, I compare health facility
utilization across the three main donor-funding mechanisms comparing the period before
and after independence under the assumption that differences in program implementation
modalities may result in differential rates of utilization across the three programs. Un-
derstanding program specific differences in program design and implementation and their
effect on improving access to health services is critical because how programs are imple-
mented has implications for the resultant efforts to accelerate health facility utilization.
1.2 Background on South Sudan
Health services in South Sudan have primarily been provided by non-state actors with
funding from international donor agencies. There have been three distinct periods; 1) A
humanitarian phase, 1983-2005, whereby non-government organizations (NGOs) provided
ad hoc health services to individual health facilities in limited geographical areas, often
achieving highly fragmented coverage. Types of services were determined by donor prior-
ities, availability of funds, and were often based on short-term contracts (typically one to
two years); 2) A transition from relief to development phase (2005-2011) whereby contracts
were often of a longer duration (3 to 5 years), and for individual health facilities. Health
services were provided following a basic package of health and nutrition services (BPHNS)
developed by the nascent Ministry of Health (MoH). Humanitarian and developmental
assistance was provided concurrently, and was inequitably distributed hence some health
facilities received assistance from both types of donors while some facilities received no
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funding. Coverage was low, with health services reaching only 25% of the population. In
addition, there was little to no oversight from government, and the extent to which the
BPHNS was implemented remains unclear.; and 3) A third phase of consolidation (2012 to
date), whereby the health financing architecture was streamlined, geographically focused,
there was consolidation of relief and developmental assistance and the government sought
to establish greater stewardship of the health sector.
Waters et al identifies a useful health system strengthening framework for analysing
the inputs and policies of post-conflict rehabilitation programs using three inter-related ap-
proaches that cross the pre-conflict, conflict and post-conflict periods (Waters et al., 2007).
The framework (1.1) assesses the initial response to immediate health needs, the restora-
tion and establishment of a basic package of essential health services and the rehabilitation
of the health system itself.
Critically, the framework acknowledges that post-conflict reconstruction is influenced
by the pre-conflict infrastructure and health system development as well as the economic
and political context therein. Post-conflict reconstruction must therefore not only address
immediate efforts to restore basic services but also the medium to longer term goals to ad-
dress the destroyed infrastructure and interruption of services. I use the Waters framework
to describe the rebuilding of the health system in South Sudan, due to the unique history
of conflict in South Sudan which was precipitated by lack of development, the importance
of its political and economic history and the priorities of the post-conflict reconstruction
in the transition from relief to development.
1.2.1 Pre-Conflict and Conflict
Sudan gained independence from the British in 1956, after more than 55 years of colo-
nialism, during which the southern region was socially and economically underdeveloped.
The country soon entered a protracted period of conflict between the northern and southern
regions - the 1st Sudan civil war- caused by the historical underdevelopment and political
grievances among southern Sudanese, who had expected to become an independent state
(Johnson, 1994; Kasfir, 1977; WB and UN, 2005).
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Figure 1.1: A framework for post-conflict health systems rehabilitation.
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The 1st Sudan civil war lasted until 1972, ending with the Addis Ababa peace agree-
ment which established an autonomous region in the south consisting of 3 administrative
provinces; Equatoria, Bahr el Ghazal and Upper Nile. The agreement ushered a decade
of peace during which several development projects were undertaken in the south by gov-
ernment, non-governmental and international agencies. Development projects focused on
improving infrastructure and services, including health sector improvements. However,
most projects were concentrated in Equatoria with limited development in the rest of the
country (Johnson, 1994). In addition, these developmental initiatives were limited in scope
due to inadequate financial resources availed for reconstruction and development (Kasfir,
1977).
The 2nd Sudan civil war led by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army
(SPLM/A) based in the southern region, begun in 1983 and lasted until 2005. This con-
flict is estimated to have caused the deaths of over two million people and significant
destruction of the already limited infrastructure in the South. In 1989, drought and the
cumulative effect of war resulted in famine in the Bahr el-Ghazal region of Sudan, resulting
in approximately 250,000 deaths and displacing over one third of the civilian population
(Africa Watch). It also led to the first major international response to the conflict in
Sudan, Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS).
OLS started as a short-term and temporary humanitarian response to provide emer-
gency assistance and food to the famine-affected population (in both south and north
Sudan). To reach the conflict-affected population, OLS negotiated access with the actors
directly involved in the conflict; the Government of Sudan (GoS) and the SPLM/A and was
essentially a tripartite agreement between these two parties and the United Nations, led
by UNICEF. The OLS agreement was the only legal means for approximately 40 NGOs to
operate in non-government-controlled areas and was the start of a long-term engagement
in service provision by non-state actors (Bradbury et al., 2000).
Between 1986 – 2005, there was no formal administrative government in most parts of
southern Sudan, and limited to non-existent social and economic development. In 1993,
the main actors involved in OLS recognized the need for more development-oriented activ-
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ities e.g. food security, support for livelihoods and capacity-building of civic institutions,
in efforts to strengthen local involvement in the relief efforts (Macrae et al., 1997; Harmer,
2004). Capacity building was to include administrative and programmatic support to the
humanitarian wings of the key actors involved in the war, and to encourage the partici-
pation of Sudanese Indigenous NGOs (SINGOs). Concurrently, the SPLM/A formed the
Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (SRRC), with a Secretariat of Health (SoH)
as a department tasked with the responsibility of overseeing the provision of health services
in areas controlled by the SPLM/A2. This was effectively the first attempt to regulate the
health sector.
1.2.2 Effect on the health system
Between 1983-2005, basic health services were largely non-existent for over 80% of
the population; health services provided by the Government of Sudan (GoS) was limited
to 11 garrison towns3 and covered a mere 14% of all health facilities in the southern re-
gion (Cometto et al., 2010). Remaining health facilities in SPLM/A controlled areas, were
managed by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) with humanitarian funding primarily
from USAID (through the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the European
Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), the United Kingdom’s Department for In-
ternational Development (DFID) and the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation
(NORAD). Funding was primarily short-term (1-2years), with NGOs typically serving over-
lapping catchment areas, had limited geographic scope (NGOs were mainly concentrated
in areas that were less hard-to-reach and less affected by conflict) and were organized by
vertical or disease specific programs (Cometto et al., 2010; Rietveld and Waldman, 2006).
By 2003, there were an estimated 19 hospitals, 103 primary health care centers (PHCCs)
and 551 primary health care units (PHCUs) in SPLM/A controlled areas whereas in the
garrison towns, there were approximately 10 hospitals and 20 health centers. Most health
facilities had inadequate capacity for providing basic or comprehensive health services (Ri-
2The SoH evolved to become the Ministry of Health of the Government of Southern Sudan
(MoH GoSS) in 2005
311 small- and medium-sized towns in southern Sudan, including Juba the southern capital,
and controlled by Khartoum throughout the war
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etveld and Waldman, 2006; WB and UN, 2005). There was also considerable geographical
inequity in the distribution of health facilities; the majority were in the Equatoria region
and the fewest in the Bahr el Ghazal region. Some rural areas had one health facility per
75,000 people, whereas in Bahr el Ghazal there were as many as 160,000 people per health
facility (Rietveld and Waldman, 2006).
In 2005, 20% of the health facilities in the southern region were non-functional either
due to lack of staff, lack of infrastructure (many facilities were nothing more than tra-
ditional huts), and lack of essential equipment and commodities. In more isolated areas
over 40% of health facilities were non-functional. Of the functional facilities, only 35%
provided immunization services, less than 20% had laboratories and 50% experienced reg-
ular drug stock-outs. Only about 44% of the population lived within a 5 km radius of a
health facility and utilization rate was estimated at less than 0.2 contacts per person per
year (Cometto et al., 2010; Rajkotia and Pressman, 2007). Indeed, by 2005, less than 25%
of the population had access to some form of health services. The southern region also
had an acute shortage of skilled health workers; approximately 3,600 health workers with
nine-months training, 36 doctors, 200 clinical officers and 670 nurses. For a population of
approximately 8 million people, the limited skilled workforce (doctors, clinical officers and
nurses) resulted in an estimated physician-population ratio of 0.5 per 100,000 (Rietveld
and Waldman, 2006).
During this period, there was limited access to health data to assess the health status
of the conflict-affected population. Table 1.1 shows the best known estimates drawn from
several sources including UN and WHO estimates and communicable disease surveillance
reports, and provides a comparison with the more reliable national (Sudan) average. As
expected, southerners had poor health status; coverage of diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus
vaccines was at 15% of the population compared to 78% nationwide, infant and under-five
mortality was estimated at 140 and 250 deaths per 1,000 live births compared to 62 and 90
for Sudan and maternal mortality was estimated at 2,037 per 100,000 live births compared
to 590.
Using the six WHO health system building blocks (leadership and governance, service
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delivery, health system financing, health workforce, medical products, vaccine and technol-
ogy and health information systems), one can argue that the southern region essentially had
no health system prior to 2005. Government involvement in the health sector was limited
to the garrison towns and limited to only 30 health facilities or approximately 14% of all
health facilities. The remaining 86% of health services were delivered by non-governmental
actors in highly fragmented and disease-specific humanitarian interventions with limited
coordination by United Nations agencies (Cometto et al., 2010). Service provision focused
on primary health care (e.g. immunization and nutrition) and specific communicable dis-
eases, there was no centralized mechanism for the purchase of drugs and supplies, and
limited health workforce training. Lastly, there was no national health status data in
the southern region; existing baseline data are drawn from a variety of sources which are
restricted in geographical scope. The transition period therefore was an opportunity to
establish a functioning health system.
Table 1.1: Key health and socio-economic and health indicators, Southern Sudan
Sudan Southern Sudan Sub-Sahara Africa (avg)
Key health indicators
Population (million) 38 8- 12 million (estimate) 15
Life expectancy at birth (years) 57 42* 48.45
Physicians (per 100,000 population) 2 0.5 2
DPT3 coverage 78% 15% 67%**
Under 5 mortality rate (per 1,000) 90 250 151
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000) 62 150 93
Measles immunization (% 12-23 months) 67 25 n/a
Maternal mortality rate (per 100,000 live births) 590 2,037 855
Fertility rate 4.2 6.7* 5.19
Births assisted by skilled attendant 57% 6% 51.70%
Socio-economic indicators
Annual population growth (%) 2.1 3 (2003)*
Urban population (%) 24 2% (2003)*
Poverty rate (%) 60-75 90 (2003)*
School enrollment, primary (%) 60.4 20 (2000)**
Primary school completion (grades 1-5), total (%) 49.7 28 (2000)**
Ratio of girls to boys in primary school 89 40 (2003)**
Literacy rate, adult total (% 15 years and over) 60.9 (2000) 31.0**
: Sources health indicators: (MOH/GoSS, UNICEF 2006, World Bank 2006, UNICEF 2007, WHO 2006a) and National Health Assembly presen-
tations *SPLM, MoH/GoSS, USAID, JSI (2006), **WHO/AFRO
Sources socio-economic: WHO Core Health Indicators (2007), latest data, except where noted. * MoH/GoSS (2007). ** SPLM and The New
Sudan Centre for Statistics and Evaluation (2004)
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1.3 The Comprehensive Peace Agreement transi-
tion period
In 2005, a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan’s National Congress
Party (NCP) and the SPLM/A ended the longest running conflict in Africa. The CPA
provided for a six-year interim period during which governance in Sudan would consist of a
Government of National Unity (GNU) based in Khartoum, Sudan and a semi-autonomous
region in the south, administered by the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) (CPA
2005). The transition period would allow for a redress of the historical inequities in eco-
nomic and social development between the north and south, prior to a referendum in
Southern Sudan to determine the future relationship; continued unity of Sudan or seces-
sion and establishment of a separate state.
The GoSS established state-level governments and legislative chambers where previ-
ously none existed in a decentralized governance structure that accorded to the Dili decla-
ration and formalized in the CPA and the 2005 Interim Constitution of Southern Sudan.
Southern Sudan consisted of 10 States4 79 counties, 514 administrative payams and 2,159
bomas5. The health system was also decentralized, with a central/national ministry of
health, state ministries of health and county health departments (Ministry of Health Re-
public of South Sudan, 2010).
The CPA protocol on wealth sharing6 provided for equal sharing of oil-revenues, the
main source of income in the south and this amounted to approximately US$ 7 billion for
the GoSS. The CPA also established the Southern Sudan Reconstruction and Development
Fund (SSRDF) for the reconstruction and rehabilitation in the south and a Multi-Donor
Trust Fund for Southern Sudan (MDTF-SS) administered by the World Bank and into
which 14 major donors pooled funds to support the SSRDF. MDTF-SS would support
priority areas of capacity building, institutional strengthening and quick start/impact pro-
4 Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr el Ghazal, Western
Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile
5 Bomas are the smallest administrative unit in government, consisting of clusters of households
or villages; several bomas form a payam, and several payams form a county (and so forth)
6chapter 3 - Wealth Sharing Protocol, clause 15.5
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grams to include health, water and education sectors. External contributions into the
MDTF was US$526 million with the GoSS committing to spending 2$ for every 1$ of
donor funding. However, as almost 98% of the government revenue was derived from oil,
making South Sudan the most oil-dependent economy in the world, government funding
was entirely dependent on a single volatile commodity, which had implications for longer-
term planning.
1.3.1 Establishing a health system in the transition period
The Secretariat of Health (SoH) established during OLS was formally incorporated as
the Ministry of Health (MOH- GoSS) in 2005 and an Interim Health Policy (IHP) was
developed. The IHP outlined the structure and key functions of the Ministry of Health
which was decentralized to four levels; central, state, county and community. Primary
healthcare was endorsed as the cornerstone for the health system ( MoH, GoSS, 2007).
The central MoH was to provide overall stewardship and guidance to the health sector and
had primary responsibility for setting health sector policies and guidelines, monitoring and
evaluation, and health financing and partner coordination to facilitate the transition from
humanitarian to developmental assistance. The MoH was also responsible for supervising
ten State Ministries of Health (SMoH) with the SMoHs supervising the 79 county health
departments (CHDs). County health departments directly supervised the primary health
care centers (PHCCs), primary health care units (PHCUs) and health services provided at
the community level.
Despite delineated roles for state and county-level structures, these were virtually non-
existent in practice. In addition, at the central level, MoH-GoSS severely lacked the capac-
ity to provide stewardship to a health sector which consisted of more than six UN agencies,
WHO, the World Bank, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS, TB and Malaria (GFATM), bi-
lateral donors (USAID, DFID and NORAD), humanitarian aid partners (USAID/OFDA,
DFID, ECHO) and over 70 NGOs. The central MoH had between 5-20 staff, limited to
non-existent management systems and inadequate capacity for administering financial re-
sources (Cometto et al., 2010). This effectively meant that WHO and the World Bank
played a fiduciary role, developing the three main documents that influenced the IHP;
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World Bank/UN Joint Assessment Mission “Framework for Sustained Peace, Development
and Poverty Eradication (JAM, 2005), World Bank/AFTH7 “Sudan Health Status Report”
(World Bank, 2003), and WHO’s Health Sector Recovery Strategic Framework (WHO,
2003) and the World Bank managed the MDTF.
WHO and the World Bank recommended investment in financial and management sys-
tems, human resources and infrastructure and contracting NGOs to deliver health services.
Given that NGOs had provided the bulk of health services during the period of conflict,
contracting-out was the only feasible model for expanding health services. However, given
that CHDs were directly responsible for the implementation of the basic package of health
services (BPHS), this also effectively meant that CHDs would have direct oversight of
over 70 local and international NGOs managing the health facilities, despite being poorly
staffed, and lacking in technical capacity. As noted in Waters et al. this meant that while
in principle, the government retained oversight of the policy and planning process despite
not providing any services, it might also suggest that the government could have been
bypassed by donors contracting directly with NGOs due to the insufficient capacity.
1.3.2 Basic Package of Health and Nutrition Services (BPHS)
The Basic Package of Health and Nutrition Services (BPHS) was developed as a
medium-term strategy to guide implementation of the Interim Health Policy (IHP) and
as the basis of service-delivery contracts with NGOs (BPHS, 2009). The development of
a basic package of health services as the mechanism to align government priorities, donor
financing and to prioritize health services delivery was initially developed in Afghanistan
(Roberts et al., 2008; Newbrander et al., 2011) and was adapted to the southern Sudan
context. Thus, South Sudan’s package closely mirrors Afghanistan’s in prioritizing mater-
nal and newborn health, immunization and integrated management of childhood illnesses
(IMCI). To improve access and quality of services, the BPHS delineated the following key
objectives; i) to increase access to primary healthcare services from 25% to 50% by 2010; ii)
to improve the quality of care through the delivery of specified norms and standards of ser-
vices; iii) to strengthen the management of health services through capacity strengthening
7Africa Region Technical Human Development Unit 3
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for State Ministries of Health, County Health Departments, and Payam Health Depart-
ments.
Southern Sudan Umbrella Program for Health System Development (UPHSD)
The Southern Sudan Umbrella Program for Health System Development (UPHSD) was
established under MDTF-SS to provide financial and technical support to the Ministry of
Health by developing core health sector systems and capacities, and to rapidly expand
access to basic health services and high impact interventions (World Bank IEG, 2012,
2013). The UPHSD was initially designed as a three-phased, 3-year US$225 million project
operative in all 10 states, with donors financing US$75 million and the GOSS US$150
million, as per the 2 to 1 ratio of domestic to international funding that underpinned the
MDTF. Phase I was estimated to cost US$60 but the government only provided US$28
million of its US$40 million obligation due to volatility in oil prices, while donor funding
increased to US$32 million to meet the gap in financing.
Phase II & III were combined into one US$63 million8 project, (UPHSD-II) covering
only 6 counties in the 4 states of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and Eastern
Equatoria. These counties were selected as a result of delays in the disbursement of MDTF-
SS funds and difficulty in attracting competitive bids from NGOs which delayed contracts
with NGOs. The first contracts were signed in 2009 with IMA World Health (Upper Nile
and Jonglei), Norwegian People’s Aid (Central Equatoria) and Health and Life Sciences
Partnership in Eastern Equatoria, a delay of almost 3 years. The reduction in funding
further restricted the geographical scope of the two projects, to the 6 counties.
Therefore, health sector funding under MDTF decreased from a planned US$225 million
to US$131 million. This had implications for the implementation of the BPHS; funding for
contracting with NGOs to implement the BPHS, fell from a planned US$28.8 to US$12.6
million under UPHSD I, although disbursements for high impact interventions delivered
through community programs (e.g. mass campaigns for measles immunization and vitamin
A supplementation, distribution of long-lasting insecticide bed nets, distribution of potable
8An additional US$7 million was later approved for procurement of drugs and US$ 1.5 million
as contingent funds and for procurement of ARVs, resulting in a final total of US$71.5 million
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water treatment products and community-based treatment of malaria, pneumonia and
diarrhoea) increased from US$8.4 to US$11.9 million. Funding to improve the capacity of
the Ministry of Health at the central, state, and county levels decreased from US$4.5 to
US$0.2 million. By the end of UPHSD I, the national ministry had successfully developed a
health sector strategy and other policies and established eleven directorates, but there was
inadequate capacity at state and county level. UPHSD also successfully piloted a national
health information system- the district health information system database (DHIS) that
was later expanded to all ten states.
Among the program achievements noted in evaluations of UPSHD were forty primary
health facilities rehabilitated (half of the target), training of 235 mid-cadre staff and 18
doctors provided with scholarships for surgery training in phase I. Phase II prioritized short-
term training for health workers, most lasting one-week. Therefore, notwithstanding the
low number of skilled health workers in the country, there were limited long-term training
opportunities to increase the number and quality of skilled health workers, despite initial
ambitious targets to train approximately 23,000 new health workers (Cometto et al., 2010).
An additional limitation noted was inadequate capacity of NGOs to implement the BPHS
in addition to low capacity of the MoH itself to oversee the implementation process.
UPHSD was intended to consolidate health programs from the OLS period and to be
the primary mechanism to build and strengthen the South Sudan health system. However,
due to the delays noted above, several developmental partners formed other mechanisms to
support the health sector, contributing to the fragmentation of the health system. These
mechanisms included the Basic Services Fund (2005-2008) established by DFID and sup-
ported by Canada, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the European Union, as a short-
term bridging fund for service delivery and a USAID-funded Sudan Health Transformation
Project (SHTP) which was implemented in two phases.
The Basic Services Fund (BSF)
The Basic Services Fund (BSF) was established in 2005 as a short-term bridging fund to
facilitate the transition from relief and humanitarian programs prior to the establishment
of the MDTF (Johnson et al., 2013). The BSF had three main programs implemented
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through contracts with NGOs; education, health (health facility construction and rehabil-
itation, health worker training and provision of basic health services) and water (provision
of improved water facilities and community-based environmental health and water man-
agement).
BSF was projected to run until 2008, but due to delays in the start of MDTF-SS, it was
extended until 2010 and finally, to 2011 due to financial and capacity constraints of the
GoSS and uncertainty surrounding MDTF funding. BSF was operational in 35 counties,
supporting 37 NGOs who were responsible for 121 health facilities in total. BSF also
constructed 57 additional health facilities. NGOs supported individual health facilities as
opposed to entire counties and it is unclear the mechanism under which the facilities were
selected. BSF also prioritized short-term training for health-workers and thus did little to
contribute to increasing the number of qualified health workers in southern Sudan. Similar
to the UPHSD, there was limited capacity-building for the state ministries of health and
county health departments.
Sudan Health Transformation Project (SHTP)
SHTP-I was a 5-year US$39.5 project implemented between 2004-2009 which pro-
vided primary health services through grants to international NGOs in 6 counties9 and
to strengthen the capacity of county health departments and state MoH to manage the
health system (Neuse et al., 2008). NGOs were responsible for implementing seven high
impact interventions10 in 99 health facilities. There was, however, limited capacity de-
velopment of the state MoH and county health departments, and the program mainly
supported short-term training for health workers.
SHTP-II was US$ 58.5 million project funded over 3 and 1/2 -years (2009-12) to support
166 health facilities across 14 counties in the 10 states in provision of the seven high
impact services from SHPT I11. The project included funding to improve the county-
health department’s management of the health system by working with the CHDs to
9 It was originally planned to cover 20 counties.
10immunizations, Vitamin A, antenatal care (ANC), treatment of diarrheal disease with oral re-
hydration therapy (ORT), Long-Lasting Insecticide Treated Bed Nets (LLITNs), case management
of malaria, and case management of acute respiratory infection (ARI)
11I worked for SHTP-II between 2011-2012
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develop county health plans and budgets and conduct joint supervision visits (Hughes and
Ali, 2008). The program utilized a performance-based contracting (PBC) approach that
was based on financial incentive on achievement of targets, with a penalty on NGOs for
failing to do so.
The SHTP-II final evaluation found that NGOs were primarily motivated to achieve
targets to maintain their reputations and only smaller NGOs that had limited sources of
funding were motivated by the financial necessity to cover operating costs. NGOs with
other sources of funding reported that PBC made little difference in the quality of their
programming. This suggests that the PBC program may have had limited effect and in
addition may have primarily penalized smaller NGOs. For example, for NGOs with fewer
sources of funding, the penalty may have reduced their operating capacity and further
exacerbated their ability to meet their targets. PBC bonuses were also not paid to project
staff, health service providers or community-based volunteers who were directly responsible
for meeting the targets. Toward the end of the project, the penalty was dropped from the
PBC scheme. As with other programs, SHTP-II did not prioritize training new health
workers, and instead conducted short-term training.
Table 1.2: USAID / OFDA / ECHO / BSF support as of December
2010
(All costs in USD) Grand Total BSF SHTP II OFDA ECHO
Annual total 48.5m 18.1m 12.9m 10.3m 7.1m
Primary health facilities supported (N=962) 544 193 164 161 26
Primary care facilities supported (%, n:962)* 57% 20% 17% 17% 3%
Estimated beneficiaries served* 4.8m 1.7m 1.4m 1.4m 0.23m
No. of counties 35 15 26 10
Notes: *Modelled on proportion of total clinics served applied to total population 8.5m Source: MoH health facility
mapping survey
1.3.3 Health and demographic indicators
The first Sudan Health and Household Survey (SSHS-I) was conducted in 2006 and was
the first ever national assessment of the health status of the southern region. The main ob-
jective of the survey was to “collect core baseline social indicators for the principle purpose
of informing public policy formulation and planning; and providing a starting point from
which progress towards MDGs and other quality of life indicators can be measured (SHHS,
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2006).” Due to lack of census and geographical data in the southern region, population
estimates were based on the World Health Organization’s list of villages and population
estimates from the National Immunization Days (NIDs) campaign.
The second survey, SHHS-II was conducted in 2010 to measure progress of the CPA
period with subsequent surveys planned for 2013 and 2016. The sample for SHHS-II
was based on population estimates from the census conducted in 2008. SHHS-II noted
disparities in the population composition compared to the first SHHS specifically, under-
reporting of children aged 0-4 years, and women 15-49 years. While this makes it difficult
to directly compare the SHHS-I to SHHS-II, the results do provide a useful estimate of
progress made during the transition period. The Southern region population was estimated
at 8.26 million, covering an area of 644,329 square kilometers, with 83% living in rural areas.
Population density varied from 3.7 to 25.6 per sq. km. Over 72% of the population was
below age 30, with 51% under 18 years, and 16% under 5 years (SSNBS, 2009).
SHHS-I confirmed the dire condition of southerners; only 16% of children had ever
attended primary school, less than a third the national average. Primary school completion
was one of the lowest in the world at 2%, with a female completion rate of 0.8% (lower even
than Afghanistan when it was under Taliban rule) and only 3% mean secondary school net
attendance ratio. Adult literacy was 27%, with a female literacy rate of 16% and youth
literacy of 31%. The SHHS estimates that only 2.5% of women aged 15-24 years of age
were literate, compared to national average of 45.8%. In terms of water and sanitation,
48.3% of the population had access to improved sources of drinking water 12 with 6.4%
using improved sanitation facilities and over 80% lacking access to any toilet facility. Water
and sanitation improved during the 5 years of the transition period with use of improved
sources of drinking water increasing to 68% and improved sanitation facilities to 15.4% by
2010.
The maternal mortality ratio (MMR) in 2006 was 2,054 deaths per 100,000 live births,
one of the highest in the world, and almost double the Sudan average of 1,107 per 100,000
live births. MMR varied widely across the 10 states, for example Western Equatoria
12Piped water (into dwelling, yard or plot), public tap/standpipe, tube-well/borehole, protected
well, protected spring, and rainwater collection
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(2,327), Lakes (2,243), and Western Bahr El Ghazal (2,216), compared to Central Equa-
toria (1,867), Eastern Equatoria (1,844) and the lowest rate in Unity State (1732). MMR
was not estimated in SHHS-II. In 2006, only 26% of pregnant women received any form
of antenatal care in the two years preceding the survey; antenatal care coverage improved
by 3.8% to 30% by 2010. In 2006, a meagre 10% of births were attended by a skilled
health-provider, over 36% were assisted by a relative or friend and 30% of mothers gave
birth without any attendant whatsoever. By 2010 however, skilled attendant deliveries im-
proved to 14.7% but overall, deliveries at health facilities (regardless of attendant health
worker) decreased by 1.3% from 13.6% to 12.3% comparing 2006 to 2010. This suggests
that more women delivering in a health facility were seen by a skilled birth attendant
despite a slight decrease in women choosing to deliver in the health facility. Overall, these
results show limited progress in improving reproductive health care coverage during the
transition period
In 2005, infant and under-five mortality was estimated at 102 and 135 per 1,000 live
births respectively. The under-five mortality rate was approximately 25% higher than
the Sudan estimate of 101.6 deaths per 1000 live births, and 7% higher than UNICEF
estimates for Sub-Saharan Africa (120.8) for the same year. This also varied widely across
the country; under-5 mortality rate was 192.1 in Western Equatoria, 175.6 in Warrap, 141.4
in Central Equatoria and lowest in Unity State (82.2). In SHHS-II, childhood mortality
estimates were calculated using direct estimation methods instead of the Brass and Coale
indirect estimation methods used in the 2006 survey. Thus the 2010 survey provides
estimates of proportion of children dying computed from respondents’ birth histories, while
the 2006 estimates probabilities of dying by exact ages of childhood. Neonatal mortality
was estimated at 43 per 1,000 live births, infant mortality was 79 per 1,000 and under-five
mortality was 108 per 1,000 live births in the 5 years preceding the survey. This represented
an increase from the period 5-9 years preceding the 2010 survey where neonatal mortality,
infant mortality and under five mortality was estimated at 29, 55 and 84 deaths per 1,000
live births respectively. While this may be affected by recall bias, it may also suggest that
the health status of children under five worsened comparing the period ten years, to five
years prior.
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Table 1.3: Early Childhood Mortality Rates, South Sudan
Survey Neonatal mortality Infant mortality Under-five mortality
2006 SHHS (indirect) 52 102 135.3
2010 SHHS (direct)
2006 - 2010 43 79 108
2001 - 2005 29 55 84
1996 - 2000 33 75 121
The leading causes of deaths among children under-five in Sub-Saharan Africa include
complications during pregnancy exacerbated by limited access to skilled health providers,
infectious diseases including malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoea as well as deaths caused
by vaccine preventable diseases (Black et al., 2010), with inadequate nutrition being an
underlying factor. In 2006, only 21% of children were exclusively breastfed in the first six
months of life, improving to 45.1% by 2010. Overall however, the nutritional status of chil-
dren remained poor; proportion of children who were moderately and severely underweight
was 32.8% in 2006 and 30.3% in 2010, 33.4% were moderately and severely stunted in 2006
compared to 25% in 2010 and 22% compared to 21% had moderate or severe wasting in
2006 compared to 2010. This also varied regionally. In 2010 for example, for severely un-
derweight children Unity State reported the highest levels (22%), Western Bahr El Ghazal
(18%), Upper Nile and Jonglei (17%) and Central Equatoria and Lakes had the lowest
levels (5% and 6% respectively).
Prevalence of the three major causes of childhood morbidity and mortality in the two
weeks preceding the survey was high; malaria (45.5%), diarrhoea (42.9%) and pneumonia
(13.6%) in 2006 compared to 32% with malaria, 34.4% with diarrhoea and 31.7% with
suspected pneumonia in 2010. In 2010, among those with malaria, diarrhoea and pneu-
monia, 9%, 22.7% and 32%, received treatment. Southern Sudan also lagged in the goal
to immunize at least 80% of children to achieve herd immunity; the proportion of children
fully immunized13 was 2.7% in 2006 and 1.8% in 2010, while the proportion of children who
did not receive any vaccinations increased from 42.5% to 46% between 2006 and 2010. For
specific vaccines, immunization coverage seems to have dropped between 2006 and 2010;
13Children aged 12-23 months receiving BCG, DPT 1-3, OPV 1-3 and measles vaccines before
their first birthday
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the proportion of children with tuberculosis immunization was 43%, compared to 35%,
polio immunization dropped from 25% to 14%, DPT immunization from 20% to 14% and
measles immunization from 28% to 21% comparing 2006 to 2010. These reductions may be
as a result of the differences in how the samples were selected in both surveys, but they are
also indicative of the lack of progress in expanding immunization coverage overall. Table
1.4 compares selected indicators from SHHS-I and SHHS-II.
Table 1.4: Comparison of select indicators, SHHS 2006
2010.
Indicator SHHS 2006 SHHS 2010
Population, millions (census 2009) 8.26
Literacy rate among women 2.5% 14.5%
Primary school net attendance ratio, female (adjusted) 15.8% 16.7%
Mortality
Maternal mortality ratio (per 100,000) 2054
Under-five mortality rate (per 1000 live births 135 106
Infant mortality rate 102 84
Water and Sanitation
Use of improved drinking water sources 48.3% 68.0%
Water treatment 13.1% 9.9%
Use of improved sanitation facilities 6.4% 15.4%
Reproductive Health
Antenatal care coverage (by skilled attendant)* 26.2% 30.0%
Antenatal care coverage (4+ visits) 9.5%
Skilled attendant at delivery 10.0% 14.7%
Institutional deliveries 13.6% 12.3%
Deliveries at home 87.0%
Exclusive breast-feeding 21.2% 45.1%
Nutrition
Underweight prevalence (moderate and severe) 32.8% 30.3%
Underweight prevalence (severe) 14.1% 12.0%
Stunting prevalence (moderate and severe) 33.4% 25.0%
Stunting prevalence (severe) 18.0% 13.8%
Wasting prevalence (moderate and severe) 21.9% 20.9%
Wasting prevalence (severe) 7.0% 7.6%
Exclusive breastfeeding under 6 months 21.2% 45.1%
Child Health
DPT immunization coverage (12-23 months) 20.2% 13.8%
Measles immunization coverage (12-23 months) 27.7% 20.6%
Fully immunized children** 2.7% 1.8%
Proportion children U5 who had diarrhoea 42.9% 34.4%
Oral rehydration therapy with continued feeding 57.7% 22.7%
Proportion children who had cough 13.6% 31.7%
Antibiotic treatment of suspected pneumonia 31.6%
Proportion children U5 who had fever- malaria 45.5% 32.0%
Anti-malarial treatment of children under age 5 47.0% 9.0%
*Skilled attendant namely doctor, midwife, or nurse-midwife **Children aged 12-23 months receiving
BCG, DPT 1-3, OPV 1-3 and measles vaccines before their first birthday
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1.3.4 Summary of the transition period
Using the Water’s framework, we can summarize that while there was political commit-
ment to building the health system in South Sudan, limited government capacity effectively
meant that the government may have had limited influence over donor coordination. The
out-sourcing of management of the MDTF also meant that government had limited control
over health sector financing. While financial resources increased compared to the conflict
period, reductions in planned commitments limited the extent to which the BPHS could
have been implemented, which also had an impact on strengthening state and county
ministries of health. Delays in MDTF-SS may also have contributed to the continued
fragmentation of the health sector with the creation of additional mechanisms for health
services delivery. In addition, during this period, humanitarian programs continued in
parallel, for example the Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Euro-
pean Commission Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO), which funded health facilities in 36
counties, providing US$ 10.3million and 7.1 million respectively.
All three funding mechanisms, MDTF, BSF and USAID utilized local and international
NGOs for implementation of the BPHS, effectively building the capacity of NGOs, noted
as a limitation in Water’s et al.. As NGOs delivered services to specific geographical areas,
service delivery remained a “patchwork of programs offered through different channels"
(Waters et al., 2007). The Ministry of Finance estimated that during the transition period
27% (n=21) of the counties in South Sudan did not receive any external financing at
all while some facilities received funding from more than one donor, further exacerbating
existing geographical inequities (MoFEP, 2012).
One of the key inputs of the health system is human resources for health. Despite the
existing health-worker shortages, none of the programs invested in training new health-
workers, and instead relied on short-term in-service training. The information system
was however established with the district health information system (DHIS) funded by
MDTF-SS. As tt was initially used by health facilities in the MDTF counties, with slower
uptake in other counties, it is difficult to do a comparative assessment of routine health
facility utilization across all programs during this period. Lastly, while all three programs
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prioritized strengthening the capacity of the state MoH and county health departments to
manage and provide oversight to the health facilities, there was limited capacity-building
overall.
It is therefore not surprising that by 2011, the contracting approach had relatively few
successes in improving health outcomes and might have resulted in increased fragmentation
of the health system. The experience of health system reconstruction during the transition
period indicates that while contracting can be a successful approach for rapidly expanding
services in post-conflict countries, this success is dependent on how it is implemented and
the capacity of the implementing partners that is donors, the government and NGOs.
During the post-independence period, some of the lessons of the transition period were
applied to the design of a health system architecture.
1.4 Post-Independence Period
Southern Sudan gained independence from Sudan on 9th July 2011, after a referendum
on self-determination where southern Sudanese overwhelmingly voted to become a sepa-
rate country. During the referendum campaigns, the SPLM/A raised expectations of the
people, promising a period of renewed focus on nation-building, basic services provision,
infrastructural development and resource distribution. The health sector was identified
as one of the key priority areas for development, and a Health Sector Development Plan
(HSDP) covering 2011-2015 developed (SSHSDP, 2010). The HSDP provides the strategic
direction for the health sector and has the overall objective of expanding coverage and uti-
lization of health services, improving the quality of services and strengthening the health
system overall. The HSDP further identified a common set of indicators to track progress
across all partners working in the health sector, aligned with MoH goals and priorities,
to include support for capacity-building of the MoH at central, state and county level to
strengthen the government’s ability to manage the health system.
The cost of implementing the HSDP was estimated to be SDG 5.1 billion/US$1.814 over
the 5-year period, with costs allocated to operational costs, capital costs and governance
14Exchange Rate: 1USD =2.9 SDG
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and management costs. It also included costs for infrastructure development of new and
existing health facilities. The GoSS estimated that 11% (SDG 392 million/US$135 million)
of the total cost of the HSDP would be apportioned to health system strengthening and
capacity-building of the MoH, to strengthen its ability to oversee the health system. For the
first time, the government would gradually take over payment of all health-worker salaries
(estimated to cost SDG 221 million/US$76 million) and procurement of pharmaceuticals
and medical supplies, whereas this was done by specific donor-funded programs during the
transition period. In addition, increasing the human resource base was prioritized with
SDG 12 million/US$ 4 million allocated for development of training facilities and SDG
50 million/ US$17 million for external recruitment of especially nurses and midwives to
reduce critical staffing gaps in the health system.
1.4.1 Contracting out Intervention in South Sudan
To harmonize and coordinate financial and technical assistance to the health sector, the
GoSS established a geographically focused aid financing architecture in 2012 with three
service delivery projects financed by USAID, the World Bank and a DFID-led Health
Pooled Fund (MoFEP, 2012). Unlike during the transition period, the government did not
commit funds to the primary health care system, limiting its support to the secondary and
tertiary sector. This may have had implications on the ability of the government to assert
control of the health sector at the primary level.
The three donor partners were to fund specific states in a county-wide contracting
approach (instead of contracting NGOs to support individual health facilities, as during
the transition period) to reduce overlap in funding and ensure that all health facilities across
the country received technical and financial support. This was to address the inequitable
funding during the transition period where some counties and health facilities received
neither technical nor financial support. The BPHS was also revised and streamlined, and
an agreement reached with the donors on a minimum ‘essential’ package of services that
formed the basis of service-delivery contracts with NGOs. The contracting approach was
closely modelled on Afghanistan’s; with the same donors (the World Bank, USAID and a
consortium of primarily European Union donors) involved in funding the health system,
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the geographically focused approach, and contracting to NGOs to deliver the BPHS in
defined geographic areas of operation (Newbrander et al., 2011).
Three health programs were established; the World Bank Rapid Results for Health
Project (RRHP) (World Bank, 2012), DFID-led Health Pooled Fund (HPF) (DFID, 2012)
and USAID’s Integrated Service Delivery Program (ISDP) (Jhpiego, 2012) as observed in
table 1.5.
Table 1.5: Geographically-Focused Financing
RRHP ISDP HPF
Donor World Bank USAID DFID-UK, EU, AusAID,CIDA, SIDA
Total funds US$28 US$85 US$186
Population (millions) 2.7 2.0 5.1
Per-capita* US$4.9 US$8.5 US$10.4
Counties 24 16 40





Notes: *Estimated based on the population in the states in 2012.
All 3 programs are managed by international NGOs (hereby referred to as lead agen-
cies), which provide technical and financial oversight of the health programs on behalf of
the MoH at the state level and which subsequently contract local and international NGOs
to directly manage the health facilities at the county level. This essentially resulted in a
three-tiered health system. The programs varied in terms of population, health infrastruc-
ture, and baseline health status as well as per capita funding for health. In addition, some
states and counties have also been more conflict-affected than others after independence.
Understanding whether this variation was accounted for in the design and funding of the
health programs is critical as this has implications in reducing health inequities that have
persisted from the conflict and post-conflict transition period.
Rapid Results for Health Project (RRHP)
The World Bank provided US$ 28 million to establish the rapid results for health
project (RRHP), for the 24 counties of Upper Nile and Jonglei States, which were previously
funded by the MDTF-SS. The RHHP contract was a fixed-price contract between the MoH
and the lead agency selected to manage the project, IMA World Health. Unique to the
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three health programs, project funds were directly managed by the Ministry of Finance
and Economic Planning (MoFEP) through a project financial management unit (PFMU).
The RHHP consisted of 2 key components; delivery of high impact primary healthcare
services (US$ 23 million) and capacity development of the MoH though strengthening
grant and project management capacity and strengthening monitoring and evaluation at
the national level (US$ 5 million) (World Bank, 2012). Upper Nile and Jonglei are the two
largest and most populous states, with estimated populations of 1,135,682 and 1,589,377
respectively, based on 2012 mid-year projections from the 2008 South Sudan Census. The
RRHP therefore covers 2.7 million people, 27% of the population of South Sudan, a direct
per capita spending for health – excluding the US$5 million- of US$ 4.05 and USD$ 4.93
inclusive, the lowest among the three health programs.
Upper Nile and Jonglei, despite being contiguous states vary; the literacy rate among
15-24-year old’s is 65% in Upper Nile but only 25% in Jonglei. Populations in both states
have limited access to health facilities, with 54% and 73% of the population in Upper Nile
and Jonglei respectively living more than 30 minutes from the nearest health facility. Upper
Nile and Jonglei are also the most conflict affected states in South Sudan; there have been
frequent inter-ethnic clashes and outbreaks of violence primarily affecting Jonglei State
since 2011. As a result, none of the other donors were willing to operate in the two states,
according to the World Bank (World Bank, 2012). This suggests that there would be
difficulty attracting NGOs to the two states, potentially limiting the competitiveness of
the contract bidding process. While this may be an issue, it is worth noting that lead
agency selected for the RHHP has the most experience working in South Sudan, having
worked in Upper Nile and Jonglei state since 2008, under the MDTF. This experience
may mean that IMA is better adapted to the context and has developed mechanisms for
successful implementation even in a conflict-affected area of the country and has existing
partnerships with NGOs from the MDTF.
Of the three partners, the RHHP has unique implementation modalities for example
performance-based contracting to provide bonuses to contractors and performance-based
financing at the health facility level to increase the motivation of health providers in sev-
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eral counties. The RHHP also contracts with the MoH county health departments in select
counties, a contracting-in approach that had not been utilized in South Sudan. The RHHP
project also has the most developed health management information system (HMIS) sys-
tem, with electronic submission of results to the DHIS from the counties which started
with funding from the UPHSD. The RRHP thus has the potential to exceed expectations,
despite the lower per capita spending in health, and the contextual challenges. It also
provides a unique opportunity to assess the different contracting approaches (performance-
based contracting and contracting with a government agency versus an NGO), in future
research.
Integrated Service Delivery Program (ISDP)
USAID established the US$85 million Integrated Service Delivery Program (ISDP),
a five-year program covering 16 counties in Central Equatoria State (CES) and Western
Equatoria State (WES). ISDP started in June 2012, and the lead agency was Jhpiego15,
which had no prior experience in South Sudan. The populations in Central Equatoria
and Western Equatoria in 2012 were 1, 302, 446 and 697, 814 respectively, thus the ISDP
covered a total population of approximately 2 million people, or 20% of the population.
Estimated per capita spending for the ISDP is US$8.5 per annum.
The USAID program consolidated health programs supported under SHTP-II, BSF,
and OFDA in the two states. The primary objectives of the ISDP was to increase access to
high-quality primary health care services, developing training and supportive supervision
mechanisms at the facility level, staffing health facilities, and improving community-based
delivery of maternal, child, and new-born health care services. Health services delivery
would be implemented by NGOs, in a similar model to that used in SHTP-II but did
not include performance-based contracting. NGOs were expected to progressively expand
support to all health facilities in their counties and were thus not expected to support all
health facilities in the county at the start of the project. The project also had no explicit
objective of strengthening the capacity of state and county ministries of health.
15 I was hired by Jhpiego/ISDP at the start of the project (June 2012) and was the quality
advisor until August 2014.
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The two states have been relatively peaceful since independence and due to the rela-
tively high per capita spending for health, I assume that the ISDP program should have the
highest acceleration in health facility utilization across the three programs. In addition,
Central and Western Equatoria have populations that are relatively more educated com-
pared to the rest of the country; literacy rates among 15-24-year olds were 55% and 43%
in Central Equatoria and Western Equatoria respectively. There are contextual challenges
however, for example access to health facilities is limited, with 72% in Central Equatoria
and 77% in Western Equatoria living greater than 30 minutes from the nearest health facil-
ity, although the two states have the highest concentration of health facilities in southern
Sudan.
Health Pooled Fund
The Health Pooled Fund (HPF) was designed as a 3.5 years GB£120 million (US$ 186
using 2012 exchange rates of 1GP£ = 1.55US$) fund supported by the Australian Agency
for International Development (AusAid), the Canadian International Development Agency
(CIDA), the United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID), and
the Swedish International Development and Cooperation Agency (SIDA). HPF supports 40
counties in six states (Eastern Equatoria (EES), Unity, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal (WBeG),
Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal (NBeG), Lakes and Warrap). The total population covered by the
HPF is 5.1 million (52% of the South Sudan population), resulting in per-capita annual
health expenditure of approximately US$ 10. Unlike the RRHP and ISDP, the HPF
supports delivery of essential primary health care services and funding for county and
state hospitals, as well as health system strengthening at the national, state, county and
facility/ community levels (HPF, 2012).
The HPF was launched in October 2012 and consolidated service delivery contracts
previously funded through the Basic Services Fund (BSF), European Community Human-
itarian Office (ECHO), the U.S. Office for Disaster Assistance (OFDA) and the Common
Humanitarian Fund (CHF). The lead agency is a consortium led by Crown Agents which
is new to the South Sudan context. However the HPF established a steering committee
chaired by the MoH, with membership from the ministry of finance, ministry of labour,
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public service and human resource development and other partners as the overall gover-
nance and decision-making body, as well as established state oversight committees across
all six states to oversee program implementation.
The main challenge for the HPF would be managing and overseeing implementing part-
ners as it carries the largest number of states and counties. There is also greater variation
in health and demographic characteristics of the states that would need to be accounted for
in program design. Of the six states, the most populous is Warrap (1,149,135), followed by
Eastern Equatoria (1,109,339), Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal (860,322), Lakes (837,363), Unity
(709,045) and lastly, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal (393,217). The states differ in literacy rates
among those 15-24 year old, ranging from 50% in Western Bahr-el-Ghazal, 44% in Unity,
40% in Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal, 30% in Lakes, 27% in Warrap, to 26% in Eastern Equa-
toria. There is differential access to health facilities, with 70% and 73% of the population
living more than 30 minutes’ walk from the health facility in Warrap and Unity, 67%, 65%
and 63% in Lakes, Western Bahr-el-Ghazal and Northern Bahr-el-Ghazal respectively, and
57% in Eastern Equatoria. Thus, there are differences within the states that may provide




Outcome measures are selected from the Ministry of Health’s core performance moni-
toring indicators16, intended to assess trends in utilizing the health facility (see appendix
table A1). Maternal health outcome measures are number of women attending the health
facility for the 1st and 4th antenatal care visit, number of women receiving two or more
doses of intermittent preventive treatment of malaria during pregnancy with sulfadoxine-
pyrimethamine (IPTp-SP), provided during antenatal care and number of deliveries occur-
ring in health facilities and attended by health workers, regardless of cadre.
16The core performance indicators are a common set of 13 indicators used to across the three 3
health programs
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Antenatal care provides pregnant women an opportunity to receive health information
related to their pregnancy, health interventions to improve pregnancy outcomes and to
promote health facility delivery (WHO, 2016). Four antenatal care visits are recommended
during pregnancy however, in sub-Saharan Africa, most women often go to the health
facility once and often late in the pregnancy period. An increase in ANC 4th visits may
suggest improvements in the quality of antenatal care and this should also presumably
accompany an increase in facility deliveries. Hence as ANC 1st visits increase, IPTp-SP,
ANC 4th visits and facility deliveries should increase and converge over time. In malaria-
endemic countries, IPTp-SP is recommended for all pregnant women starting in the second
trimester, hence IPTp-SP may be considered a proxy indicator for subsequent ANC visits
and quality of care as it captures the availability of preventive medicines at the health
facility.
Skilled and unskilled deliveries are combined mainly because preliminary data analysis
indicated that trends were similar across the years and also because the total number of
women delivering in the facility is relatively fewer than the other maternal health indicators.
Deliveries in the community are excluded; while it is probable that health workers also
attend deliveries within their communities, the data does not disaggregate deliveries by
cadre of health worker hence including community deliveries would also capture deliveries
by traditional birth attendants, who have no formal training and function independently
of the health system. An assumption I make is that any increase in facility deliveries
partially occurs as a result of a trend towards delivery in a health facility with a health care
professional and hence gains in facility delivery should accompany declines in community
deliveries over time.
For children under five years of age, I selected children receiving their third dose of
diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus (DPT) vaccinations (DPT3) from the core indicators,
and number of children observed with malaria, and diarrhoea at the health facility. DPT3
is often used as a proxy indicator of how well countries manage routine immunization ser-
vices as it requires three separate contacts with health care providers and the availability of
vaccines. I combine DPT vaccinations provided at both the health facility and at outreach
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sites, regardless of age of administration (the database captures vaccines provided between
0-11 months and 12-23 months). Improvements in immunization coverage should result in
a convergence of the trends in DPT 1 and DPT 3 vaccinations should it result in more
children completing the DPT vaccination protocol, while a divergence would be a cause
for concern. Malaria, pneumonia and diarrhoea are the leading killers of children under
five in South Sudan, and hence malaria and diarrhoea indicators are also selected, despite
not being among the 13 core indicators, which instead aggregates the total number of cu-
rative consultations for children under five years. The malaria outcome measure combines
both clinically diagnosed malaria and malaria cases confirmed with a rapid diagnostic test
or laboratory testing. Note that confirmation is not differentiated based on test in the
database, nor in analysis.
Outcome measures are disaggregated by level of health facility, that is by primary
health care centers (PHCCs) and primary health care units (PHCUs). PHCUs are the
closest point of contact for most people in South Sudan, while PHCCs are a higher level
of care relative to the PHCUs and serve as referral points for PHCUs. Services provided
at outreach sites are combined with PHCU data by recoding these sites as PHCUs. This
mainly affects immunization data, and largely in Upper Nile and Jonglei State where
the RHHP program has immunization catch-up campaigns during the dry season due
to challenges in accessing health facilities during the rainy season. While there may be
concerns with using utilization data, I argue that since this represents women and children
receiving services at the health facility, this may come closest to assessing the effect of
policies whose primary objective is to increase access to or utilization of health services.
Other measures (for example mortality) may be affected by factors independent of the
heath system (e.g. improvements in education, water and sanitation) that are difficult to
control for in the South Sudan context, due to limited availability of data.
1.5.2 Data Source(s)
District Health Information Database (DHIS)
The primary data source comprises of a panel of health facilities reporting monthly
to the national District Health Information Database (DHIS). Health facility data can be
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aggregated to the payam, county, state and finally national level for example by summing
up results from all health facilities within a county to form a county-level dataset. The
DHIS was initially piloted in two States, Upper Nile and Jonglei between 2009 and 2010,
and adopted in all 10 states by 2012. In 2009, only 53 facilities were reporting to the DHIS,
but by 2011 1,053 facilities had submitted reports, hence data from 2009 – 2010 will not be
utilized as this represents fewer than 20% of all primary health care facilities nationwide.
Data at the health facility level is entered into standardized paper-based registries and
aggregated in a monthly report form containing priority indicators and submitted to the
County Health Department (CHD). The CHD is responsible for entering the data into the
DHIS database and these reports are then submitted to State Ministries of Health (SMoH)
electronically or using external flash drives. The SMOH database aggregates data from
the counties within the state and submits these to the centralized DHIS which aggregates
data nationally (MOH, 2015). These different levels of data-entry and aggregation provide
additional levels for errors in data-entry, and the quality of DHIS data will be a challenge.
However, these are the best estimates of health facility utilization available in South Sudan.
In addition, facilities may fail to submit monthly reports to the CHD; monthly reporting
rates range from 47% in 2012, 76% in 2013, 74% in 2014, 85% in 2015, and 68% in 2016,
with rates denoting facilities submitting reports in all 12 months. National reporting fails
to account for the variation in reporting across States, for example, reporting rate in Upper
Nile State (35%), Jonglei State (51%), Unity (61%), and Eastern Equatoria State (64%)
compared to Warrap and Western Bahr-el-Ghazal (90% and 89% respectively) (MOH,
2013, 2014, 2015). Health facility reporting affects utilization indicators at the state or
county level, and it may be necessary to adjust estimates based on facilities submitting
reports to obtain a valid estimate of county-level performance. Health facility reporting
may also be directly associated with conflict affecting specific areas with Jonglei, Upper
Nile and Unity States primarily being affected since 2013. This strongly suggests that
variation in utilization may be related to health facility closures that are independent of
program implementation hence it is imperative to assess the effect of conflict.
The full DHIS database was received from the MoH in February 2018, covering the
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period January 2010 to December 2017. The DHIS also contains data from the 3 tertiary
hospitals in South Sudan (Juba, Malakal and Wau Teaching Hospitals), 8 state hospitals,
15 County Hospitals, 45 Hospitals (denoted as special, mission or other hospitals), 33 sites
serving internally displaced populations (IDPs), 20 outreach sites and 7 sites serving police
and other uniformed personnel. Analysis is restricted to the primary health centers and
primary health units as the analysis focuses on the primary healthcare level and it is this
level where most donor funding is concentrated. Data will be aggregated at the national
and the donor level and by primary health care centers and primary health care units, to
understand overall trends in health facility utilization.
Population Data
Population data were obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics’ population pro-
jections which are based on the 2008 5th Sudan Population Census and mid-year population
distributions (SSNBS, 2009). Projections for 2009 and 2010 were based on the census and
were adjusted for the influx of returnees to South Sudan following the signing of the CPA
in 2005 until 2011, using estimates obtained from the International Organization of Mi-
gration (IOM). The largest number of returnees were estimated to have returned between
2008 and 2011 and the data was dis-aggregated by counties and states and distributed
over the four-year period. Projections done after 2010 were based on estimates from the
SHHS 2010 (SSNBS, 2009; South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics(SSNBS), 2015). No
additional migration data was used to adjust the population after 2011, hence it is possible
that population estimates are under-reported. In addition, the projections do not account
for internal migration, and the population that has left the country due to the conflict in
2013 affecting primarily Upper Nile, Jonglei and Unity states.
Conflict Data
South Sudan conflict data was obtained from The Armed Conflict Location & Event
Data Project (ACLED) downloaded from Humanitarian Data Exchange website (HDX).
ACLED provides the most up-to-date data on location, fatalities and characteristics of
political and violence events as well as non-violent events. Conflict data is not integrated
with other datasets, although this is recommended (Donnay et al., 2019) as I am mainly
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interested in the presence of conflict and its effect on utilization, and not the specific details
of the conflict itself. Fatalities (number of people who died as a result of the conflict event)
are aggregated to define a conflict indicator. At the county level, areas with no fatalities are
coded as experiencing no conflict, 1-50 fatalities as low-level conflict, 50-100 as mid-level
conflict and higher than 100 as high-level conflict. ACLED data is geo-coded and hence
can be used for spatial analysis and this may be an area of additional research.
1.6 Empirical Strategy
Exploratory Data Analysis
The dataset consists of 1,596 health facilities with monthly data from 2011-2015; 372
primary health care centers (PHCCs) and 1,224 primary health care units (PHCUs). As
a result of widespread conflict starting in 2016, the number of PHCCs and PHCUs drops
to 302 and 287 PHCCs and 966 and 884 PHCUs in 2016 and 2017 respectively, hence the
analysis will focus on the period 2011-2015, which also corresponds to the period covered
by the health sector development plan. National level analysis aggregates data from all
health facilities reporting to the DHIS, while donor level analysis aggregates data based
on the specific donor supporting the states. Thus, for example, World Bank data consists
of data from Jonglei and Upper Nile state.
Longitudinal trends in key maternal and child health indicators are illustrated with
empirical time-series line graphs covering the periods January 2011 to December 2015,
representing 60 data points. This provides a visual representation of the data allowing
us to identify how trends are changing across time. Time series graphs also compare
utilization at the primary health care centers and primary health care units and between
the three donor regions.
Empirical analysis is conducted at the national level, donor level and disaggregated by
facility type (PHCC or PHCU). At the national level, the following model estimated;
Yt = β0 + β1time+ β2Population+ β3Conflict+ ϵit (1.1)
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Where; Yt is the health utilization measure (e.g. ANC 1, IPTp-SP, DPT3, or malaria);
β1 is the average monthly increase in utilization between 2011-2015;
β2 is the effect of population on utilization and;
β3 is the effect of conflict, by level of conflict.
To assess the effect of the contracting policy, a policy dummy variable is created for
year 2013. The above model is slightly modified to include the policy variable and the
coefficient thus compares utilization after 2013 to before 2013 as illustrated below;
Yt = β0 + β1Policy + β2Population+ β3Policy ∗ Conflict+ ϵit (1.2)
As specified in equations (2.1) and (2.2), ϵ is assumed to be independently and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d) normal with mean 0 and variance σ2. However, as the data consists
of a panel of health facilities, I relax the assumption that the observations are indepen-
dent and allow for intra-group correlation, assuming that health facilities within a county
for example, are more similar than those in other counties. The equations are estimated
using ordinary least squares (OLS) regression with robust standard errors clustered at the
facility. An additional model is fitted with year fixed effects.
To assess the robustness of the results and account for the time-series nature of the data,
I extend equations (2.1) and (2.2) using Prais –Winsten and Cochrane –Orcutt regression
(Prais and Winsten, 1954) which estimates the generalized least-squares method. This
assumes that the errors follow a first-order autoregressive process (AR1). In this extension,
the error terms satisfy;
ϵit = ρϵt−1 + ϵit (1.3)
and the ϵit are independent and identically distributed as N (0, σ2).
Lastly, in order to allow for a comparison of these results to extant findings, I estimate
the natural logarithm of health facility utilization, estimating the semi-elasticity of health
facility utilization with respect to time. This has the added advantage of allowing for the
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calculation of the annual rate of increase 17. Estimating elasticities also reflects the idea
that increasing health facility utilization by a given absolute amount is also dependent on
its baseline levels (Jamison et al., 2016). For national level estimates, these results are
shown in the appendix.
Data is also aggregated by health facility type (PHCC and PHCU) and by supporting
donor (World Bank, USAID and HPF). To allow for comparison between facility type
and donor, I estimate the natural logarithm of health facility utilization as in the below
equations.
For facility type;
Log(Yt) = β0 + β1time+ β2Facility + β3Facility ∗ Conflict+ β4Population+ ϵit (1.4)
For donor type;
Log(Yt) = β0 + β1time+ β2Donor + β3Donor ∗ Conflict+ β4Population+ ϵit (1.5)
Similar analysis is conducted to assess the relative health facility utilization and com-
paring utilization during the period policy (2013-2015) relative to before the policy. Thus,
I estimate the following equation;
Log(Yt) = β0+β1Donor+β2Donor∗Y ear+β3Donor∗Conflict+β4Population+ϵit (1.6)
For equations (1.4), (1.5) and (1.6), I estimate a linear regression model using Prais–Winsten
regression with panel-corrected standard error (PCSE) estimates (Beck and Katz, 1995)
to account for the time-series nature of the data. In addition, I specify a panel-specific
AR(1) process with panel-level heteroskedastic errors. Analysis results with the raw levels
is shown in the appendix. All the above analysis is conducted using Stata version 13.
17The effective annual rate formula is [1 + (i/n)] n − 1
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1.7 Results
Results from the analysis are presented in this section starting with a description of
maternal health outcomes followed by child health outcomes. Analysis is first done at the
national level aggregating data from all states and is further disaggregated by health facility
type therefore comparing utilization at the primary health care centers and units. To
understand national-level health facility utilization, results from data analysis conducted
at the donor level and comparing the three health programs funded by the World Bank,
USAID and the Health Pooled Fund are presented. The underlying assumption of the donor
level analysis is that higher per-capita spending for health, experience of the implementing
lead agencies and the differences in program design described above may have implications
in improvement of health facility utilization.
1.7.1 Maternal health
Maternal health results are graphically illustrated in figure 1.2 which shows trends in
antenatal care 1st and 4th visits, IPT-Sp 2 or more doses and delivery at the health facility
between 2011-2015. There is a relatively big gap between antenatal first and fourth visits
throughout the observation period, with the gap increasing over time. This suggests that
health facilities are successful in attracting women to attend the health facility for their first
antenatal care visit, but are less successful in encouraging subsequent visits. IPTp-Sp is
primarily provided during antenatal care visits and hence increase in proportion of women
attending antenatal care should result in a concurrent increase in proportion of women
attaining the minimum recommended doses (two or more doses) of IPTp-Sp. However, we
observe a relatively lower uptake of two or more IPT-Sp doses, which closely follows ANC
4th visits. Health facility delivery across the observation period barely improves over time.
The low uptake of subsequent antenatal care visits, IPT-Sp and health facility delivery
indicates limited progress in increasing the average number of contacts with the health
system by pregnant women, one of the key goals of all three health programs, despite more
women attending the health facility at least once during their pregnancy, overall.
Table 1.6 presents analysis results for the same outcome measures, with year centered
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Figure 1.2: Trends in maternal health indicators, 2011-2015 Sudan.
on 2011 so that the constant term represents a 2011 baseline, and controlling for population
and level of conflict. Two models are presented; ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
with robust standard errors and Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt regression where the
errors are assumed to follow a first-order auto-regressive process and adjusted for 1,508
clusters at the facility level for comparison. The Prais-Winsten regression results are of
similar magnitude and direction as OLS and are the focus of the below discussion.
Between 2011-2015, mean monthly ANC 1st visits increased by 3,465 visits while ANC
4th visits increased by 1,118 (p<0.01) monthly reflecting the drop between 1st and 4th
visits observed in figure 1.2. In addition, the number of women receiving two or more
IPT-Sp doses increased by 1,556 (p<0.01) monthly, slightly higher than ANC 4th visits
suggesting that there are women who do attend the health facility for at least two antenatal
care visits, but have fewer than four visits. Deliveries at the health facilities increased by
a mere 515 (p<0.01)deliveries per month from their 2011 baselines. Overall, there is an
increase in the number of women receiving maternal health services across South Sudan,
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Table 1.6: Maternal Health Indicators
Models (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Variables ANC1 ANC1 ANC4 ANC4 IPT2 IPT2 Delivery Delivery
Panel A
Year 3,366*** 3,465*** 1,086*** 1,118*** 1,553*** 1,556*** 480.2*** 514.9***
(6.801) (7.541) (4.619) (5.328) (6.031) (6.268) (2.793) (3.223)
conflict = Low -190.2*** -140.9*** -141.3*** -81.82*** -268.8*** -129.4*** -70.93*** -19.65***
(34.04) (38.18) (22.14) (24.37) (23.81) (33.65) (9.616) (6.347)
conflict = Mid -296.5*** -250.6*** -253.2*** -122.5*** -665.9*** -399.0*** -219.8*** -70.06***
(34.30) (51.51) (24.14) (35.80) (24.29) (48.89) (7.870) (8.003)
conflict = High -673.5*** -584.2*** -532.1*** -392.8*** -1,135*** -801.5*** -316.3*** -139.3***
(66.54) (60.24) (54.77) (56.63) (40.23) (54.46) (14.23) (31.41)
Constant 7,939*** 7,654*** 5,412*** 5,285*** 4,601*** 4,567*** 2,600*** 2,532***
(21.98) (24.60) (15.03) (17.65) (19.32) (20.99) (8.625) (10.63)
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
R-squared 0.866 0.756 0.606 0.532 0.701 0.533 0.550 0.588
Panel B
Year = 2012 5,004*** 4,997*** 1,985*** 1,961*** 2,051*** 2,042*** 539.7*** 748.9***
(34.59) (27.92) (25.48) (20.25) (37.50) (29.35) (16.94) (15.17)
Year = 2013 8,804*** 8,821*** 3,476*** 3,541*** 3,836*** 3,857*** 800.4*** 1,088***
(36.65) (31.97) (26.01) (22.47) (37.99) (31.60) (16.97) (16.77)
Year = 2014 10,608*** 10,876*** 3,392*** 3,675*** 3,794*** 4,110*** 1,044*** 1,525***
(34.25) (30.08) (25.56) (22.27) (37.58) (31.66) (16.90) (16.77)
Year = 2015 14,573*** 14,618*** 5,029*** 4,931*** 6,904*** 6,726*** 2,057*** 2,167***
(36.17) (29.38) (26.02) (21.71) (37.95) (31.34) (17.39) (16.50)
conflict = Low -15.04 -3.400 1.584 30.70** -12.56 18.66 -14.34* -15.27**
(31.77) (22.30) (20.27) (13.68) (17.15) (11.98) (8.029) (7.325)
conflict = Mid -21.13 -76.65*** -8.789 -41.01*** -15.80 -34.62*** -2.587 -15.39**
(31.63) (17.23) (21.76) (13.07) (17.27) (9.685) (6.653) (7.123)
conflict = High -15.50 -113.9** 0.953 -102.1* -16.86 -117.4*** 5.893 -62.94**
(66.74) (50.36) (55.06) (52.68) (40.28) (43.76) (14.17) (30.50)
Constant 6,783*** 6,681*** 4,749*** 4,676*** 4,343*** 4,291*** 2,670*** 2,447***
(33.83) (29.09) (24.94) (21.65) (37.17) (31.20) (16.92) (16.34)
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
R-squared 0.886 0.800 0.669 0.564 0.768 0.604 0.605 0.593
Panel C
Policy 8,419*** 8,011*** 2,811*** 2,799*** 3,699*** 3,475*** 1,007*** 980.1***
(29.31) (33.42) (14.80) (16.12) (19.31) (20.13) (7.935) (8.020)
conflict = Low 1,805*** 1,713*** 756.8*** 735.5*** 701.3*** 685.6*** 174.7*** 159.0***
(88.15) (64.65) (49.04) (39.85) (45.59) (30.54) (18.64) (14.93)
conflict = Mid 2,099*** 1,436*** 901.4*** 629.4*** 898.9*** 631.1*** 255.0*** 200.8***
(113.4) (198.3) (74.97) (65.65) (59.47) (61.50) (25.68) (18.60)
conflict = High -896.7*** -212.1 -632.9*** -333.8*** -1,183*** -452.7*** -290.1*** -21.84
(68.16) (129.9) (54.96) (72.18) (41.04) (73.69) (14.55) (30.85)
Policy#Low -1,503*** -1,071*** -790.5*** -617.3*** -722.9*** -442.1*** -140.6*** -50.75*
(106.4) (182.9) (56.52) (60.51) (59.60) (83.13) (23.76) (28.78)
Policy#Mid -3,010*** -2,301*** -1,401*** -945.8*** -1,826*** -1,117*** -518.4*** -307.2***
(123.2) (227.5) (79.00) (71.01) (65.80) (73.89) (27.67) (24.74)
Constant 9,620*** 9,526*** 5,889*** 5,800*** 5,492*** 5,499*** 2,962*** 2,926***
(31.31) (50.06) (16.00) (21.67) (20.77) (29.52) (8.549) (12.80)
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
R-squared 0.632 0.504 0.471 0.483 0.464 0.388 0.286 0.491
Std errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Pooled OLS with robust std errors
(2) Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression
however as previously noted, the number of health facilities reporting to the DHIS also
increases over time, so it may be argued that this reflects increased reporting. However, I
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argue that the increase in number of health facilities after 2011 is not substantial enough
to make a huge difference in average utilization.
As expected, conflict negatively affects health facility utilization; areas with low level
conflict had 141, 82, 129 and 20 fewer ANC 1, ANC 4, IPT 2 and deliveries respectively,
while areas with high level conflict had 584, 393, 802 and 139 fewer ANC 1, ANC 4,
IPT 2 and deliveries respectively all statistically significant results. Note that as the level
of conflict increases, so does the reduction in health facility visits, indicative of a dose
response. Level of conflict is determined by number of fatalities, hence higher level conflict
(greater than 100 deaths) is likely to be accompanied by population displacement, and this
result is therefore not surprising. The results may also suggest that DHIS data is sensitive
to the context and may therefore be of adequate quality.
Panel B adjusts for year fixed effects. Mean monthly ANC 1st visits increased by 4,997
in 2012, 8,821 in 2013, 10,586 in 2014 and 14,548 in 2015 from the 2011 baseline of 6,813.
The highest increase is observed between 2011-2012 (75%) with subsequent year by year
increases of 43% (2012-2013), 17% (2013-2014) and 37% (2014-2015). There is a noticeable
drop-off in the number of women who complete ANC 4th visits compared to those who have
ANC 1st visits. When we compare across the years; while we see relatively large increase
in ANC 1st visits between 2011-2015, there is neither a comparable increase for ANC 4th
visits nor for IPTp-Sp. ANC 4th visits increase by 41% between 2011-2012 (n=1,978), 43%
(2012-2013), by -1.83% (2013-2014) and 33% (2014-2015). Therefore, while ANC 1st visits
were increasing, the proportion of pregnant women completing the recommended 4 ANC
visits does not increase at a similar rate, and thus ANC 1st and ANC 4th visits were in
fact diverging during that period.
For IPT-Sp, we observe a similar trend to that of ANC 4th visits, with a slower year
by year increase in number of women receiving IPTp-Sp during that same period (46%,
n=2,02; 47%,n=3,792; -2.06%, n=3,763; 83%, n=6,875), from a relatively lower 2011 base-
line of 4,374 mean monthly visits. Thus while health facilities successfully attract women
for their first visit antenatal care visit, they are less successful in retaining women for care
as previously noted. This may be evidence of low quality antenatal care services, or ex-
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ternal factors such as difficulty in accessing health facilities or cultural practices whereby
women come for ANC merely to confirm progress of their pregnancy, not for care-seeking.
Antenatal care provides an opportunity to advice pregnant women on the importance
of delivering with a skilled health-care provider and thus similarly to IPTp-Sp, increase
in ANC visits is presumed to correlate with increases in facility deliveries. The results
suggest that while ANC visits and IPTp-Sp increase, the increase in facility deliveries was
much slower. Between 2011-2015, mean monthly facility deliveries increased by 481 mean
monthly deliveries (P<0.01) on average, starting from a relatively low 2,594 deliveries per
month in 2011. Annually, mean monthly increases were 531, 787, 1,036, and 2,048 in 2012,
2013, 2014 and 2015, albeit statistically significant increases.
The effect of the geographically - focused health financing strategy on health utilization
is presented in Panel C, which compares maternal health utilization before to after 2013,
that is comparing 2011-2012 to the period 2013-2015, henceforth referred to as the policy
period. During the policy period there were statistically significant monthly increases in
utilization across all indicators. Mean monthly ANC 1st visits increase by 8,011, mean
monthly ANC 4th visits by 2,799, IPT-2 by 3,475 and deliveries by 980.1 compared to the
period prior. Once again women do come to the health facility for their first antenatal
care visit but fewer return to receive a second IPT2 dose, meaning even fewer complete
the antenatal care protocol. Antenatal care therefore does not act as a vehicle to promote
additional maternal health services for women in South Sudan.
The effect of conflict is unclear as the results suggest that areas with low level and
mid level conflict have increases in utilization of maternal health services, while high level
conflict reduces health facility utilization. While this may be indicative of displacement;
women moving from areas with higher to lower level conflict hence these areas showing
increased utilization, it may be worthy of further research.
To allow for comparison with extant findings, I estimate the natural logarithm of health
facility utilization in appendix table A2. In summary, monthly ANC 1st and 4th visits
and IPT-Sp increase by 30%, 17% and 24% during the observation period, while facility
deliveries increase by a mere 16%. During the policy period, monthly increases in ANC 1st
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Figure 1.3: Trends in maternal health indicators, by facility type.
and 4th visits and IPT-Sp are 66%, 42% and 56% while deliveries increase by 34% relative
to the period prior. These increases are however relative to low baselines in 2011.
Maternal health by Facility Type
Figure 1.7 illustrates maternal health outcomes disaggregated by health facility type.
The trends suggest that both primary health care centers and primary health care units
increase health facility utilization across all 4 indicators. However, similar to the aggregated
results presented above, ANC 1st visits are much higher than ANC 4th visits, and IPT two
or more doses closely mirrors ANC 4th visits. Number of women delivering in the health
facility does not show much improvement in both types of health facilities.
Analysis results are presented in Table 1.7 comparing utilization at primary health care
centers relative to primary health care units. PHCCs serve a larger catchment population
than PHCCs (approximately 30,000 compared to 10,000) and provide a higher level of
services than PHCUs. They are also more likely to be located in more urbanized settings
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than PHCUs and thus should have a higher utilization.
This is observed in the analysis results, with ANC 1 and 4 visits, IPT-Sp second dose
and delivery all being higher at the PHCCs relative to PHCUs by 56%, 34%, 44% and 35%
respectively. Relative to PHCUs, areas with low conflict experience statistically significant
reductions of 2% in ANC 4th visits but have 11% higher deliveries. Similarly, areas with
mid conflict have statistically significantly higher ANC 1st visits, and deliveries by 4%,
and 10% relative to PHCUs respectively. These results suggest that PHCUs are more
affected by conflict than the PHCCs, suggesting that conflict may be primarily located in
less urban settings.
Panel B compares annual increase in health facility utilization. Overall, results suggest
that while women prefer to attend their 1st ANC visit at the PHCCs, they are more likely
to return for subsequent antenatal care visits when they attend PHCUs. Thus, PHCCs
have higher ANC 1st visits by 13%, 4%, 10% and 8% in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015 relative
to the PHCUs, however, ANC 4th visits, are lower in 2013, 2014 and 2015 by 24%, 15%
and 19% with a similar trend observed for IPT-Sp.
This suggests that while PHCCs attract a larger share of women for their 1st antenatal
care visit, they are less successful in getting women to come for subsequent antenatal care
visits compared to PHCUs. PHCCs however have higher increase in monthly deliveries by
8%, 12%, 32% and 26%, suggesting that across the years, women who deliver in health
facilities may increasingly prefer giving birth with skilled providers, who are more likely
to be at PHCCs. Overall however, fewer women deliver at the health facility than attend
antenatal care services.
Panel C assesses health facility utilization by mothers during the policy period. The
results largely confirm previous results; health facility utilization is significantly higher
during the policy period. For PHCCs, percent increase in monthly ANC 1st visits are
higher by a moderate 1% relative to PHCUs during the policy period whereas deliveries
are significantly higher by 16%. The converse is true for ANC 4th visits and IPT-Sp
with both significantly lower at PHCCs relative to PHCUs by 20% and 10% once again
emphasizing that PHCUs perform better in encouraging return visits.
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Table 1.7: Maternal Health Indicators by Facility Type
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC4 IPT2 Delivery
Panel A
PHCC 0.560*** 0.340*** 0.436*** 0.350***
(0.00280) (0.00334) (0.00372) (0.00309)
Year 0.255*** 0.178*** 0.235*** 0.131***
(0.000886) (0.000945) (0.00115) (0.00111)
Conflict = Low -0.0233*** -0.0235*** -0.0315*** -0.0577***
(0.00545) (0.00562) (0.00640) (0.00730)
Conflict = Mid -0.00150 -0.00915 -0.0517*** -0.0744***
(0.00689) (0.00686) (0.00802) (0.00978)
Conflict = High -0.0247 -0.0394* -0.0995*** -0.120***
(0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0249) (0.0254)
PHCC#Low conflict 0.00410 -0.0208* -0.0166 0.107***
(0.0101) (0.0117) (0.0131) (0.0111)
PHCC# Mid conflict 0.0394*** -0.00472 0.0310* 0.0984***
(0.0130) (0.0155) (0.0177) (0.0160)
PHCC#High conflict 0.0249 -0.0163 -0.000206 0.138***
(0.0321) (0.0372) (0.0410) (0.0400)
Constant 7.985*** 7.640*** 7.463*** 6.985***
(0.00295) (0.00316) (0.00388) (0.00361)
R-squared 0.992 0.990 0.989 0.984
Panel B
PHCC 0.488*** 0.476*** 0.525*** 0.186***
(0.00656) (0.00799) (0.00911) (0.00836)
PHCC#2012 0.130*** 0.00373 0.00113 0.0811***
(0.00782) (0.00947) (0.0106) (0.00965)
PHCC#2013 0.0421*** -0.243*** -0.158*** 0.120***
(0.00770) (0.00948) (0.0105) (0.00963)
PHCC#2014 0.0971*** -0.151*** -0.0924*** 0.320***
(0.00768) (0.00950) (0.0105) (0.00971)
PHCC#2015 0.0801*** -0.191*** -0.132*** 0.256***
(0.00760) (0.00938) (0.0104) (0.00966)
PHCC#Low conflict 0.00401 0.0121 0.00204 0.0202**
(0.00815) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.00999)
PHCC#Mid conflict 0.00333 -0.00561 0.00144 -1.53e-05
(0.0115) (0.0144) (0.0156) (0.0149)
PHCC#High conflict -0.00407 -0.0171 -0.00536 -0.0106
(0.0284) (0.0349) (0.0397) (0.0363)
Constant 7.780*** 7.413*** 7.238*** 6.936***
(0.00396) (0.00396) (0.00508) (0.00560)
R-squared 0.993 0.989 0.990 0.985
Panel C
Policy#PHCC 0.0143* -0.199*** -0.101*** 0.160***
(0.00770) (0.00691) (0.00904) (0.00754)
Policy 0.651*** 0.538*** 0.620*** 0.235***
(0.00390) (0.00341) (0.00470) (0.00422)
PHCC 0.546*** 0.479*** 0.503*** 0.236***
(0.00663) (0.00597) (0.00772) (0.00641)
Conflict = Low 0.149*** 0.112*** 0.161*** -0.00686
(0.0140) (0.0124) (0.0152) (0.0142)
Conflict = Mid 0.245*** 0.165*** 0.221*** 0.144***
(0.0285) (0.0286) (0.0361) (0.0306)
Conflict = High -0.0131 -0.0495** -0.0797*** -0.0422*
(0.0225) (0.0212) (0.0284) (0.0229)
Policy#Low conflict -0.105*** -0.0969*** -0.120*** 0.0232
(0.0155) (0.0138) (0.0172) (0.0161)
Policy#Mid conflict -0.284*** -0.213*** -0.300*** -0.204***
(0.0296) (0.0294) (0.0373) (0.0318)
Constant 8.093*** 7.661*** 7.543*** 7.101***
(0.00402) (0.00354) (0.00488) (0.00423)
R-squared 0.990 0.990 0.988 0.983
Number of facility 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508
Std errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
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As noted previously, there is a dose-response of utilization and level of conflict, with
fewer health facility visits the higher the level of conflict across all indicators. For example,
low and mid level conflict reduces ANC 1st visits by 10% and 28% while mid-level conflict
reduces facility deliveries by 20% during the policy period.
In summary, while there are significant increases in health facility utilization by preg-
nant women, this may not result in increasing the number of contacts with the health
facility as observed in the drop off in completion of ANC 4th visits and women receiving
their second IPT-Sp dose. In addition, given the relatively lower rate of increase in health
facility deliveries, this suggests slow progress in reducing the high maternal mortality ratio
in the country. This also implies that current programs may need to identify additional
ways to attract women to the health facility, perhaps by understanding and addressing
barriers to access and/or providing incentives at the community level (for example vouch-
ers for women delivering at the health facility). As expected, conflict negatively impacts
health facility utilization, with the higher the level of conflict, the higher the drop in uti-
lization. The observed dose response also suggests that DHIS data may be a robust way
of assessing health facility utilization as it is responsive to contextual factors. This also
gives some confidence in the quality of the data collected by the DHIS.
Maternal health by Donor
Results for the World Bank, USAID and Health Pooled Fund) are illustrated in figure
1.4 and table 1.8. Due to the variation in population across the three donors, maternal
health indicators are standardized by the population of women of reproductive age (WRA),
15-49 years in each of the states. Based on the graphs, the best performing donor is the
Health Pooled Fund. Surprisingly, USAID sites have much lower performance than the
HPF sites, and are relatively similar to the World Bank sites. USAID states have been
relatively peaceful during the period of observation (compared to both the World Bank
and HPF sites) and also have higher per capita funding than the World Bank thus it is
surprising that the performance is not similar to that of the Health Pooled Fund. This
may be due to differences in the specific contracting approaches and may be worthy of a
future research.
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Figure 1.4: Maternal health indicators, by donor.
Comparison of health facility utilization by facility type is illustrated in figure 1.5. As
noted from the prior results, World Bank sites have relatively lower performance, but note
that PHCUs in USAID sites have similar levels of health facility utilization as the World
Bank sites. The PHCCs however, have much higher utilization relative to the PHCUs,
hence performance appears largely driven by the PHCCs. This may indicate that the
USAID intervention primarily focused on the PHCCs, at the expense of PHCUs or there
may be a higher preference for PHCCs in Central and Western Equatoria. This is worth
exploring further. In contrast, Health Pooled Fund sites have observed increases in health
facility utilization in both PHCCs and PHCUs, suggesting a more balanced implementation
approach. Due to the higher performance of HPF sites, it may also be necessary to identify
the specific contract modalities that have been successful for implementation in these six
states.
Empirical estimates are presented in table 1.8 with the World Bank sites as the ref-
erence. Panel A shows that USAID, and Health Pooled Fund sites had higher increases
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Figure 1.5: Maternal health indicators, by donor and health facility type.
in health facility utilization, relative to World Bank sites. For USAID, ANC 1st and 4th
Visits, IPT-Sp and delivery had higher increases by 20%, 57%, 47% and 24% respectively
while HPF sites are higher by 95%, 88%, 95% and 54% respectively, relative to the World
Bank sites. As previously noted, I adduce from these results that HPF sites perform much
better compared to USAID, during the period of observation.
In areas of low conflict, USAID sites perform relatively worse than comparable World
Bank sites, with ANC 1st and 4th visits, IPT-Sp and delivery declining by 9%, 11%, 2%
and 5% relative to World Bank sites, albeit only ANC declines are statistically significantly
different. This also implies that World Bank sites are relatively better able to continue
service provision in presence of conflict, possibly due to the longer experience with con-
flict or due to the specific differences in contract design. Overall, HPF sites have higher
utilization relative to World Bank sites affected by similar levels of conflict.
Panel B compares within year differences in utilization relative to World Bank sites. In
both USAID and HPF sites, utilization increases relative to the World Bank, with a larger
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Table 1.8: Maternal Health Indicators by Donor Type
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC4 IPT2 Delivery
Panel A
USAID 0.199*** 0.567*** 0.470*** 0.242***
(0.00759) (0.00944) (0.00762) (0.00958)
Health Pooled Fund 0.953*** 0.881*** 0.951*** 0.539***
(0.00784) (0.00990) (0.00804) (0.0105)
Year 0.272*** 0.174*** 0.244*** 0.194***
(0.00131) (0.00181) (0.00166) (0.00176)
USAID#Low conflict -0.0873* -0.113* -0.0214 -0.0475
(0.0462) (0.0607) (0.0465) (0.0532)
HPF#Low conflict 0.123*** 0.174*** 0.0606 0.0794
(0.0460) (0.0603) (0.0466) (0.0544)
HPF#Mid conflict -0.00391 -0.0230 -0.107*** 0.117***
(0.0253) (0.0311) (0.0243) (0.0371)
HPF#High conflict 0.667*** 0.830*** 0.585*** 0.711***
(0.0546) (0.0689) (0.0548) (0.0799)
Constant 7.410*** 6.873*** 6.758*** 6.358***
(0.00771) (0.00960) (0.00787) (0.0101)
R-squared 0.992 0.981 0.988 0.983
Panel B
USAID#2012 0.317*** 0.562*** 0.201*** 0.460***
(0.00855) (0.0110) (0.00889) (0.0125)
USAID#2013 0.392*** 0.609*** 0.257*** 0.622***
(0.00858) (0.0110) (0.00886) (0.0124)
USAID#2014 1.065*** 1.379*** 0.935*** 1.280***
(0.00904) (0.0116) (0.00920) (0.0132)
USAID#2015 0.877*** 1.094*** 0.982*** 1.274***
(0.00875) (0.0115) (0.00902) (0.0127)
HPF#2012 0.797*** 0.534*** 0.292*** 0.672***
(0.0121) (0.0146) (0.0159) (0.0191)
HPF#2013 0.993*** 0.963*** 0.650*** 1.123***
(0.0119) (0.0145) (0.0156) (0.0191)
HPF#2014 1.866*** 2.040*** 1.426*** 1.999***
(0.0122) (0.0149) (0.0158) (0.0198)
HPF#2015 1.677*** 1.903*** 1.403*** 1.879***
(0.0118) (0.0146) (0.0154) (0.0193)
USAID -0.243*** -0.0473*** 0.116*** -0.353***
(0.00671) (0.00855) (0.00717) (0.00961)
Health Pooled Fund -0.119*** -0.172*** 0.249*** -0.529***
(0.0106) (0.0128) (0.0144) (0.0168)
Constant 7.797*** 7.386*** 7.014*** 6.908***
(0.00496) (0.00613) (0.00439) (0.00881)
R-squared 0.990 0.983 0.979 0.981
Panel C
Policy#USAID 0.435*** 0.525*** 0.396*** 0.659***
(0.00866) (0.0114) (0.0100) (0.0111)
Policy#HPF 0.819*** 1.105*** 0.782*** 1.059***
(0.0108) (0.0127) (0.0124) (0.0142)
Policy = 1 0.104*** -0.270*** 0.0358*** -0.311***
(0.00702) (0.00980) (0.00762) (0.00988)
USAID# Low conflict 0.173*** 0.0848 0.244*** 0.143***
(0.0444) (0.0559) (0.0437) (0.0468)
HPF#Low conflict 0.126*** 0.150*** 0.0595 0.0574
(0.0447) (0.0558) (0.0444) (0.0480)
HPF#Mid conflict -0.0328 -0.155*** -0.162*** 0.000557
(0.0225) (0.0258) (0.0236) (0.0303)
HPF#High conflict 0.456*** 0.498*** 0.345*** 0.421***
(0.0464) (0.0534) (0.0524) (0.0617)
Constant 7.829*** 7.319*** 7.127*** 6.834***
(0.00566) (0.00757) (0.00650) (0.00805)
R-squared 0.985 0.979 0.982 0.978
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
Number of facility 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508
Std errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
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gap with every year increase. This difference is much higher in HPF sites; for example in
2014, increases in ANC 1st and 4th visits and facility deliveries are double that of the World
Bank. This once again shows that HPF sites have much higher performance compared to
USAID sites.
During the policy period, USAID sites have 44%, 53%, 40% and 66% higher monthly
increases in ANC 1st and 4th visits, IPT-Sp and facility deliveries relative to World Bank
sites. Once again, the HPF sites have markedly higher increases in utilization with ANC
1st and 4th visits, IPT-Sp and facility deliveries experiencing monthly increases of 82%,
110%, 78% and 106% relative to the World Bank sites.
1.7.2 Child health
I now shift focus to the child health indicators and analyze results following a similar
format as that of the maternal health indicators. Figure 1.6 is a graphical illustration
of trends in DPT 1st and 3rd dose and malaria and diarrhoea treatment while table 1.9
presents empirical results at the national level.
DPT 1 dose is presented to assess the gap in completion of the DPT schedule which
recommends 3 doses. Between 2011 and 2015, mean monthly DPT 1st and 3rd dose,
increase by 4,153 and 3,528, all statistically significant increases. However, DPT 1 starts
at a higher baseline relative to DPT 3 and hence the difference between the first and third
dose is evidence of divergence. This also suggests that immunization programs may be
failing to expand coverage rate for DPT3. Treatment for malaria, and diarrhoea cases at
health facilities increased by 11,632, and 5,779 all statistically significant increases from
2011 baselines of 32,368 and 15,171. Health facility utilization is much higher for treatment,
compared to that for immunization. This suggests that women in South Sudan take their
children to the facility when they fall sick, but are less likely to go to the health facility
for preventive measures.
All levels of conflict negatively impact utilization of health facilities by children under
five years, except for malaria cases in areas of low conflict where the effect is not significant.
Conflict primarily affects immunization and treatment seeking for diarrhoea, with all levels
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Figure 1.6: Trends in child health indicators, 2011-2015 Sudan.
of conflict significantly reducing immunization and diarrhoea cases. Once again there is an
observed dose-response, with higher levels of conflict associated with higher reductions.
Panel B presents annual increases; in 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, malaria cases saw year
on year increases of 36% (n=11,632, p<0.01), 38% (n=23,121, p<0.01), 54% (n=35,252,
p<0.01) and 40% (49,339, p<0.01), while diarrhoea cases increased by 66%, 72%, 3%
and 67%. The mean number of children seen for malaria is considerably higher than for
diarrhoea indicative of the high burden of malaria incidence in South Sudan. Fewer children
are seen for immunization; mean monthly first dose of DPT vaccines administered increased
by 1%, 27%, 92% and 142% between 2012 and 2015. While there is a gap between children
receiving their first and 3rd DPT doses in 2011, mean monthly increases across the years
are relatively similar signifying improvements in the immunization program. Statistically
significant increases in DPT immunization are observed beginning in 2013 (for DPT 1st
dose) and 2012 (for DPT 3rd dose). Thus prior to the health financing strategy, there
were existing improvements in immunization programs that may have been strengthened
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Table 1.9: Child Health Indicators
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
VARIABLES DPT1 DPT1 DPT3 DPT3 Malaria Malaria Diarrhoea Diarrhoea
Panel A
Year 4,153*** 4,314*** 3,528*** 3,659*** 11,632*** 10,795*** 5,779*** 6,190***
(18.53) (20.25) (13.92) (15.70) (33.01) (49.98) (11.78) (14.93)
Conflict = Low -367.4** -576.1*** -416.8** -569.0*** 414.2* 901.7*** -880.7*** -650.1***
(177.0) (214.8) (171.8) (192.7) (240.7) (215.4) (183.4) (130.9)
Conflict = Mid -2,048*** -2,599*** -2,025*** -2,290*** -1,297*** 1,219*** -2,010*** -1,717***
(115.5) (205.8) (120.7) (202.3) (139.7) (148.5) (216.6) (186.1)
Conflict = High -2,765*** -3,197*** -2,829*** -2,853*** -2,020*** -783.7 -3,506*** -2,668***
(156.2) (240.3) (133.2) (261.3) (700.9) (901.2) (46.84) (224.1)
Constant 8,975*** 8,739*** 6,998*** 6,776*** 32,368*** 33,619*** 15,171*** 14,136***
(62.70) (71.04) (47.38) (55.33) (107.4) (169.3) (41.84) (51.56)
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
R-squared 0.564 0.395 0.583 0.409 0.520 0.368 0.764 0.627
Panel B
Year = 1, 2012 119.5* 2,688*** 680.3*** 3,275*** 16,697*** 17,383*** 8,815*** 9,147***
(63.89) (104.5) (38.74) (82.67) (173.8) (136.8) (47.15) (54.11)
Year = 2, 2013 3,341*** 5,186*** 3,144*** 5,116*** 23,042*** 27,445*** 15,174*** 15,213***
(48.69) (85.66) (26.55) (67.76) (173.8) (170.7) (53.29) (61.37)
Year = 3, 2014 6,408*** 7,522*** 5,208*** 6,582*** 35,119*** 38,303*** 15,598*** 16,917***
(50.58) (85.35) (28.17) (66.23) (175.3) (187.9) (46.02) (57.43)
Year = 4, 2015 15,489*** 17,305*** 13,615*** 15,055*** 49,239*** 45,424*** 26,017*** 26,245***
(50.71) (85.68) (29.99) (66.68) (183.1) (200.3) (48.33) (54.75)
Conflict = Low 116.2** -51.56 84.01* -45.04 431.7* 495.4*** -79.51** -70.36
(53.98) (68.15) (45.85) (61.24) (226.4) (158.7) (38.69) (58.96)
Conflict = Mid -91.84*** -157.5*** -73.59*** -94.26* -266.7*** -149.2 -52.06*** -237.0***
(26.60) (50.84) (21.74) (48.22) (97.53) (139.2) (15.95) (56.03)
Conflict = High -160.2 -51.86 -136.2 -29.47 -615.2 -2,165*** -6.213 -267.4
(155.8) (182.8) (132.8) (174.2) (704.4) (832.2) (43.82) (163.4)
Constant 12,348*** 10,647*** 9,620*** 7,850*** 30,735*** 29,751*** 13,405*** 12,874***
(49.79) (85.51) (27.41) (65.76) (179.8) (191.3) (47.63) (52.86)
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
R-squared 0.653 0.465 0.689 0.484 0.529 0.372 0.823 0.686
Panel C
Policy 8,657*** 7,458*** 7,196*** 5,664*** 26,164*** 19,179*** 13,903*** 12,967***
(43.36) (47.78) (34.72) (37.74) (158.2) (142.9) (63.62) (58.22)
Conflict = Low -336.1 255.6 -171.2 390.8** 6,569*** 6,309*** 2,842*** 2,484***
(209.1) (218.7) (155.6) (171.5) (251.7) (211.7) (130.6) (130.1)
Conflict = Mid -87.83 22.27 216.7 280.9 8,048*** 4,781*** 3,664*** 2,394***
(240.4) (207.7) (174.5) (231.0) (251.4) (1,170) (119.1) (297.9)
Conflict = High -2,521*** -2,760*** -2,575*** -2,379*** -1,914*** 320.5 -3,725*** -1,732***
(158.1) (286.1) (135.4) (306.9) (710.0) (810.6) (62.94) (257.3)
Policy#low conflict 1,181*** 191.0 777.2** -246.3 -3,904*** -3,811*** -2,840*** -1,784***
(437.8) (494.9) (382.0) (409.5) (735.3) (418.5) (426.1) (401.2)
Policy#mid conflict -2,198*** -3,322*** -2,435*** -3,164*** -10,747*** -5,400*** -6,674*** -5,114***
(340.8) (322.8) (276.1) (307.4) (620.5) (1,160) (278.2) (368.8)
Constant 12,175*** 12,582*** 9,813*** 10,228*** 40,037*** 42,046*** 18,397*** 18,258***
(60.92) (81.09) (51.61) (73.60) (197.5) (242.3) (83.66) (98.22)
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
R-squared 0.292 0.210 0.288 0.216 0.311 0.262 0.515 0.422
Std errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
(1) Pooled OLS with robust std errors
(2) Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression
further as a result of the approach. Comparing mean monthly utilization during the policy
period, DPT 1 and DPT3 are 8,657 and 7,196 higher during the policy period compared
to the 2011-2012 period and malaria and diarrhoea are 26,164, and 13,903 statistically
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significantly higher as well.
To allow for comparison with extant findings, I once again estimate the natural log-
arithm of health facility utilization in appendix table A2. In summary monthly DPT
immunization increases by 26% during the period of observation while malaria and di-
arrhoa increase by 22% and 27%. However, by 2015, monthly DPT immunizations and
malaria treatments are 100% higher relative to 2011, while diarrhoea treatment is 116%
higher. During the policy period monthly increases in immunization are about 60% higher
than prior to the policy period, while malaria and diarrhoea treatment are 42% and 58%
higher. This results show substantial increases in child health service provision nationwide.
Child health by Facility Type
Child health pattern of utilization differs from that of pregnant women, as visually
depicted in figure 1.7. PHCUs receive more children with malaria, diarrhoea compared to
PHCCs, however DPT 1st and 3rd dose are slightly higher at the PHCCs. This suggests
that mothers have a strong preference for PHCUs compared to PHCCs, which might be due
to convenience; PHCUs tend to be closer to the village than PHCCs which are primarily
in more urban areas.
Analytical results are in table 1.10 with PHCUs as the reference. Monthly increases
in DPT 1st and 3rd doses at the PHCCs are higher relative to the PHCUs by 23%, and
14%. This may reflect availability of vaccines at the PHCCs due to existence of cold chain
(refrigerators and cold boxes which are less likely to be available at the PHCUs, which
typically rely on a supply of cold boxes from PHCCs). The lower gap in DPT 3rd doses
relative to PHCUs suggests that PHCUs may have a higher completion rate for the DPT
immunization protocol relative to the PHCCs, whereas the gap in DPT 1 and DPT 3 at
the PHCCs shows evidence of divergence.
Malaria and diarrhoea cases are higher at the PHCUs relative to the PHCCs overall;
PHCCs have 20% and 37% lower utilization relative to the PHCUs. Once again this may
be evidence that mothers prefer taking their children to the PHCUs, possibly due to their
being relatively closer compared to the PHCCs. Therefore, there is reason to recommend
that child health interventions in South Sudan prioritize the provision of child health
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Figure 1.7: Child health indicators, by Facility Type.
services at the PHCUs.
Conflict primarily affects children attending the health facility for DPT immunization,
and diarrhoea, with less effect on malaria cases. There are statistically significant reduc-
tions in DPT immunization and diarrhoea treatment in presence of conflict, with a similar
dose response observed as noted previously; the higher the level of conflict is associated
with a larger drop in utilization. However, this is different in the case of malaria treatment
where there are observed increases in malaria cases seen at the health facility by 2%, 3%
and 1% in areas with low, mid and high-level conflict respectively. While this may be due
to the high number of malaria cases seen at the health facilities overall, it may also be due
to urgency in treatment seeking due to severity of malaria cases.
Comparing the policy period, there are statistically significant increases in child health
indicators across all health facility sites. DPT increases by 73%, DPT 3 by 64%, malaria
by 49%, and diarrhoea treatment by 62% relative to the period prior. These increasing
gains in health facility utilization among children overall may be adequate to reduce child
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mortality and assessing the impact of health facility utilization on under-five mortality
may therefore be worthwhile for further evaluation, given the lack of national survey data
for the period of observation.
PHCUs perform better than the PHCCs during the policy period. Relative to the PH-
CUs, PHCCs have lower DPT immunization by 30% and 20% for first and 3rd dose and
lower malaria and diarrhoea treatment by 17% and 32%, further bolstering the recommen-
dation to expand child health services to the PHCUs, due to the strong preference among
mothers. The difference in utilization patterns comparing pregnant women and children
may also indicate that while there may be barriers to health facility utilization, for example
distance, there is adequate room for improvement in efforts to encourage women to also
attend the health facility in similar rates as children.
Child health by Donor
Child health utilization results comparing donors are illustrated in figure 1.8 with
results standardized by the population of children under 5 years of age and table 1.11.
Figure 1.8 shows that malaria is the leading cause of health facility visits by children across
all donor sites. This is clearly evident in the health pooled fund sites and USAID sites
and less so in the World Bank sites. Health pooled fund sites show much higher increases
in child health facility utilization similar to the observed trend in maternal health. Once
again, Health Pooled Fund sites have higher performance compared to World Bank and
USAID sites.
Table 1.11 presents empirical results relative to World Bank sites. USAID sites have
statistically significantly higher monthly increases in DPT 1st and 3rd dose and malaria
treatment by 14%, 42% and 18% but lower treatment for diarrhoea by 50% relative to the
World Bank. Once again, HPF sites have the highest performance overall, with monthly
increases in DPT 1st and 3rd dose and malaria and diarrhoea treatment by 61%, 70%, 83%
and 57% relative to the World Bank. Areas with low conflict have similar performance in
USAID sites relative to World Bank in DPT immunization but significantly lower treatment
for malaria and diarrhoea by 21% and 16% while HPF sites have similar performance.
Once again this suggests that World Bank sites may be better able to continue health
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Table 1.10: Child Health Indicators by Facility Type
VARIABLES DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea
PHCC 0.226*** 0.135*** -0.197*** -0.366***
(0.00499) (0.00494) (0.00471) (0.00321)
Year 0.293*** 0.280*** 0.223*** 0.248***
(0.00162) (0.00159) (0.00133) (0.000915)
conflict = Low -0.0270** -0.0108 0.0162** -0.0209***
(0.0112) (0.0113) (0.00794) (0.00569)
conflict = Mid -0.0707*** -0.0878*** 0.0322*** -0.0523***
(0.0145) (0.0141) (0.0103) (0.00667)
conflict = High -0.133*** -0.156*** 0.0108 -0.0775***
(0.0471) (0.0434) (0.0305) (0.0192)
PHCC#Low conflict -0.0842*** -0.0949*** -0.0436*** -0.0364***
(0.0181) (0.0183) (0.0164) (0.0120)
PHCC#Mid conflict -0.0161 -0.00874 0.0130 0.0291*
(0.0253) (0.0241) (0.0211) (0.0151)
PHCC#High conflict -0.0153 -0.0145 -0.0513 -0.00969
(0.0674) (0.0615) (0.0507) (0.0331)
Constant 8.259*** 8.132*** 9.792*** 9.088***
(0.00544) (0.00536) (0.00436) (0.00314)
R-squared 0.969 0.969 0.991 0.992
PHCC 0.544*** 0.405*** -0.184*** -0.283***
(0.0116) (0.0107) (0.0101) (0.00679)
PHCC#2012 -0.199*** -0.211*** 0.0629*** -0.0340***
(0.0146) (0.0135) (0.0119) (0.00842)
PHCC#2013 -0.296*** -0.187*** -0.00730 -0.100***
(0.0140) (0.0132) (0.0123) (0.00838)
PHCC#2014 -0.375*** -0.337*** -0.0427*** -0.0993***
(0.0142) (0.0133) (0.0130) (0.00840)
PHCC#2015 -0.602*** -0.564*** -0.0616*** -0.143***
(0.0140) (0.0131) (0.0131) (0.00829)
PHCC#Low conflict 0.0153 0.00832 0.00619 -0.000118
(0.0163) (0.0164) (0.0162) (0.0103)
PHCC#Mid conflict -0.00861 -0.00651 0.00114 0.00808
(0.0222) (0.0211) (0.0207) (0.0133)
PHCC#High conflict 0.0147 0.0203 -0.0243 -0.00702
(0.0595) (0.0550) (0.0488) (0.0310)
Constant 8.250*** 8.114*** 9.630*** 8.867***
(0.00752) (0.00704) (0.00584) (0.00363)
R-squared 0.969 0.967 0.991 0.989
Policy = 1 0.734*** 0.642*** 0.488*** 0.612***
(0.00737) (0.00727) (0.00499) (0.00428)
Policy#PHCC -0.290*** -0.196*** -0.0605*** -0.0846***
(0.0111) (0.0107) (0.00967) (0.00789)
type = 1, PHCC 0.410*** 0.254*** -0.169*** -0.318***
(0.00927) (0.00887) (0.00818) (0.00669)
Policy#Low conflict 0.107*** 0.0399 -0.138*** -0.113***
(0.0330) (0.0319) (0.0207) (0.0180)
Policy#Mid conflict -0.118** -0.152*** -0.229*** -0.295***
(0.0479) (0.0434) (0.0375) (0.0299)
Constant 8.385*** 8.287*** 9.927*** 9.208***
(0.00720) (0.00712) (0.00523) (0.00438)
R-squared 0.966 0.971 0.990 0.989
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
Number of facility 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508
Std errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
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services delivery in areas of low conflict compared to USAID sites. DPT immunization is
significantly lower in HPF sites (by 28% and 34%) experiencing mid-level conflict relative
to the World Bank sites, but provide higher rates of treatment for malaria and diarrhoea
with the difference being less than 10%.
As with maternal health utilization, health utilization among children under five is
distinctly lower in World Bank sites relative to the two donor sites starting in 2014 as
observed in panel B. This suggests that the effect of conflict on health facility utilization
in the World Bank sites was significant starting in 2014. USAID sites have double the
DPT immunization rates of World Bank sites, while HPF sites have approximately 2.5
higher immunization in 2014 and 2015. In addition, while the USAID sites have signifi-
cantly higher utilization across all child health indicators relative to the World Bank sites
in 2012 and 2013, the HPF sites start with significantly lower DPT immunization (by ap-
proximately 30%) relative to the World Bank in 2013 suggesting that the World Bank had
higher provision of DPT immunization during that period. The gap in 2014 and 2015 is
therefore further evidence that the effect of the policy intervention was markedly higher
in the HPF sites, relative to both USAID and World Bank interventions, but suggest that
the drop in World Bank performance may be primarily due to conflict.
During the policy period, USAID sites have relatively higher DPT immunization rates
by 84% and 81% and malaria and diarrhoea treatment by 21% and 37% compared to the
World Bank Sites. The effect of the policy intervention is once again markedly higher
in the HPF sites; DPT immunization rates increase by 152%, and malaria and diarrhoea
treatment by 63% and 80% relative to the World Bank sites.
Comparison of health facility utilization across donor and facility type is shown in
figure 1.9 This graphical illustration offers additional evidence that Health Pooled Fund
sites perform better overall, relative to USAID and World Bank sites. It remains surprising
that World Bank sites remain competitive with USAID with regards to performance given
the difference in per-capita health spending and the higher levels of conflict observed in
World Bank sites.
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Table 1.11: Child Health Indicators by Donor Type
VARIABLES DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea
Panel A
USAID 0.140*** 0.423*** 0.176*** -0.504***
(0.0166) (0.0175) (0.00739) (0.00753)
Health Pooled Fund 0.610*** 0.693*** 0.834*** 0.571***
(0.0175) (0.0184) (0.00843) (0.00761)
Year 0.250*** 0.233*** 0.202*** 0.263***
(0.00203) (0.00225) (0.00194) (0.00142)
USAID#Low conflict 0.0899 0.0806 -0.206*** -0.160***
(0.114) (0.108) (0.0419) (0.0457)
HPF#Low conflict 0.126 0.0944 0.0666 0.0309
(0.114) (0.108) (0.0426) (0.0452)
HPF#Mid conflict -0.275*** -0.342*** 0.0950*** 0.0790***
(0.0634) (0.0613) (0.0276) (0.0259)
HPF#High conflict 1.181*** 1.132*** 0.745*** 0.565***
(0.140) (0.141) (0.0669) (0.0589)
Constant 7.689*** 7.376*** 8.933*** 8.398***
(0.0169) (0.0178) (0.00780) (0.00763)
R-squared 0.972 0.971 0.988 0.991
Panel B
USAID#2012 0.329*** 0.405*** 0.105*** 0.515***
(0.0260) (0.0266) (0.0117) (0.0106)
USAID#2013 0.430*** 0.399*** 0.133*** 0.536***
(0.0248) (0.0254) (0.0119) (0.0106)
USAID#2014 1.866*** 1.992*** 0.726*** 1.050***
(0.0268) (0.0270) (0.0124) (0.0110)
USAID#2015 1.792*** 1.982*** 0.419*** 0.816***
(0.0257) (0.0262) (0.0124) (0.0105)
HPF#2012 -0.310*** -0.282*** 0.368*** 0.645***
(0.0272) (0.0272) (0.0171) (0.0132)
HPF#2013 0.359*** 0.305*** 0.535*** 0.964***
(0.0259) (0.0259) (0.0174) (0.0132)
HPF#2014 2.326*** 2.376*** 1.485*** 1.618***
(0.0278) (0.0274) (0.0180) (0.0134)
HPF#2015 2.463*** 2.730*** 1.238*** 1.468***
(0.0266) (0.0264) (0.0177) (0.0128)
USAID -0.506*** -0.304*** 0.0194** -0.969***
(0.0189) (0.0195) (0.00923) (0.00822)
Health Pooled Fund -0.151*** -0.124*** 0.184*** -0.333***
(0.0203) (0.0202) (0.0150) (0.0112)
Constant 8.307*** 8.018*** 9.107*** 8.726***
(0.0177) (0.0179) (0.00662) (0.00627)
R-squared 0.955 0.954 0.989 0.989
Panel C
Policy#USAID 0.841*** 0.807*** 0.212*** 0.364***
(0.0222) (0.0237) (0.0105) (0.0102)
Policy#HPF 1.524*** 1.518*** 0.632*** 0.785***
(0.0241) (0.0252) (0.0136) (0.0113)
Policy = 1 -0.313*** -0.323*** 0.0916*** 0.104***
(0.0212) (0.0226) (0.00866) (0.00816)
USAID#Low conflict 0.314*** 0.272*** 0.0168 0.0913**
(0.108) (0.0999) (0.0407) (0.0438)
HPF#Low conflict 0.140 0.110 0.0673 0.0177
(0.109) (0.0998) (0.0417) (0.0437)
HPF#Mid conflict -0.386*** -0.465*** 0.0449* 0.0183
(0.0572) (0.0569) (0.0261) (0.0243)
HPF#High conflict 0.782*** 0.763*** 0.528*** 0.346***
(0.118) (0.122) (0.0653) (0.0518)
Constant 8.235*** 7.906*** 9.211*** 8.773***
(0.0165) (0.0177) (0.00701) (0.00653)
R-squared 0.960 0.964 0.987 0.987
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
Number of facility 1,508 1,508 1,508 1,508
Std errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
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Figure 1.8: Child health indicators, by donor
1.8 Conclusions
South Sudan became a signatory of the UN Millennium summit and committed to
meeting MDG goals during the period 2010-2015. However, due to lack of nationally
representative survey data, there has been limited information on the country’s progress
to date. The analysis sought to illuminate trends in maternal and child health indicators,
using select global indicators for child and maternal health and the Ministry of Health’s
priority indicators.
Between 2011-2015, mean monthly ANC 1st visits increased by 3,357 visits and ANC
4th visits by 1,080 (p<0.01), whereas monthly deliveries at health facilities increased by
a mere 481.2 on average from their already low 2011 baseline. There is noticeable drop-
off in the number of women who complete ANC 4th visits compared to the number who
have their first ANC visit. Thus, while ANC 1st visits were increasing, the proportion of
pregnant women completing the recommended 4 ANC visits does not increase in a similar
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Figure 1.9: Child health indicators, by donor and facility type.
rate and thus ANC 1st and ANC 4th visits are in fact diverging during that period. This
may mean that while health facilities successfully attract women for their first visit, they
are less successful in retaining women for care or encouraging facility delivery. This has
negative implications for efforts to reduce maternal mortality.
Nationally, women appear to prefer to have their 1st antenatal care visit at the PHCCs,
compared to PHCUs, with mean monthly visits at PHCCs increasing by 2,177 compared
to 1,214 at the PHCUs between 2011-2015. However, PHCUs tend to have a relatively
higher proportion of women completing their 4th ANC visit and receiving IPT-Sp second
dose compared to PHCCs both increasing monthly by 541 and 673 compared to 551 and
854 at PHCCs, respectively. This suggests that while PHCCs attract a larger share of
women for their 1st antenatal care visit, they have a harder time retaining women for
health services compared to PHCUs despite serving a larger catchment population and
having skilled health workers compared to the PHCUs.
Overall, there is need to exert additional efforts to increase health facility contacts
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among pregnant women. This could be achieved by introducing incentives e.g. voucher
schemes for individual women and by improving the quality of ANC 1st visits to encourage
further health facility visits. Given that PHCUs are better at encouraging additional
contacts with the health facility, this also suggests that provision of skilled birth attendants
and increasing the capacity of PHCUs to provide delivery services may be a successful
strategy in increasing health facility deliveries and thus reducing the overall maternal
mortality ratio.
Child health pattern of utilization differs from that of pregnant women with PHCUs
seeing more children with malaria and diarrhoea compared to PHCCs. Results suggest
that mothers have a stronger preference for PHCUs compared to PHCCs when it comes to
malaria and diarrhoea treatment for their children, but prefer PHCCs for antenatal care
and facility deliveries. While this might be due to convenience; PHCUs tend to be closer
to the village than PHCCs which are primarily in more urban areas, it also indicates that
there is room for improving health facility utilization among mothers, despite barriers to
access to care. They are accessing the health facility to receive treatment for their children.
DPT 1st and 3rd dose are higher at the PHCCs, albeit being significantly lower than the
number of children receiving treatment for malaria and diarrhoea compared to the PHCUs.
The higher DPT immunization at the PHCCs might be due to the fact that vaccines are
more readily available at the PHCCs due to availability of cold chain (refrigerators and
cold boxes), whereas PHCUs mainly receive their supply of vaccines in cold boxes from
the nearest PHCCs. Therefore, there is a missed opportunity to improve immunization
rates in the country given the larger number of children already receiving treatment at
the facilities. Strengthening the capacity of PHCUs to provide immunization services may
result in comparable levels of increase to that of the treatment indicators. In addition,
using innovative methods of vaccine delivery e.g mobile vaccination clinics, or immunization
campaigns as in the World Bank sites may expand coverage overall.
The mean monthly increases in children seen for malaria is considerably higher than
for diarrhoea indicative of the high burden of malaria incidence in South Sudan, however
the high number of diarrhoea cases may also reflect poor accessibility to clean water and
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sanitation. The gap between number of children receiving treatment, compared to the
number receiving preventive services (immunization) also suggest that health facility con-
tacts remain reactive rather than preventive, suggesting need for behavioral interventions.
This is also observed in pregnant women, while women attend their first antenatal care
visit, they are less likely to return to the facility for additional preventive care.
At the donor level, the World Bank sites are the most affected by conflict; both USAID
and HPF have higher health facility utilization during the observation period. However,
while the HPF sites have markedly higher performance relative to World Bank, USAID
sites have moderately higher performance, despite having a much higher per capita funding
and being in areas with less conflict relative to the World Bank sites. In fact, in presence
of low level conflict, performance at World Bank sites remains comparably higher than at
USAID sites. The higher gap in utilization in 2014 and 2015 for HPF provides further
evidence that the effect of the policy intervention was markedly higher in the HPF sites,
relative to both USAID and World Bank, but also implies that the drop in World Bank
performance may be primarily due to conflict.
This difference in relative levels of improvement in health facility utilization across the
three donors also suggests that contract design, and not necessarily per capita investment,
matters. It may suggest that contracts require a greater degree of flexibility to accommo-
date for contextual factors that might have alleviated the drop in health facility utilization
in presence of conflict. For example, World Bank sites seem capable of continued service
delivery in presence of low level conflict relative to USAID sites which are the more peace-
ful and have higher per capita funding. World Bank sites also have higher performance
in presence of mid-level conflict relative to the HPF sites. Health Pooled Fund sites are
however, the best managed of the three, judging by health facility utilization, but it is
worth noting that they also start at the lowest levels.
Of the 3 programs, the World Bank sites had the lowest per capita spending on health,
and were the most conflict affected. To identify innovative ways of providing health services
in presence of conflict, it may be necessary to understand the contractual modalities in
the World Bank sites. Additional information on how providers operate in situations of
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hardship and whether contracts take into considering the challenges of meeting performance
targets is also necessary in order to further contextualize these results.
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1.9 Appendix
Appendix table A1 provides the 13 core indicators that the MoH uses to compare
performance across the three health donor programs in South Sudan. These indicators
were negotiated with the three donor partners and are selected from a comprehensive list
of 56 MoH performance indicators that cover child health, maternal health and expanded
program of immunization.
Table A1: MoH Core performance monitoring indicators across the 3 health pro-
grams.
No. Indicator
1. Number and proportion of children who received DPT3 before 12 months of age.
2. Number and proportion of children who received measles vaccination before 12months of age.
3. Number and proportion of children 6-59 months who received vitamin A supple-mentation.
4. Number and proportion of pregnant women receiving ANC first visit.
5. Number and proportion of pregnant women delivering in a health facility.
6. Number and proportion of outpatient visits for children under 5 years.
7. Number of Insecticide treated nets (ITNs) purchased and/or distributed.
8. Number and proportion of functional health facilities submitting standardized HMISmonthly reports within one month of the reporting month.
9. Number and proportion of health facilities with structured supervision visit using aquantified supervisory checklist (QSC) within a month before the verification visit.
10. Number and proportion of health centers with at least two skilled health workers.
11. Number and proportion of PHCCs with ten essential tracer drugs at the time ofsupervisory visit.
12. Average score of quality of care from QSC.
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Appendix Table A2 provides national level health facility utilization for maternal and
child health indicators respectively in natural logarithm (instead of raw levels). This allows
for a comparison of these results with extant findings and with the theoretical and practical
advantage that the coefficients are semi-elasticities of utilization across time. The following
model is estimated for each variable;
LogUtilization = β0 + β1(Policy)β2(Y ear) + β3(Population) + β4(Policy ∗ Conflict) + ϵ
hence for example, for ANC 1st visit this estimates;
LogANC1 = β0 + β1(Policy)β2(Y ear) + β3(Population) + β4(Policy ∗ Conflict) + ϵ
Tables A3 and A4 provide maternal and child health utilization monthly averages in
the raw levels. These are provided for primary health care centers and primary health care
units and allow for comparison of utilization by health facility.
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Table A2: Maternal and Child Health Indicators
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC4 IPT2 Delivery DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea
Year 0.297*** 0.175*** 0.238*** 0.164*** 0.257*** 0.256*** 0.222*** 0.264***
(0.00146) (0.00127) (0.00156) (0.00137) (0.00116) (0.00106) (0.00146) (0.00118)
Conflict = Low -0.00795 -0.00798* -0.0120*** -0.00595*** -0.0267*** -0.0304*** 0.0200*** -0.0191***
(0.00601) (0.00433) (0.00424) (0.00226) (0.00693) (0.00733) (0.00557) (0.00411)
Conflict = Mid 0.0282*** 0.0104** 0.000214 -0.00530* -0.0702*** -0.0786*** 0.0394*** -0.0208***
(0.00426) (0.00453) (0.00590) (0.00272) (0.00611) (0.00755) (0.00371) (0.00588)
Conflict = High 0.00804 -0.0246*** -0.0519*** -0.0275*** -0.102*** -0.122*** 0.00527 -0.0520***
(0.0115) (0.00942) (0.00905) (0.00820) (0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0180) (0.00986)
Constant 8.895*** 8.521*** 8.383*** 7.799*** 9.148*** 8.947*** 10.39*** 9.578***
(0.00465) (0.00422) (0.00523) (0.00455) (0.00405) (0.00366) (0.00499) (0.00381)
R-squared 0.989 0.987 0.981 0.985 0.956 0.967 0.987 0.988
Year = 2012 0.603*** 0.416*** 0.498*** 0.356*** 0.176*** 0.248*** 0.508*** 0.583***
(0.00386) (0.00403) (0.00558) (0.00560) (0.00847) (0.00805) (0.00403) (0.00371)
Year = 2013 0.898*** 0.636*** 0.778*** 0.467*** 0.455*** 0.496*** 0.687*** 0.810***
(0.00452) (0.00468) (0.00638) (0.00652) (0.00662) (0.00633) (0.00502) (0.00392)
Year = 2014 1.053*** 0.676*** 0.842*** 0.589*** 0.617*** 0.629*** 0.894*** 0.895***
(0.00445) (0.00476) (0.00650) (0.00660) (0.00646) (0.00606) (0.00534) (0.00382)
Year = 2015 1.231*** 0.791*** 1.064*** 0.739*** 1.012*** 1.042*** 0.992*** 1.158***
(0.00424) (0.00460) (0.00634) (0.00647) (0.00638) (0.00596) (0.00526) (0.00361)
2012#Low conflict -0.0264*** -0.0113 -0.0217*** -0.0390*** -0.139*** -0.167*** 0.00692 -0.0611***
(0.00888) (0.00712) (0.00788) (0.00780) (0.0215) (0.0207) (0.00865) (0.00839)
2012#Mid conflict -0.0123 -0.00757 0.0150* 0.00667 -0.0811*** -0.0731*** 0.0101 -0.0174**
(0.00847) (0.0107) (0.00907) (0.0101) (0.0177) (0.0203) (0.0142) (0.00819)
2013#Low conflict 0.0120 0.00241 0.00178 0.00636 -0.00820 -0.0131 0.00963 0.0104
(0.0123) (0.00893) (0.00975) (0.00933) (0.0132) (0.0144) (0.00795) (0.0133)
2013#Mid conflict -0.0104** -0.00656 0.00270 0.0144** 0.00723 0.00640 0.0100 -0.0145**
(0.00504) (0.00925) (0.00638) (0.00617) (0.00970) (0.0122) (0.00663) (0.00565)
2014#Low conflict 0.00534 0.00678* 0.00698** 0.0123*** -0.000418 -0.00544 0.0230*** 0.00427
(0.00341) (0.00394) (0.00355) (0.00394) (0.00520) (0.00597) (0.00608) (0.00348)
2014#Mid conflict -0.0166*** -0.0154 -0.00745 0.00612 -0.0262*** -0.0278** -0.00856 -0.0164***
(0.00425) (0.0102) (0.00684) (0.00563) (0.00920) (0.0120) (0.00787) (0.00557)
Constant 8.737*** 8.367*** 8.221*** 7.695*** 9.208*** 8.971*** 10.22*** 9.414***
(0.00422) (0.00460) (0.00631) (0.00649) (0.00650) (0.00605) (0.00525) (0.00361)
R-squared 0.989 0.988 0.981 0.986 0.954 0.966 0.988 0.987
Policy 0.661*** 0.420*** 0.555*** 0.335*** 0.583*** 0.551*** 0.419*** 0.575***
(0.00378) (0.00313) (0.00404) (0.00349) (0.00315) (0.00293) (0.00360) (0.00333)
Policy#Low conflict -0.146*** -0.127*** -0.132*** -0.0703*** 0.0881*** 0.0682*** -0.127*** -0.128***
(0.0130) (0.00836) (0.0109) (0.00919) (0.0260) (0.0248) (0.00898) (0.0135)
Policy#Mid conflict -0.210*** -0.154*** -0.200*** -0.140*** -0.105*** -0.142*** -0.150*** -0.245***
(0.0241) (0.0143) (0.0165) (0.0106) (0.0197) (0.0192) (0.0254) (0.0178)
Constant 9.080*** 8.611*** 8.512*** 7.914*** 9.307*** 9.116*** 10.55*** 9.747***
(0.00545) (0.00438) (0.00581) (0.00495) (0.00422) (0.00424) (0.00578) (0.00485)
R-squared 0.984 0.986 0.978 0.983 0.955 0.964 0.984 0.983
Observations 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356 53,356
Std errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Prais-Winsten and Cochrane-Orcutt AR(1) regression
Tables A5 to A7 provide maternal and child health utilization for each of the three
donors; the World Bank, USAID and Health Pooled Fund, standardized for the population
of women of reproductive age and children under-5 years respectively.
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Table A3: Maternal Health Indicators by Facility Type
PHCU PHCC PHCU PHCC PHCU PHCC PHCU PHCC
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC1 ANC4 ANC4 IPT2 IPT2 Delivery Delivery
Panel A
Year 1,214*** 2,177*** 540.7*** 550.6*** 673.4*** 854.0*** 136.8*** 348.4***
(4.164) (10.46) (2.956) (6.995) (3.079) (8.714) (1.898) (2.850)
conflict = low -107.3*** -111.4* -96.19*** -19.32 -123.5*** 11.47 -67.47*** 21.25
(26.24) (62.43) (18.36) (38.37) (18.50) (52.85) (10.72) (15.79)
conflict = mid -159.5*** -105.0 -114.2*** -109.5** -294.6*** -316.7*** -112.2*** -22.72
(31.02) (72.02) (21.31) (47.90) (20.94) (60.95) (13.63) (19.73)
conflict = high -297.5*** -365.2** -227.5*** -245.2** -440.6*** -585.9*** -167.9*** -78.96*
(90.48) (154.4) (60.11) (105.2) (59.51) (121.2) (38.74) (41.97)
Constant 2,875*** 4,960*** 2,051*** 3,299*** 1,687*** 2,993*** 1,204*** 1,379***
(13.67) (32.72) (9.709) (22.11) (10.24) (26.81) (6.084) (8.606)
Observations 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920
R-squared 0.740 0.826 0.624 0.677 0.716 0.582 0.538 0.740
Number of facility 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354
Panel B
Year = 2012 1,538*** 3,448*** 800.3*** 1,152*** 835.6*** 1,107*** 179.0*** 441.3***
(17.72) (43.85) (11.56) (30.53) (11.29) (34.55) (8.154) (11.65)
Year = 2013 3,198*** 5,659*** 1,844*** 1,678*** 1,817*** 1,931*** 260.8*** 629.3***
(17.58) (43.32) (11.43) (30.70) (11.30) (33.84) (7.987) (11.80)
Year = 2014 3,724*** 7,055*** 1,716*** 1,839*** 1,738*** 2,103*** 221.8*** 998.9***
(17.83) (43.82) (11.61) (31.00) (11.38) (34.08) (8.069) (12.08)
Year = 2015 5,129*** 9,403*** 2,404*** 2,540*** 2,940*** 3,749*** 615.8*** 1,454***
(17.64) (43.32) (11.56) (30.47) (11.18) (33.77) (8.043) (12.08)
Population 4.08e-05 0.000166* 4.97e-05 0.000219*** 4.95e-05* 0.000168** 4.74e-05** 7.75e-05***
(4.76e-05) (9.86e-05) (3.12e-05) (6.51e-05) (2.92e-05) (7.01e-05) (1.97e-05) (2.56e-05)
conflict = low -6.664 -1.675 2.211 22.73 10.24 7.478 -21.91** 9.605
(24.20) (58.30) (15.87) (36.82) (14.33) (40.47) (9.130) (14.67)
conflict = mid -30.10 -14.75 -7.465 -23.36 -19.48 -11.72 3.267 3.787
(29.47) (69.18) (19.08) (48.25) (17.70) (53.45) (12.58) (18.97)
conflict = high -35.09 -73.25 -3.767 -77.46 -12.26 -47.97 -2.931 -33.45
(91.37) (140.2) (59.27) (100.9) (57.18) (115.2) (37.19) (40.82)
Constant 2,557*** 4,158*** 1,762*** 2,942*** 1,539*** 2,885*** 1,215*** 1,372***
(16.20) (37.86) (10.57) (26.97) (10.45) (30.04) (7.575) (10.52)
Observations 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920
R-squared 0.766 0.837 0.671 0.680 0.783 0.611 0.541 0.761
Number of facility 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354
Panel C
Policy 2,943*** 5,193*** 1,495*** 1,310*** 1,564*** 1,924*** 270.5*** 670.1***
(18.32) (53.21) (9.714) (22.87) (11.76) (32.87) (5.833) (11.16)
conflict - Low 409.2*** 1,619*** 170.7*** 750.5*** 301.5*** 524.9** -116.5*** 310.4***
(87.82) (544.5) (47.10) (226.0) (53.77) (264.0) (23.64) (102.0)
conflict - Mid 451.8** 1,336*** 306.0*** 421.2*** 291.7** 457.7*** 47.86 171.1***
(187.2) (271.2) (105.2) (139.5) (123.0) (175.5) (69.64) (59.27)
conflict - High -199.4 -233.3 -240.2*** -230.6* -322.1*** -434.1*** -131.3*** 10.47
(135.6) (261.2) (74.24) (119.3) (80.68) (160.5) (43.00) (55.53)
policy#low conflict -169.7* -481.4 -131.9** -455.9** -202.9*** 139.6 122.2*** -52.03
(96.95) (554.1) (52.49) (230.2) (59.71) (272.2) (27.04) (104.2)
policy#mid conflict -797.1*** -1,848*** -520.5*** -616.9*** -624.8*** -867.1*** -161.0** -247.3***
(191.3) (300.9) (107.6) (149.9) (125.3) (193.1) (70.97) (64.78)
Constant 3,566*** 6,247*** 2,259*** 3,690*** 2,101*** 3,550*** 1,328*** 1,680***
(15.28) (43.78) (8.128) (19.04) (9.788) (26.68) (4.910) (9.283)
Observations 39,595 14,049 39,595 14,049 39,595 14,049 39,595 14,049
R-squared 0.635 0.592 0.628 0.591 0.621 0.505 0.515 0.623
Observations 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920
R-squared 0.743 0.827 0.636 0.677 0.716 0.584 0.524 0.750
Number of facility 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A4: Child Health Indicators by Facility Type
PHCU PHCC PHCU PHCC PHCU PHCC PHCU PHCC
VARIABLES DPT1 DPT1 DPT3 DPT3 malaria malaria diarrhoea diarrhoea
Year 2,536*** 1,588*** 2,152*** 1,294*** 6,324*** 4,672*** 3,746*** 2,258***
(14.68) (25.35) (13.49) (19.12) (49.97) (72.58) (14.31) (18.78)
conflict = low -348.6*** 231.0* -177.2** 121.4 661.2** 189.1 -560.1*** -198.4*
(90.09) (139.1) (82.10) (110.8) (282.9) (400.8) (93.77) (112.3)
conflict = mid -1,517*** -988.9*** -1,357*** -841.1*** 462.7 417.9 -1,664*** -642.6***
(108.7) (176.2) (96.04) (129.3) (328.0) (440.6) (100.5) (130.1)
conflict = high -2,072*** -1,076*** -1,911*** -1,095*** -169.4 -969.5 -2,115*** -1,211***
(316.7) (376.1) (268.8) (252.5) (1,003) (986.3) (281.0) (238.4)
Constant 2,856*** 6,358*** 2,529*** 4,805*** 17,804*** 15,327*** 8,275*** 6,353***
(49.23) (76.91) (45.15) (57.93) (151.9) (212.1) (47.49) (58.39)
Observations 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920
R-squared 0.519 0.352 0.491 0.389 0.536 0.465 0.748 0.611
Year = 2012 1,716*** -409.3*** 1,604*** 207.5*** 8,618*** 8,224*** 5,296*** 3,766***
(56.03) (101.4) (46.91) (72.64) (180.4) (251.3) (53.02) (71.01)
Year = 2013 2,889*** 1,296*** 2,290*** 1,634*** 14,145*** 11,569*** 9,296*** 5,923***
(53.81) (100.3) (45.88) (72.95) (190.5) (264.8) (52.29) (72.43)
Year = 2014 4,471*** 2,332*** 3,674*** 1,983*** 20,956*** 16,014*** 9,970*** 6,370***
(54.78) (103.3) (46.84) (75.69) (202.7) (293.3) (52.57) (73.97)
Year = 2015 10,209*** 6,000*** 8,866*** 5,163*** 26,212*** 19,758*** 16,261*** 9,896***
(53.56) (102.8) (45.92) (75.41) (210.9) (299.5) (51.67) (73.17)
conflict = low -32.42 8.249 21.41 9.159 498.8* 499.6 -20.08 -52.59
(74.16) (129.2) (66.42) (102.0) (283.8) (400.5) (74.10) (101.4)
conflict = mid -63.44 -133.3 -8.517 -65.57 -15.05 -74.02 -130.5 -16.49
(92.13) (163.0) (79.98) (119.2) (330.2) (439.7) (85.49) (120.6)
conflict = high -209.0 -22.05 -216.3 -26.94 -851.3 -1,113 -94.58 -115.6
(286.9) (346.4) (242.2) (240.3) (997.2) (973.5) (274.0) (227.1)
Constant 4,048*** 7,631*** 3,478*** 5,496*** 16,496*** 13,585*** 7,505*** 5,592***
(49.89) (88.13) (42.28) (63.84) (180.6) (242.7) (47.61) (62.70)
Observations 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920
R-squared 0.631 0.385 0.616 0.422 0.539 0.476 0.804 0.635
Facilities 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354
Policy 4,239*** 3,198*** 3,292*** 2,633*** 12,567*** 9,010*** 8,358*** 4,924***
(59.03) (81.59) (52.27) (60.65) (158.1) (214.6) (63.45) (68.82)
conflict = low 731.2*** -417.4 870.5*** -380.2 4,725*** 4,277** 1,526*** 1,203*
(283.3) (819.0) (241.2) (633.0) (725.3) (2,107) (316.5) (702.7)
conflict = mid 311.0 -363.7 219.3 3.794 3,010** 3,623*** 1,561*** 1,586***
(608.2) (458.6) (482.2) (312.2) (1,499) (1,004) (575.0) (354.1)
conflict = high -1,823*** -822.0** -1,680*** -887.2*** 618.6 -300.9 -1,375*** -915.6***
(401.1) (376.3) (331.0) (247.4) (1,113) (1,179) (465.7) (292.2)
Policy#low -231.1 1,631* -332.8 1,261* -2,409*** -1,848 -884.6** -224.6
(314.6) (835.3) (268.9) (645.8) (802.0) (2,152) (350.6) (716.4)
Policy#mid -2,239*** -926.9* -1,871*** -1,092*** -3,516** -4,184*** -3,337*** -2,555***
(619.0) (499.5) (491.7) (343.3) (1,526) (1,099) (590.3) (388.7)
Constant 5,252*** 7,488*** 4,691*** 5,677*** 22,575*** 18,456*** 10,646*** 7,721***
(66.57) (83.82) (60.34) (63.03) (180.5) (233.9) (71.34) (72.00)
Observations 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920 39,436 13,920
R-squared 0.258 0.280 0.269 0.323 0.471 0.396 0.540 0.489
Number of facility 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354 1,154 354
Prais-Winsten regression, heteroskedastic panels corrected standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A5: Maternal and Child Health Indicators - World Bank
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC4 IPT2 Delivery DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea
Year = 2012 135.8*** 33.00 116.2*** 7.257 65.07 105.8 176.3 52.68
(49.70) (31.69) (29.41) (17.71) (238.9) (186.5) (180.7) (121.8)
Year = 2013 359.8*** 99.96*** 191.7*** 27.20 128.5 186.4 640.6*** 163.8
(55.43) (35.40) (32.61) (17.86) (250.9) (199.9) (191.9) (129.7)
Year = 2014 -85.43 -154.0*** -46.36 -98.08** -607.1 -438.4 -617.0* -495.9**
(78.62) (50.95) (46.48) (40.26) (434.7) (323.1) (325.0) (215.8)
Year = 2015 31.95 -131.1** -29.42 25.57 31.47 -15.54 111.7 367.7*
(86.75) (56.39) (50.41) (62.34) (434.2) (321.1) (507.5) (216.8)
conflict = low 36.42 57.23 100.00*** 104.9*** 150.9 159.6 -52.13 -33.24
(62.57) (41.17) (35.69) (28.93) (288.1) (204.4) (236.1) (145.8)
conflict = mid -48.48 12.30 -135.4** -85.63 244.3 -403.2 -236.4 -294.3
(108.2) (70.92) (61.99) (55.31) (552.1) (357.9) (428.6) (253.1)
conflict = high -35.27 13.69 2.218 -5.163 -497.5* -414.6** -715.4*** -492.7***
(64.18) (42.09) (36.64) (29.18) (293.8) (208.4) (242.5) (148.6)
2012#low conflict -112.5 -85.61* -154.6*** -119.4*** 280.9 41.42 130.8 52.49
(78.13) (51.28) (44.59) (34.91) (356.2) (253.2) (293.2) (180.2)
2012#high conflict -48.07 -51.35 -43.69 21.61 1,452*** 1,188*** 1,603*** 748.3***
(92.58) (61.29) (53.28) (47.51) (460.7) (330.7) (358.2) (233.4)
2013#low conflict -246.7*** -152.4*** -202.0*** -160.8*** 0.420 -120.5 -336.0 -68.84
(82.79) (54.19) (46.86) (34.58) (346.8) (245.0) (299.6) (177.8)
2013#mid conflict -161.2 -123.6 573.9 84.58
(152.0) (99.67) (534.5) (375.6)
2013#high conflict -313.0*** -154.2*** -159.2*** -72.26* 189.2 17.26 25.07 160.0
(88.78) (57.94) (50.70) (38.13) (392.4) (279.9) (329.1) (200.0)
2014#low conflict -50.22 -36.88 -73.56 -101.3** -108.9 -189.4 169.0 167.2
(97.28) (64.22) (56.02) (49.42) (486.6) (348.7) (380.3) (245.3)
2014#mid conflict -16.04 -6.595 142.6* 99.15 -248.6 361.0 172.6 358.5
(135.8) (88.99) (78.24) (69.74) (700.2) (473.4) (542.5) (332.4)
2014#high conflict 34.35 0.754 18.20 15.92 599.9 455.4 804.2** 568.6**
(98.28) (64.75) (56.65) (49.79) (491.2) (351.7) (384.9) (247.6)
2015#low conflict -61.74 -23.88 -67.48 -199.0*** -680.5 -573.1* -172.8 -404.0*
(94.52) (62.76) (53.98) (68.18) (453.1) (322.8) (545.9) (229.4)
2015#mid conflict 131.9 -788.7
(87.65) (744.3)
2015#high conflict -97.86 374.5
(73.10) (588.7)
Constant 429.6*** 271.2*** 197.2*** 162.6*** 811.6*** 615.6*** 1,924*** 1,307***
(33.00) (20.77) (19.85) (12.22) (174.5) (139.9) (126.6) (87.30)
R-squared 0.581 0.505 0.537 0.415 0.241 0.280 0.533 0.307
policy 40.77 -64.88** -0.158 -49.75** -468.6** -359.9** -187.7 -118.0
(42.10) (27.86) (27.18) (21.36) (202.0) (163.3) (198.7) (116.6)
conflict = low -37.33 -8.129 0.292 -7.407 170.8 72.75 -62.89 -27.41
(28.21) (18.24) (16.22) (10.33) (129.8) (95.23) (109.3) (63.53)
conflict = mid -95.82** -30.93 -32.27 -6.419 55.20 8.907 -208.6 -81.92
(45.00) (29.11) (26.03) (17.81) (219.2) (162.5) (185.0) (107.7)
conflict = high -75.72** -21.25 -22.30 -17.26 4.796 -60.49 -210.1 -163.7**
(32.79) (21.24) (19.00) (13.49) (166.0) (123.1) (139.2) (81.05)
Constant 438.2*** 275.7*** 226.6*** 166.1*** 897.1*** 714.2*** 2,104*** 1,362***
(35.14) (22.74) (22.40) (17.85) (158.6) (131.3) (161.3) (95.27)
R-squared 0.121 0.059 0.105 0.065 0.071 0.105 0.167
Number of State 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A6: Maternal and Child Health Indicators - USAID
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC4 IPT2 Delivery DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea
Year = 2012 262.8*** 263.5*** 222.1*** 84.33*** 146.7 203.8 962.4** 927.3***
(63.19) (68.95) (42.10) (26.19) (175.1) (178.3) (465.8) (231.6)
Year = 2013 456.2*** 320.1*** 273.4*** 109.4*** 356.1* 376.1** 1,415*** 1,160***
(66.82) (71.74) (44.32) (28.15) (182.8) (188.0) (516.4) (258.6)
Year = 2014 485.0*** 289.4*** 290.4*** 126.9*** 571.3*** 559.2*** 1,563*** 1,193***
(73.44) (80.71) (49.00) (30.56) (203.8) (206.3) (562.5) (282.0)
Year = 2015 539.7*** 183.9* 399.9*** 176.1*** 924.0*** 832.2*** 1,508** 1,314***
(90.20) (110.0) (57.97) (36.81) (278.9) (260.4) (639.9) (325.3)
conflict = low 124.2 58.72 117.4 40.24 -19.16 43.70 -161.8 392.3
(107.1) (121.3) (78.67) (34.92) (269.0) (267.3) (607.0) (251.1)
conflict = mid 61.37 254.3** 66.10 2.751 -419.7 149.8 -160.5 -122.9
(94.10) (128.0) (63.10) (33.51) (311.6) (261.1) (575.1) (230.6)
conflict = high -232.9** -174.5 -53.44 -11.48 -288.5 -236.1 -485.5 -221.7
(107.2) (121.7) (78.70) (34.83) (270.1) (267.3) (604.3) (249.3)
2012#low conflict -142.6 -93.32 -195.0** -59.71 221.7 140.3 339.8 -425.0
(124.9) (141.7) (91.33) (40.83) (316.4) (312.4) (704.5) (291.4)
2013#low conflict -137.7 -97.76 -124.3 -52.81 152.9 63.90 180.9 -434.5
(117.1) (133.8) (85.59) (38.34) (299.4) (293.8) (660.7) (274.9)
2014#low conflict -101.0 -98.07 -104.5 -56.50 -169.8 -203.4 55.23 -502.4*
(116.3) (134.8) (84.54) (38.42) (304.3) (295.1) (656.0) (276.5)
2014#mid conflict 26.41 -278.0 -77.33 417.7
(141.4) (176.3) (100.0) (410.8)
2015#low conflict -29.82 61.09 -67.48 -51.44 -48.37 -60.34 181.5 -356.6
(126.6) (154.3) (90.04) (43.09) (357.7) (335.0) (713.7) (314.8)
2015#mid conflict 60.41 -452.5 89.94 257.4
(47.74) (376.1) (773.9) (340.6)
Constant 363.8*** 274.8*** 210.5*** 136.4*** 704.2*** 588.7*** 2,554*** 517.5***
(47.17) (49.65) (31.56) (20.39) (126.4) (133.5) (388.8) (197.9)
R-squared 0.491 0.177 0.420 0.163 0.189 0.129 0.066 0.180
policy 352.9*** 176.7*** 188.7*** 84.03*** 414.5*** 370.8*** 690.8* 520.6**
(51.84) (60.71) (41.73) (24.51) (129.0) (135.0) (396.5) (210.2)
conflict = low 33.06 -23.04 7.270 -7.376 45.77 42.51 -5.282 -10.34
(25.61) (29.39) (17.81) (8.017) (76.11) (68.06) (132.7) (53.83)
conflict = mid 39.36 56.86 20.53 48.65** -157.3 -69.09 -84.89 54.84
(66.73) (75.68) (46.75) (20.35) (195.5) (175.7) (341.3) (132.6)
conflict = high -249.1** -142.7 -67.14 -9.100 -328.1 -252.4 -473.1 -149.9
(108.8) (108.2) (81.79) (28.30) (267.2) (256.8) (536.5) (139.2)
Constant 512.4*** 391.5*** 354.0*** 172.7*** 825.4*** 743.9*** 3,154*** 998.1***
(41.50) (48.61) (34.50) (21.93) (99.92) (107.4) (354.3) (226.1)
R-squared 0.385 0.028 0.167 0.050 0.093 0.031 0.002
Number of State 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 120
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A7: Maternal and Child Health Indicators - HPF
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC4 IPT2 Delivery DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea
Year = 2012 332.2*** 118.9*** 80.68 36.44** -174.9 -61.32 764.7** 504.0***
(67.03) (43.82) (56.84) (16.83) (114.9) (82.11) (368.6) (128.4)
Year = 2013 544.5*** 203.4*** 197.9*** 78.86*** 29.36 85.50 1,056** 953.3***
(79.17) (50.50) (67.65) (18.02) (130.5) (94.93) (427.5) (147.8)
Year = 2014 804.2*** 248.3*** 242.5*** 115.5*** 522.8*** 421.5*** 2,026*** 1,277***
(88.83) (60.16) (72.14) (19.99) (142.7) (103.9) (481.7) (164.9)
Year = 2015 893.3*** 309.5*** 340.2*** 139.2*** 972.2*** 830.4*** 2,616*** 1,786***
(93.79) (60.91) (76.63) (20.17) (148.8) (107.7) (511.4) (168.6)
conflict = low -255.5** -199.7* -61.08 44.24 -119.3 -64.50 -310.7 -298.4
(126.9) (118.5) (100.1) (35.45) (189.0) (137.8) (605.5) (290.6)
conflict = mid -107.0 -95.22 -60.46 10.80 549.3** 355.5** 357.6 56.49
(153.4) (113.8) (111.9) (46.54) (263.7) (180.1) (523.7) (393.4)
conflict = high 161.2 22.05 -19.24 9.699 289.1 -49.61 -80.96 -51.56
(153.4) (70.55) (111.9) (27.74) (201.9) (140.8) (475.7) (271.7)
2012#low conflict 153.9 131.1 -8.198 -35.57 86.08 19.91 -5.783 345.6
(136.4) (122.5) (107.2) (38.32) (214.0) (153.7) (658.6) (307.3)
2012#mid conflict 127.1 179.6 -45.48 -63.98 -481.3 -276.4 -359.9 -358.1
(197.0) (156.0) (198.2) (56.35) (334.8) (235.2) (826.9) (485.4)
2012#high conflict -20.22 2.595 -351.7 -48.44 50.47 -116.2
(133.7) (54.17) (332.1) (228.6) (706.2) (477.8)
2013#low conflict 279.2** 214.3* 75.68 -45.94 124.0 73.95 172.5 358.4
(133.8) (122.9) (106.6) (37.49) (206.0) (150.6) (641.2) (304.1)
2013#mid conflict -114.4 152.5 -54.86 10.02 -830.3** -520.4** -347.4 67.20
(199.0) (133.2) (130.6) (58.56) (375.2) (244.5) (921.9) (438.6)
2013#high conflict -242.6 -3.076
(186.8) (188.6)
2014#low conflict 191.3 251.9** 93.65 -37.48 69.48 17.28 116.6 245.5
(136.3) (124.9) (110.4) (37.97) (211.1) (154.3) (656.4) (308.6)
2014#mid conflict -49.35 101.8 65.36 -16.06 -723.5** -456.0** -846.6 -243.3
(167.5) (123.1) (131.8) (51.06) (295.8) (201.0) (669.4) (418.2)
2014#high conflict -274.8 -21.69 -23.06 -9.527 -466.9** -89.27 -405.3 66.46
(168.9) (87.78) (128.5) (33.02) (226.6) (158.4) (565.7) (302.8)
2015#low conflict 191.4 213.3* 38.32 -50.31 72.01 -7.413 -210.7 143.7
(137.0) (125.3) (110.2) (37.84) (211.4) (154.5) (659.9) (307.6)
2015#mid conflict -72.26 -18.49 21.77 -25.19 -553.1* -378.8* -1,169 -492.2
(183.4) (131.3) (134.2) (58.14) (333.5) (221.3) (859.7) (442.4)
2015#high conflict -194.2 -40.30 -11.96 -7.907 -247.5 -10.10 -654.1 -509.4
(174.6) (89.59) (142.1) (36.50) (257.4) (178.4) (639.6) (331.3)
Constant 235.7*** 131.6*** 195.1*** 59.08*** 471.3*** 304.2*** 1,386*** 414.9***
(59.48) (36.42) (47.49) (13.21) (91.47) (66.51) (328.5) (108.9)
R-squared 0.395 0.166 0.242 0.133 0.254 0.262 0.105 0.337
policy 440.4*** 180.9*** 230.5*** 79.85*** 376.9*** 274.4*** 892.6** 893.7***
(59.28) (40.67) (51.28) (14.31) (110.4) (79.62) (351.8) (119.2)
conflict = low -24.80 2.962 -2.239 7.085 13.57 -10.52 -169.8 12.28
(24.27) (17.92) (20.24) (6.277) (42.90) (30.92) (114.3) (50.89)
conflict = mid -108.9** -10.87 -35.48 -4.254 -21.27 -16.50 -174.1 -158.7*
(43.02) (28.27) (37.98) (13.11) (83.18) (53.37) (251.6) (90.04)
conflict = high -15.74 -2.698 -27.87 8.444 22.36 -57.19 -222.0 -94.57
(44.20) (31.46) (41.85) (12.48) (76.96) (51.66) (212.6) (106.1)
Constant 513.7*** 205.5*** 250.2*** 81.43*** 499.6*** 387.6*** 2,046*** 751.8***
(51.41) (35.09) (43.69) (12.08) (96.57) (71.00) (332.6) (103.2)
R-squared 0.402 0.084 0.247 0.053 0.045 0.070 0.023 0.169
Number of State 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6
Observations 353 353 353 353 353 353 353 353
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Paper 2: Does contracting-out of primary health care
services to Non-State Providers reduce child mortal-
ity in South Sudan? A synthetic control analysis
Abstract
Contracting-out is increasingly utilized as a health system strengthening strategy to expand access
health interventions known to reduce child mortality in lower- and middle-income countries (LMICs).
Existing scholarship suggest its effect has been mixed, limiting a definitive conclusion on its magni-
tude and direction. Few evaluations of the large-scale interventions in Sub-Saharan Africa have been
done to date. . I test the hypothesis that the contracting-out approach led to reductions in U5MR,
using a novel approach to construct a synthetic South Sudan from a panel of LMICs, and using
data from the World Bank Developmental Indicators (WDI) database. The analysis shows that on
average, contracting out had a negative effect on the rate of decline of U5MR; between 2000 and
2010, U5MR declined by 5.22% annually, prior to declining by 4.67% in 2011 and by 2.58% annually
between 2012 and 2016. These findings suggest limitations in the contracting approach implemented
in South Sudan and I discuss the possible policy implications of these findings.
Keywords— Synthetic Control; Under-five mortality; Conflict-affected settings; Lower-
and-middle-income countries; South Sudan
2.1 Introduction
The under-five mortality rate (U5MR), is a core indicator of the social, economic and
environmental conditions of children, and the quality of a country’s healthcare overall
(UNIGME, 2011). The U5MR was a key indicator of progress in the 2000 United Nations
(UN) Millennium Declaration where 189 heads of state committed to reducing child mor-
tality by two-thirds from their 1990 baseline by 2015. It remains a key objective of the 2030
UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) developed in 2015, which commit to reducing
U5MR to as low as 25 per 1,000 live births by 2030 (UNGA, 2015, 2000). Contracting-out
has been proposed as a health system strengthening approach to speed up the reduction
in child mortality by expanding access to evidence-based interventions and particularly in
countries with severe public resource constraints.
Globally, there has been substantial progress in reducing the U5MR, with rates de-
clining from 90 to 43 deaths per 1,000 live births between 1990 and 2015, a reduction of
approximately 6.7 million deaths (UN, 2015). There are however wide regional disparities;
while 55 countries achieved U5MR of less than 10 per 1,000 live births in 2013, only 9
were in developing economies. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), despite experiencing some of
the largest declines, remains the region with the highest U5MR; the U5MR declined from
179 to 86 deaths per 1,000 live births by 2015, further declining to 76 deaths per 1,000 live
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births in 2017. Of the 26 countries accounting for 80 per cent of all child deaths worldwide
in 2013, the ten countries with the highest U5MR were all in Sub-Saharan Africa (Wang
et al., 2014; UNIGME, 2011). Sub-Saharan Africa is also the only region in the world
where U5MR is expected to rise in the coming decades due to its relatively higher fertil-
ity rate and despite the impressive gains (UN, 2015). For Sub-Saharan Africa to achieve
the SDGs, there is a need for health systems approaches that accelerate access to health
interventions known to reduce child mortality.
Contracting out is increasingly utilized as one such approach to rapidly scale-up pri-
mary health care in lower- and middle-income countries. It involves the public sector
paying private organizations, typically non-governmental organizations (NGOs), for the
delivery of a defined package of evidence-based health interventions to defined popula-
tions. Contracting is regarded as having the potential to expand access to health services,
reduce production costs, improve quality, and to facilitate the provision of a package of
standardized health interventions known to reduce child mortality where existing capacity
is limited. It can increase allocative efficiency by increasing competition between providers,
improve quality, and overall health system performance by linking incentives to payments
on achievement of predefined targets and improvements in quality of care provided (Bar-
bara and Ngalande, 1994; Bennett and Mills, 1998; Palmer, 2000).
Thus far, there have been a limited number of studies that have directly assessed the
impact of contracting out on U5MR, with a relatively larger number of studies assessing the
effect on health facility utilization. The underlying assumption is that increasing access to
services results in improved health outcomes and thus reductions in child mortality. These
studies have however, also shown an unclear relationship between contracting-out and
increasing the utilization of specific health interventions that impact childhood morbidity
and mortality and there less evidence showing a relationship between contracting out and
production cost. In addition, the quality and rigor of the research design of existing studies
have been shown to be inadequate (Lagarde and Palmer, 2009; Bloom et al., 2006; Liu et al.,
2007).
This paper addresses some of these limitations; assuming that the contracting inter-
89
vention increased health facility utilization among children under-five, I use the synthetic
control method- a rigorous study design - to test the hypothesis that the contracting-out
policy implemented nationally to expand coverage of primary healthcare services in South
Sudan in 2012 led to reductions in the U5MR. I thus add to the existing evidence-space
on the impact of contracting-out on under-five mortality.
2.2 Background
2.2.1 Theoretical Framework
The major causes of child mortality are well-known and have been documented in
various studies (Rutstein, 2000; Bryce et al., 2005; Black et al., 2010). Between 68-75
percent of under-five deaths are attributable to six causes; pneumonia, diarrhoea, malaria,
neonatal sepsis, preterm birth complications, and birth asphyxia, with malnutrition being
an underlying cause of over half of these deaths. Evidence-based interventions that reduce
childhood mortality are also well-known.
Progress in reducing U5MR requires broad-based interventions that address not only
the distal determinants, but also the more proximal determinants primarily delivered within
the health sector. Within the health sector, these include preventive interventions such as
antenatal care that encourages birth spacing using modern contraceptive methods, tetanus
toxoid vaccination for pregnant women, delivery by skilled birth attendants, and exclusive
breastfeeding in the first six months of life, distribution of insecticide treated nets, child-
hood immunization, zinc and vitamin A supplementation. Treatment interventions include
integrated case management of childhood infections (diarrhoea and dysentery, pneumonia,
malaria), and neonatal sepsis. Outside the health sector, improving levels of education
for women, women’s empowerment through increasing political and socioeconomic partic-
ipation, reducing fertility rate and poverty and environmental management for example
improving access to clean water and sanitation also play a role in reducing child mortality
(Jones et al., 2003; Rutstein, 2005; Kuruvilla et al., 2014).
Recent studies have assessed the proportion of U5MR reductions attributable to health
interventions to those outside of the health sector. The 2013 Global Burden of Disease
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Study estimated that income growth and maternal education reduced child mortality by
16% and 38% respectively, while higher fertility rates which result in increased numbers
of births, were associated with increases in the number of the children dying. Overall
however, 72% of childhood deaths were averted through investments in new drugs, vaccines,
diagnostic procedures and public health campaigns, thus providing strong evidence for
prioritizing investment in health-related interventions (Wang et al., 2014). A more recent
analysis of 146 low-and-middle income countries (Bishai et al., 2016) evaluated health and
social determinants of maternal and child mortality across eight policy areas; wealth (gross
domestic product (GDP) per capita), environment (clean water and improved sanitation
access), infrastructure (rural electricity access, urbanization and road density), education
(gross female primary and secondary school enrolment), gender equality (female labour
force participation and number of women parliamentarians in national legislatures), health
service coverage (skilled birth attendance, physicians per 1,000 population and prenatal
care), immunization (measles and diphtheria, pertussis, and tetanus (DPT) immunization)
and fertility (total fertility and adolescent fertility rate). Results show that 89% of the
reduction in child mortality between 1990 and 2010 were attributable to improvements in
the health determinants, while per capita GDP growth was associated with a mere 20% of
improvements in child health, suggesting that even low-income economies can significantly
improve U5MR (Bishai et al., 2016).
In-depth analysis of 10 countries that were on track to achieve the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) 4&5 in 2012 suggested that GDP growth per capita accounted
for only 12% of the reduction in child mortality between 1990 and 2010, however health
system investments (immunization coverage (DPT, measles and polio), reduction in total
fertility rate, skilled birth attendance and maternal and newborn care) accounted for over
half the reductions (Kuruvilla et al., 2014). Another study of 241 sub-national regions in
Sub-Saharan Africa found that improvements in child mortality in the region between 2000
and 2010 occurred despite moderate growth in GDP during that period. These improve-
ments were largely a result of increased antenatal care coverage, expansion of intermittent
preventive treatment of malaria in pregnancy (IPTp), vaccination coverage, and maternal
education (Akachi et al., 2017). Taken together, these studies suggest that health sector
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investments that expand quality of and access to health care services are key factors to
successfully reducing child mortality, even in countries with low GDP per capita.
2.2.2 Contracting-out
Contracting-out the provision of health services is increasingly utilized as an approach
to scale-up access to and quality of primary healthcare services in lower- and middle-income
countries. It involves governments entering into contracts with the private sector to deliver
a defined package of health services due to capacity constraints inherent within the public
sector. This allows the government to concentrate on providing stewardship and oversight
to the health sector while the private sector retains responsibility for rapidly expanding
access to care.
Contracting-out is believed to increase allocative efficiency by increasing competition
among providers and to improve health system performance by linking incentives to pay-
ments on achievement of predefined targets (Barbara and Ngalande, 1994; Bennett and
Mills, 1998; Palmer, 2000). Contract payments have thus been predicated on achievement
of pre-specified targets based on increases in health facility utilization to increase access to
care and to improvements in quality of care. To date, most contracting interventions have
had the overall objectives of reducing maternal and child mortality by expanding access
to health services, improving quality of care, and reducing inequity. In Afghanistan, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia and South Sudan for example, the contract has
been based on the provision of a basic package of health services comprising of high-impact
interventions known to improve reproductive health and child health.
The underlying assumption is that contracting-out can aid in reducing child mortality
by expanding access to a package of health interventions known to reduce child mortality
on a larger scale. For example, contracting has been found to increase coverage by 3.4-26.0
percentage points compared to non-contracted services (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005)
and a study of 12 contracting-out projects found that 10 out of the 12 studies reported
significant gains in increasing access to contracted health services (Liu et al., 2007). Con-
tracting out may also be a cost-effective means of delivering public health interventions;
the cost of implementing the basic package of health services per head per year ranged from
92
US$ 2.82 in Cambodia, US$4.50 in Afghanistan and US$ 6.25 in Guatemala. Contracting-
out may also lead to an increase government spending for health; Bloom (2006) found that
it increased government health expenditure by $2.94 in contracted districts compared with
a $1.59 in non-contracted districts, suggesting higher public sector investment in health.
This was offset by reductions in individual health expenditures of USD$ 19.25 dollars
(Bloom et al., 2006; Liu et al., 2007; Odendaal et al., 2018). Reductions in health care
costs at the household level may reduce poverty, leading to increased spending in other
goods and services that improve overall health for example food, education, and clean
water.
Contracting-out can also improve equity in health services provision resulting in the
poor accessing health services. Studies in Cambodia and Bangladesh showed that con-
tracting that targeted poor and marginalized populations increased access to health ser-
vices (Loevinsohn and Harding, 2005). Contracting out has also been effective in reducing
the inequity-gap of health services utilization when comparing the poor and non-poor
in Afghanistan (Alonge et al., 2014). Interestingly, this study found that this was also
dependent on the contracting model with variation in access depending on whether the
contract budget is negotiable but deliverables or outputs are not (OR 2.82, p=0.001) or
non-negotiable with a degree of flexibility on deliverables (OR 2.00, p=0.001). Inputs based
contracts did not have a significant effect on equity. Given that child mortality is often
highest in poorer and marginalized communities, contracting may thus reduce within coun-
try variations in child mortality with careful design of the contract itself. This implies that
while contracting-out may overall improve access to care, the design and implementation
of the approach is critical and may explain variations in observed outcomes.
2.2.3 Effect heterogeneity
Successful contracting depends on the ability of the public sector to design and manage
contracts particularly where financial management, human resources and technical capacity
is limited, as well as the broader socio-economic and political environment (Mills, 1998;
Bennett and Mills, 1998). This influences the competitiveness of the contract bidding
process (where there are few providers) and the capacity of providers to implement health
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interventions and meet predefined targets. This suggests that while contracting is presumed
to increase allocative efficiency, it may be dependent on the availability of providers. Thus,
while contracting may be implemented as a strategy to increase access to health services
and improve health outcomes, it may have a limited effect due to contextual circumstances
and the specifics of the contract itself.
The design of the contract may itself influence the achievement of outputs, targets
and therefore U5MR. Contract design has been shown to influence the effectiveness of
interventions aimed at improving equity where there is limited flexibility in negotiating
the cost of the contract or the contract deliverables (Alonge et al., 2014). The case of
health is particularly relevant as the principal (government) may not be able to observe
the efforts the providers undertake to meet targets. Contracts that focus solely on outcomes
may therefore create distortions in the allocation of resources as these may reward those
providers that exert less effort. For instance, providers may only be willing to work in easy
areas where the cost of achieving specific goals may be lower than other geographic areas
with higher mortality rate. There have been limited studies that have assessed the specifics
of the contract design on health system performance, thus this relationship remains unclear.
Changes in health facility utilization, and ultimately reductions in child mortality may
also take a long time to accrue resulting in reductions in U5MR only becoming apparent
years after a contracting-out policy is implemented. In addition, the success of contracting
is likely to vary at the sub-national level due to e.g. limited capacity of governments to
provide overall stewardship to the health system, inadequate financial and management
systems, differences in implementation modalities across providers, resource constraints and
incompleteness of contracts (Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010; Witter, 2012; Rao et al., 2018).
Studies have also shown that sub-national variations in for example poverty and health
care utilization at the individual and population level influences the overall magnitude and
direction of U5MR (Burke et al., 2016) suggesting that the observed U5MR may mask
improvements in sub-national U5MR.
Reductions in U5MR may also depend on the quality of health services provided.
However, there is limited evidence on the effect of contracting-out on the quality of health
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services provided primarily due to inconsistencies in the definition of quality of care, and
lack of control groups with which to assess improvements in quality accrued to contracting
(Liu et al., 2007). Thus, while contracting-out may increase access to care, poor quality of
health services may limit impact on the overall U5MR despite increases in health facility
utilization.
2.2.4 Previous Literature
To date, there have been a limited number of studies that directly assessed the impact
of contracting out on U5MR. In Cambodia, two studies found that contracting had little
to no effect on infant and child mortality; one study found reduced mortality in children
younger than one year of age by a non-significant 4.3% (p=0.36) (Odendaal et al., 2018)
while another study found a non-significant increase of 0.0023% (Bonfrer et al., 2014). In
Sao Paulo, Brazil, the effect of contracting on child mortality was a non-significant re-
duction of 0.093 percentage points (Greve and Schattan Ruas Pereira Coelho, 2017). The
limitations in the number of studies may be related to lack of adequate measures of child
mortality at the national level, as these estimates require relatively large populations and
are thus primarily ascertained through national household surveys, and observable reduc-
tions in U5MR may take a long time to accrue. There is need for additional evidence to
clarify the effect of contracting on under-five mortality. Synthetic control analysis provides
an additional toolkit for researchers seeking to understand the impact of contracting on
mortality outcomes.
Lack of progress on reducing U5MR may also be due to an overall assumption that
improvements in access to evidence-based health interventions are correlated with reduc-
tions in under-five mortality. Alternatively, increases in health facility utilization may not
necessarily be accompanied by advances in the quality of care, limiting overall impact.
There have been relatively more studies assessing the effect of contracting on utilization of
health services. Two systematic reviews published in 2009 and 2018 assessed the effect of
contracting on access in Cambodia, Bolivia, Pakistan, and Guatemala, and found mixed
results (Lagarde and Palmer, 2009; Odendaal et al., 2018). In Bolivia contracting-out of
the primary care facilities at the district level led to an increase of 8.8% in skilled birth
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attendance, and in Pakistan the average number of monthly consultations increased by
144%, though this steadily declined to 73% over an 18-month period, indicative of regres-
sion to the mean. In Cambodia, contracting-out significantly increased the use of public
health facilities by 21% (p = 0.02) and uptake of vitamin A by 19% (p = 0.02), but had
little to no effect on the number of pregnant women with more than two antenatal care
visits, skilled birth attendance, contraceptives use, childhood immunization, incidence of
childhood diarrhoea and mortality of children younger than one year in the 12 months of
the study period. Results from Guatemala also showed limited effect on children receiving
3 doses of DPT immunization, more than 3 antenatal care visits to a health professional
and use of contraceptives. In Afghanistan, contracting-out was found to increase the av-
erage number of new patient visits per health facility per month by 5.08, representing an
increase of a factor of 21.88, total deliveries at health facilities by a factor of 41.75, and
DPT3 by a factor of 13.46 by 2011, compared to the baseline in 2004 (Newbrander et al.,
2014).
There have been limited assessments of contracting-out in Sub-Saharan Africa, despite
its increasing popularity. In Burundi and Rwanda, the contracting-out model included
performance-based financing in select health facilities, with payments tied to increased uti-
lization of pre-selected interventions. In Rwanda there was a 23% increase in health facility
deliveries, 56% and 135% increase in curative consultations among children younger than
23 months and aged 24 - 59 months respectively in intervention facilities. However, there
were no improvements in antenatal care 4th visits or children fully immunized (Basinga
et al., 2011). In Burundi, there was no effect on skilled birth attendance, and quantity
or timeliness of antenatal care visits. There may have been improvements in quality of
ANC services as measured by an increase in the proportion of mothers with blood pressure
measurements and receiving one or more tetanus toxoid vaccination (Bonfrer et al., 2014).
Overall, these results suggest that while contracting does increase utilization of pub-
lic health facilities potentially by reducing barriers to access, its effect on specific health
interventions is mixed. Maternal health interventions and expansion of immunization cov-
erage appear less influenced by the contracting-out intervention and may require more
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demand-driven approaches at the individual level, for example the use of vouchers or more
expansive health education for behavioural change at the community level.
Previous studies therefore show an unclear relationship between contracting-out and
actual or perceived reductions in child mortality. Firstly, there are a limited number
of studies that have directly assessed impact on child mortality, with these few studies
suggesting a limited effect overall albeit this may be due to the short duration of the study
periods and limitations in sample size. There is need for additional assessments of the effect
of contracting on U5MR that take into consideration these limitations. Secondly, studies
assessing the utilization of specific health interventions known to reduce child mortality
have also shown mixed results. Of note are lack of improvements in antenatal care visits,
skilled birth attendance and immunization coverage which may suggest that the specifics
of the contracting interventions may require further research in implementation modalities
and to identify innovations in improving coverage.
Lastly, the quality and rigor of the research design of a number of these studies have
been shown to be inadequate (Lagarde and Palmer, 2009; Bloom et al., 2006; Liu et al.,
2007). For example (Bloom et al., 2006) was a cluster randomized study with too few
randomized districts and control districts with significantly lower funding, in Bolivia the
selected control was a maternity unit whereas intervention sites were health facilities, and
in Pakistan there was regression to the mean over the 18-month study period. In addition,
very few studies utilized population-based household data; most were descriptive studies
and thus did not control for potential confounders and only a few included a control group
to allow a counterfactual assessment.
I address a number of these limitations by evaluating the impact of contracting on
U5MR in South Sudan with data from 2000-2016 using the synthetic control method.
Synthetic control is a rigorous study design that utilizes a data-driven approach to construct
a counterfactual, allowing for an assessment of the direction and magnitude of U5MR. The
evaluation contains U5MR data from 2000-2016, with 5 years of data after the contracting
intervention is implemented, allowing us to observe the overall trend of U5MR and to
assess for any regression to the mean. The evaluation is at the national level, and thus
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does not assess the effect of contracting on specific health interventions. Note that U5MR
is influenced by a wide range of interventions. I make the assumption that the effect
of health interventions on U5MR should be observable given the studies that have shown
these to have greater weight on U5MR reduction (Kuruvilla et al., 2014; Bishai et al., 2016;
Akachi et al., 2017). Previous literature therefore suggest that the limitation in reducing
childhood mortality may be due to the specifics of the contracting-out intervention itself
and not the effectiveness of the specific interventions. However this study does not assess
this and instead adds to the evidence-base on the effect of contracting on U5MR.
I evaluate whether the contracting policy led to reductions in child mortality, compared
to a synthetic South Sudan comprised of a weighted average of similar countries which acts
as the counterfactual. I hypothesize that the contracting policy led to improved access to
evidence-based health interventions known to reduce childhood mortality and thus reduced
U5MR.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
In 2012, South Sudan implemented a nation-wide contracting-out approach in a geo-
graphically focused financing architecture aimed at ensuring adequate financial, technical
support and oversight to all health facilities nationwide. The basis of the contracts was a
basic package of health services known to have a high impact on reducing child and ma-
ternal mortality. Three mechanisms were established and financed primarily by bilateral
and multilateral donors with implementation by local and international NGOs; the World
Bank provided US$28 million for a population of approximately 2.7 million, an annual
per capita spending for health estimated at US$4.93, USAID provided US$ 85 million to
cover a population of 2 million, an estimated annual per capita spending of US$8.5 per
annum, and a Health Pooled Fund consisting of 6 donors contributed GB120 million for a
population of 5.1 million resulting in per-capital health expenditure of US$ 10.41.
Due to the nationwide implementation, there are no valid comparison units within
South Sudan with which to assess impact on U5MR. South Sudan also has a unique history
1using 2012 exchange rates of 1 GB = 1.55 US$. The program was for 3.5 yrs
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among the countries in East Africa; it emerged from over 30 years of conflict in 2005, had
very low health indicators as per the 2006 and 2010 Sudan Health and Household Survey,
and had high GDP per capita due to its reliance on oil exports. None of the other Eastern
Africa countries had a similar trajectory, making it difficult to compare the trends in South
Sudan to that of other countries in the region.
2.3.1 Synthetic Control Method
The synthetic control method resolves the previously mentioned limitation of a com-
parative unit by using a data-driven approach to construct a ‘synthetic’ South Sudan as a
weighted average of similar countries, chosen to reflect the characteristics of South Sudan
prior to the implementation of the health system policy. Synthetic control is a compara-
tive case study methodology developed by Abadie and colleagues (Abadie and Gardeazabal,
2003; Abadie et al., 2010, 2015). It has primarily been used in the fields of political science
and economics with limited studies focusing on lower- and middle-income economies and
on health specifically. For LMICs, it has been used to assess the effect of trade liberal-
ization on child mortality (Barlow, 2018), effect of democracy on child mortality (Pieters
et al., 2016), to evaluate a tobacco control policy in South Africa (Chelwa et al., 2017),
and the effect of the elimination of user fees in health facilities in Zambia (Lépine et al.,
2018).
The synthetic control method estimates the effect of a policy, for example contracting,
by approximating a counterfactual constructed from a weighted combination of similar
countries, referred to as the donor pool. The underlying assumption is that the character-
istics of South Sudan are more accurately matched by a weighted combination of countries
i.e. the synthetic control, than by a single country or by the average of several countries.
I therefore select pre-intervention characteristics, W such that the characteristics of
South Sudan best resemble those of the synthetic control. Thus, if we let x1 be the pre-
intervention characteristics for South Sudan, and x0 the pre-intervention characteristics
of countries in the donor pool, we aim to closely match x1 to x0 such that the difference
between the pre-intervention characteristics between the South Sudan and synthetic South
Sudan is x1−x0, with a weight W* selected to minimize this difference. Thus, the difference
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between pre-intervention characteristics is the vector X1 −XoW . If we denote the specific
variable as m, where m=1,...k, we are thus choosing the value of W that minimizes;
k∑
m=1
vm(x1m − x0jW )2 (2.1)
where vm is a weight reflecting the relative importance of the specific variable; x1m
is the value of the m-th variable for the treated unit, while X0m is the value for the
corresponding donor units.
Note that the pre-intervention characteristics are variables with large predictive power
on U5MR, and following (Abadie et al., 2015), we also include the outcome of interest
among the pre-intervention variables in the subsequent analysis. Given a large number
of pre-intervention periods, matching on pre-intervention characteristics controls for the
effect of observed and unobserved confounders on the outcome of interest and thus the
observed difference following the intervention can be attributed to the policy. The effect of
the contracting policy is therefore the difference between South Sudan and the synthetic






w ∗j Yjt (2.2)
WhereY1t is the observed U5MR for South Sudan after contracting and w ∗j Yjt is the
U5MR for synthetic South Sudan.
2.3.2 P-values and inference
A key limitation of the synthetic control method is the inability to use standard meth-
ods of statistical inference due to the small-sample size, the lack of randomization and
that probabilistic sampling is not used. However, falsification tests, referred to as placebo
studies can be conducted as an alternative model for inference (Abadie et al., 2015).
To assess the validity of the observed effect, a series of falsification tests are conducted.
This involves replicating the synthetic control procedure but iteratively reassigning the
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treatment unit to each of the donor countries and comparing the effect estimate to that
obtained initially, referred to as " in-space" placebos. Additionally, we also reassign the
treatment time to a period when the intervention did not occur, in an "in-time" placebo
test. As we have adequate data prior to 2012 when contracting was implemented, we test
whether the method produces large effects when applied to that earlier period.
Another limitation is that a few countries in the donor pool have also implemented a
similar nationwide contracting intervention, for example Liberia and Sierra Leone, while
other countries have implemented contracting at a smaller scale (for example Rwanda and
Burundi). This may result in a smaller effect size comparing South Sudan to synthetic
South Sudan, should those countries also have experienced reductions in U5MR. An anal-
ysis comparing South Sudan to a synthetic South Sudan that does not include Liberia and
Sierra Leone is thus also done. However, note that the synthetic control is selected based
on comparability of the U5MR to South Sudan prior to the contracting intervention intro-
duced in 2012, while contracting in donor unit countries occurred prior to that of South
Sudan.
2.3.3 Data sources and measurement
Data is obtained from annual country-level panel data covering the period 2000 to
2016 obtained from the World Bank Developmental Indicators (WDI) database. The WDI
represents the most accurate global development data for 217 countries. Data for South
Sudan is dis-aggregated from Sudan for the period 2000-2016, representing 12 year prior
and 5 years after the 2012 health system policy implemented in South Sudan. This gives
us adequate pre-implementation data points to construct a counterfactual to South Sudan,
henceforth referred to as synthetic South Sudan, as described in the methodology section.
The donor pool for synthetic South Sudan consists of 81 countries identified as low income
and lower middle-income economies from Africa, Latin America and Asia, according to the
World Bank’s classification of countries by per capita gross national income (Fantom and
Serajuddin, 2016). The full list of countries is available in the Supplemental Appendix.
The outcome variable, Yjt, is mortality rate for children under-5 years of age, per 1,000 live
births for each of the countries consisting of the donor pool. The World Bank estimates
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are obtained from the median estimates of under-five mortality from the United Nations
Inter-agency Group for Child Mortality Estimation (UN IGME) database (Alkema et al.,
2016). The UN IGME estimates are based on household surveys and are thus the most
robust estimates available.
Following the variables described in (Bishai et al., 2016), the following predictor vari-
ables for U5MR are selected; Wealth ( domestic health expenditure, nutrition status), ed-
ucation (female literacy rate amongst 15-24 year olds), gender equality (female labor force
participation rate), health service coverage (cause of death, by communicable diseases and
maternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions), immunization (DPT immunization), fertility
(Crude birth-rate and Fertility rate, total), and also include mortality indicators (U5MR,
Probability of dying, Lifetime risk of maternal death, Crude death-rate). Note that due
to limited data for South Sudan, indicators for environment and infrastructure are not
included in the model. A comprehensive definition of these variables is found in Table 2.1.
2.3.4 Sample specification
As noted previously, synthetic South Sudan is constructed as a weighted average of
countries in the donor pool, with higher weights applied to countries more similar to South
Sudan in the pre-intervention period.
The model is fitted with the outcome variable for the pre-intervention period, assuming
that the intervention had no effect on U5MR prior to 2012. To best approximate the U5MR
prior to the intervention year 2012, vm weights are chosen so that the resulting synthetic
South Sudan and South Sudan have similar pre-intervention trends in U5MR as shown in
Table 2.2.
Where year is specified, predictors are averaged for the year indicated and not the
entire pre-intervention period as these are the years for which data for South Sudan is
available.
Using the assigned vm weights, we find that the most important predictors for U5MR
during the pre-intervention period were; U5MR in 2011 (0.55), cause of death, by commu-
nicable diseases and maternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions (0.12), survival to age 65,
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Table 2.1: Data sources and definition of measures.
Variable Source Measure
U5MR UN IGME
Probability per 1,000 that a newborn baby will die
before reaching age five, if subject to age-specific
mortality rates of the specified year
Communicable
disease deaths WDI database
Cause of death, by communicable diseases and ma-
ternal, prenatal and nutrition conditions (% of to-
tal)
Survival to age
65, female WDI database
Percentage of a cohort of newborn infants that
would survive to age 65, if subject to age specific
mortality rates of the specified year.
Domestic health
expenditure WDI database
Domestic general government health expenditure
(% of current health expenditure.
Probability of
dying WDI database
Probability of dying between age 5-14 years of age
expressed per 1,000 children aged 5, if subject to
age-specific mortality rates of the specified year.
Population ages
0-14 WDI database Population ages 0-14, total
Lifetime risk of
maternal death WDI database
Probability that a 15-year-old female will die even-
tually from a maternal cause assuming that cur-
rent levels of fertility and mortality (including ma-
ternal mortality) do not change
Fertility rate,
total WDI database
Number of children that would be born to a woman
if she were to live to the end of her childbearing
years and bear children in accordance with age-




WDI database Labor force participation rate for ages 15-24, fe-male (%) (modeled ILO estimate)
Life expectancy,
female WDI database
Number of years a newborn female infant would
live if prevailing patterns of mortality at the time
of its birth were to stay the same throughout its
life.
Crude birth-rate WDI database Number of live births per 1,000 midyear popula-tion.
Crude
death-rate WDI database Number of deaths per 1,000 midyear population.
Prevalence of
stunting WDI database
Prevalence of stunting, height for age (% of chil-
dren under 5)
Literacy Rate,
15-24 females WDI database




Percentage of children ages 12-23 months who re-
ceived DPT vaccinations before 12 months
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Table 2.2: Under-Five Mortality
Predictor Weights.
Under-5 mortality rate 0.5534
Communicable disease deaths(2010) 0.1203
Survival to age 65, female 0.1135
Domestic health expenditure(2012) 0.0413
Probability of dying (2010) 0.0403
Population ages 0-14 0.0402
Lifetime risk of maternal death (%) 0.0378
Fertility rate, total 0.0189
Female labor force participation rate 0.0169
Life expectancy, female 0.0067
Crude birth-rate 0.0039
Crude death-rate 0.0028
Prevalence of stunting (2006&2010) 0.0028
Literacy Rate, 15-24 females(2008) 0.0010
DPT immunization coverage(2011&2012) 0.0002
Notes: Definitions from World Bank Indicator Database.
among females as percentage of cohort (0.11), domestic general government health expen-
diture as percentage of current health expenditure (0.04), probability of dying at age 5-14
years per 1,000 children age 5 (0.04), lifetime risk of maternal death (0.04), total fertility
rate (0.2), female labour force participation rate (0.02), and female life expectancy (0.01).
In accordance with previous studies (Bishai et al., 2016; Kuruvilla et al., 2014), our
model assigns highest weights ( 70%) to health sector determinants, specifically U5MR
(although this may be due to the fact that it is our outcome variable), probability of
dying before 15 years of age among children under five, and communicable disease deaths.
The importance of mothers to the survival of the child is also predicated with predictor
variables for maternal health, education, fertility and mortality assigned an importance of
approximately 20 percent. Domestic health expenditure for health contributes a mere 4
percent, likely as a result of data being available only for the year 2012 for South Sudan,
but also consistent with previous studies (Akachi et al., 2017). The low contribution of
nutrition as ascertained by the prevalence of stunting may be due to its correlation with
the determinants of childhood morbidity and mortality (Charmarbagwala et al., 2004).
By construction, the weights of countries making up synthetic South Sudan sum up to
1. Synthetic South Sudan is a weighted average of Liberia, Malawi, Sierra Leone, Burundi,
Central African Republic, Angola, Eswatini, Gambia and Kenya in order of decreasing
weight as illustrated in Table 2.3.
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Among the countries selected, Liberia and Sierra Leone have both implemented a
similar health system strengthening contracting policy as that implemented in South Sudan
in 2012, thus further analysis excluding the two countries is done as a check on their relative
importance to the model. These results are discussed in a subsequent section on robustness
tests as the results do not vary significantly, whether we include or exclude them.
Comparison of the pre-intervention characteristics of South Sudan, Synthetic South
Sudan, and remaining 80 lower and middle income economies is provided in Table 2.4. As
observed, Synthetic South Sudan more closely resembles South Sudan prior to the 2012
intervention, when compared to all other LMICs. For example, the difference in U5MR
between synthetic South Sudan and South Sudan is less than 0.2, while the remaining
LMIC countries have close to half the U5MR of South Sudan. Across all other indicators,
except female literacy rate, prevalence of stunting, and DPT immunization coverage, there
is a less than 5% variation between South Sudan and synthetic South Sudan.
Comparing South Sudan with the other LMIC countries, South Sudan has lower do-
mestic spending on health care, a higher crude birth rate, a much younger population
that also has a higher probability of dying between the ages of 5-14 years, almost double
the risk of dying of communicable diseases, and lower DPT immunization coverage. All
indicators except prevalence of stunting among children under 5 years have a greater than
20% variation and of note, South Sudan has poorer indicators on average compared to the
other LMICs.
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Table 2.4: Comparison of U5MR pre-intervention predictor
Predictor Balance South Sudan Synthetic South Sudan LMIC countries
Under-5 mortality rate 138.59 138.78 65.67
Domestic health expenditure (2012) 22.86 22.12 32.25
Population ages 0-14 44.18 44.79 39.00
Crude death-rate 14.21 13.91 9.89
Probability of dying (2010) 28.05 28.23 16.95
Crude Birth-rate 40.32 41.40 32.78
Life expectancy, female 52.62 52.99 62.84
Female labor force participation rate 48.38 48.63 39.39
Fertility rate, total 5.76 5.67 4.37
Literacy Rate, 15-24 females (2008) 29.58 5.45 80.62
Communicable disease deaths (2010) 71.30 70.36 45.73
Lifetime risk of maternal death (%) 5.91 5.77 2.30
Survival to age 65, female 46.79 46.66 61.62
Prevalence of stunting (2006&2010) 33.65 29.29 36.14
DPT immunization coverage (2011&2012) 60.00 85.24 80.75
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Synthetic control analysis
Figure 2.1 plots trends in U5MR comparing South Sudan to all other LMICs, to neigh-
bouring countries and to countries within Eastern Africa only. These countries are Bu-
rundi, Somalia Djibouti, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, South Sudan, Su-
dan, Uganda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic.
As illustrated in the figure, countries close to or neighbouring South Sudan may not
provide a valid comparison to estimate the impact of contracting on U5MR. U5MR falls
throughout the observation period, however South Sudan has higher U5MR compared to
its neighbours throughout. U5MR is similar in a pool of countries consisting of a select
number of Eastern African countries and South Sudan’s neighbours and Eastern African
countries only, although U5MR does begin to diverge with the Eastern African countries
achieving higher reductions. However, the U5MR of these countries is higher than that of
all LMICs combined, but the accelerated rate of decline of the U5MR suggest that these
countries may close this gap in future.
As explained above, we construct a synthetic South Sudan from a pool of LMICs in
order to ensure that the pre-intervention trends provide a valid counterfactual. A graphical
illustration of the trend in U5MR for South Sudan and synthetic South Sudan for the period
2000 – 2016 is depicted in Figure 2.2. Synthetic South Sudan closely replicates the U5MR
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Figure 2.1: Trend in U5MR rate, South Sudan compared to other LMICs.
for South Sudan during the period prior to the 2012 health system policy, indicating that
it provides an acceptable counter-factual, relative to the other lower- and middle-income
economies or countries within Sub-Saharan Africa.
During the pre-intervention period, U5MR for South Sudan and synthetic Southern
Sudan falls from a high of approximately 180 under-five deaths per 1,000 live births to a
low of 102 under-five deaths per 1,000 live births. This largely follows the overall drop in
U5MR observed in Sub-Saharan Africa during the MDG period. The drop in U5MR prior
to the signing of a Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan and southern
Sudan in 2005, is surprising as this was during the period when southern Sudan was in
conflict with northern Sudan and may be suggestive of the effect of humanitarian aid during
that time period.
The U5MR for synthetic South Sudan begins to diverge from that of South Sudan
mid- 2011, corresponding with the independence of South Sudan on July 2011. In 2012
and 2013, U5MR in South Sudan is estimated at 98.6 and 96.9 per 1000 live births, before
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Figure 2.2: Trend in U5MR rate, South Sudan and Synthetic South Sudan.
stagnating at 96.4 during the remaining observation period, while that of synthetic South
Sudan drops to 96.5, 91.5, 86.8, 82.7 and 79 per 1,000 live births between 2012 and 2016.
Thus the percentage difference between South Sudan diverges from synthetic South Sudan
by 2%, 6%, 10%, 14% and 18% between 2012-2016 as shown in table 2.5
Table 2.5: Impact of Contracting on U5MR.
Year South Sudan Synthetic South Sudan Percentage Change
2012 98.6 96.55 2%
2013 96.9 91.50 6%
2014 96.4 86.84 10%
2015 96.4 82.67 14%
2016 96.4 79.03 18%
Another way of depicting the effect of the contracting policy on U5MR is by depict-
ing the yearly gaps in U5MR rate between South Sudan and synthetic South Sudan as
illustrated in figure 2.3. These results suggest that the contracting-out policy had a neg-
ative effect on the rate of decline of U5MR during the observation period. Reduction
in the U5MR would have therefore been larger, had the contracting-out intervention not
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Figure 2.3: Gap in U5MR rate, South Sudan and Synthetic South Sudan.
been implemented, or in other words had the existing interventions continued during the
intervention period.
In order to assess the robustness of the results, I exclude the two countries that have
implemented similar large-scale contracting intervention in Sub-Saharan Africa that were
included in construction of synthetic South Sudan and rerun the synthetic control analysis.
The synthetic South Sudan pre-intervention trend in U5MR is similar to that of South
Sudan even when I exclude these two countries, and the overall trend remains the same,
as illustrated in figure 2.4.
I also assess U5MR using a pool of countries neighbouring South Sudan selecting the
countries depicted in figure 2.1. While the pre intervention trend of U5MR comparing
South Sudan to synthetic South Sudan is less similar, the overall trend of U5MR after
the contracting intervention remains the same, with U5MR remaining higher, compared
to that of the synthetic South Sudan (Fig. 2.5). I also further compare South Sudan to a
synthetic South Sudan consisting of oil-producing countries, and while the pre-intervention
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Figure 2.4: Trend U5MR excluding Liberia and Sierra Leone.
trend is similar, find a similar post-intervention effect (Fig. 2.6).
Due to the limited number of existing studies that have directly estimated the impact
of contracting on U5MR at a national level, it is difficult to compare these results to other
findings. However, note that in Cambodia two studies found that contracting had little to
no effect on infant and child mortality in children younger than one year of age (Odendaal
et al., 2018; Bonfrer et al., 2014) while in Sao Paulo, Brazil, there was a non-significant
reduction of 0.093 percentage points (Greve and Schattan Ruas Pereira Coelho, 2017).
The results however, may also be reflective of broader socio-economic and political
environment in South Sudan. They may be as a result of transferring greater management
and stewardship of the health system to the state with limited capacity, whereas prior to
independence the health system was primarily managed by private sector, with little to no
oversight from the public sector. However, due to the donor-driven design of the contracts
in South Sudan, and the fact that these were primarily managed by agencies selected by
the donors, I infer that this management role of the government was limited, especially
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Figure 2.5: Trend U5MR restricting to neighbouring countries.
during the initial implementation of the policy. South Sudan gained its independence in
2011 and in 2013 conflict broke out in a few regions in the country, with further expansion
of the geographical scope of the conflict in 2016. While this may explain the slowing down
of rate of decline of U5MR, it does not explain the results immediately prior to 2013, but
may explain the U5MR observed after 2013 where it remains relatively stable.
Also, note that the U5MR is constructed based on existing household surveys as well
as by modelling and there have been a limited number of representative surveys conducted
in South Sudan since its independence. Thus the U5MR for South Sudan may not be
as valid, and it is also possible that the U5MR may have actually increased during the
contracting period due to the contract design, and given the existence of conflict in South
Sudan. This strongly indicates that this is an area worthy of further research to assess
whether these results are unique to South Sudan, by conducting similar SCM analysis of
countries that have implemented contracting.
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Figure 2.6: Trend U5MR restricting to oil producing countries.
2.4.2 Robustness checks
In-Space Placebo Study
To assess the robustness of the results, I further conduct a series of placebo studies. I
iteratively reassign the treatment to each country in the donor pool that did not experience
the health policy intervention, in what is referred to as ‘in-space’ placebo studies. This
then allows us to compare South Sudan’s estimated effect to the distribution of placebo
effects for the remaining 80 countries. The South Sudan effect is then considered significant
if it is different in comparison to the distribution of the placebo effects. This is illustrated
in Figure 2.7. The robustness test once again affirms that South Sudan appears to be one
of the few countries with stagnating U5MR relative to progress made in other countries.
To evaluate the gap obtained from the ‘in-space’ placebo, the distribution of the ratios
of post/pre the 2012 health system intervention RMSPE (root mean square prediction
error) is compared for South Sudan and the remaining 80 countries. This is depicted in
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Figure 2.7: Gap in U5MR Placebo Controls.
Figure 2.8. RMSPE measures the magnitude of the gap in U5MR between each country and
its counterfactual. This ratio is 0.67 for South Sudan, which is not significantly different
from that of other countries. South Sudan ranks 58, resulting in a non-significant p-value
of 0.725 2. This further supports the result that contracting had limited effect on U5MR..
This further supports the result that contracting had limited effect on U5MR. The countries
with the largest ratios are Cote D’Ivoire, Senegal, Sudan, Pakistan and Uzbekistan with
ratios of 4.7, 3.87, 3.57, 3.27 and 3.16 respectively. It is also worth noting that of these
countries, only Pakistan implemented a contracting-out health intervention.
In-time Placebo Study
I also conduct an in-time placebo study where the synthetic control method is estimated
assuming the contracting policy occurs in 2005 and 2011, corresponding to the signing of
the comprehensive peace agreement and the independence of the Republic of South Sudan.
That is, the same model is rerun, but intervention period is reassigned to 2005 and 2011
2Null hypothesis of no effect. p≈ 58/80
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Figure 2.8: Ratio of pre and post U5MR.
respectively.
For treatment year 2011, all previous variables are included in the model. Countries
used in the construction of synthetic South Sudan now include Bolivia (0.012), Burundi
(0.162), Eswatini (0.019), Liberia (0.27), Malawi (0.232), Nigeria (0.159), and Sierra Leone
(0.147). Once again observe in Figure 2.9 and Figure 2.10 that the synthetic South Sudan
replicates under-five mortality rates for the real South Sudan, in the pre-intervention pe-
riod. In addition, the same divergence in U5MR is observed between South Sudan and its
counterfactual, although this divergence occurs closer to 2012 than in the previous result.
For treatment year 2005, DPT immunization rates and female literacy rate variables
are dropped due to lack of availability of data for the southern Sudan region prior to
2008. Countries used in the construction of the 2005 synthetic South Sudan are Burundi
(0.168), Central African Republic (0.023), Djibouti (0.064, Liberia (0.4), Malawi (0.1),
Niger (0.033), Sierra Leone (0.19), and Timor-Leste (0.021). While there are fewer pre-
intervention years with which to fit the pre-intervention variables for synthetic southern
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Figure 2.9: Trends in U5MR rate.
Sudan, it once again replicates U5MR for the southern Sudan as observed in Figure 2.9.
More importantly, we observe the same effect on U5MR as previously. Critically, these
results support the utility of the synthetic control method for comparative case analysis.
2.5 Conclusions
This analysis has produced two important results. Firstly, it has extended the synthetic
control method to the analysis of the impact of contracting out of primary healthcare
services on U5MR in lower and middle-income. Given the popularity of contracting-out
primarily in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is also the first evaluation of impact on U5MR and
provides replicable methodology for future analysis.
Second, results suggest that the contracting out intervention in South Sudan had a
negative impact on the U5MR. This is a surprising result, worthy of further research
to identify the specific reasons why the policy was not effective. However, the results
complement earlier discussion on the limitations of contracting to increase utilization of
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Figure 2.10: Trends in U5MR rate.
specifically antenatal care services, uptake of delivery with skilled birth attendants and
expansion of coverage of the immunization services. It also highlights the possibility that
private entities may not be willing to work in remote and costly geographic areas.
It is worth noting that South Sudan has a high fertility rate, and low uptake of modern
contraceptive methods and this may explain the lack of progress in reducing child mortality.
Also, worth noting is the large influx of returnees to the country after the signing of the
peace agreement in 2005, most of whom were recorded as arriving in 2009 and 2010 during
the census.
This might therefore also be a result of an increase in fecundity due to a return of
younger men and women to the country, resulting in a slow-down of reduction of U5MR.
While one may argue that South Sudan experienced conflict starting primarily in 2013,
these results show that the rate of decline of U5MR did not change even prior to 2013.
This also implies that there was no observed ‘peace dividend’ from the country experiencing
relative peace after the signing of the CPA, as there is no steep decline in U5MR observed
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even prior to 2005.
These findings have important implications for the broader discussion on the effec-
tiveness of contracting given its increasing popularity as a health system strengthening
mechanism. As one of the few evaluations of a national contracting policy, the results
broadly support other studies that found a limited effect of contracting as an approach
to increase utilization of health services, and thus to impact health outcomes. There is
therefore a need for further research to determine if these results are also observed in other
contracting countries.
One critical question that also needs to be addressed in further research is whether
the failure to accelerate reduction of the U5MR was due to the specific contracting design
and implicit incentive of the contracts implemented in South Sudan, unobserved contex-
tual factors or if it is reflective of inadequate health systems financing. Furthermore, the
complexity of observing effort may create distortions that slowdown the reduction in de-
sired outcomes. The study has a few limitations. First, the U5MR for South Sudan, while
based on household surveys, is also primarily modelled, thus the estimates may not be the
most up-to-date or valid as South Sudan has had a limited number of national household
surveys. This is especially true for the period after 2013. In addition, the contracting
intervention may have a delayed effect on U5MR and lack of additional data points may
reflect additional reductions.
Second, given the sub-national variations in health status in South Sudan, and the
differential per capita spending on health, national level U5MR may mask gains in reducing
U5MR at the regional or state level in South Sudan. Identifying sub-national variation in
U5MR may illuminate differences but will require large sample sizes. Given wide-spread
conflict in South Sudan, this may not be possible.
Third, the study did not explore contextual factor that may have an impact on U5MR.
It is possible that events or policy changes that occurred in South Sudan during the study
period may have affected the rate of decline of U5MR. Future evaluations of other national
contracting interventions may therefore show that the South Sudan case is unique.
In summary, the analysis has shown that contracting in South Sudan did not increase
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the rate of decline of the U5MR as expected. For the country to achieve the UN SDGs,
there is need for additional health system strengthening approaches, perhaps targeting the
capacity of the government to provide stewardship of the health system, strengthening
the health-care workforce or provision of additional financial resources. Further research
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2.6 Appendix
2.6.1 Synthetic Control Analysis
Table B1: Synthetic South Sudan Countries
Country Synthetic Weight Country Synthetic Weight
Afghanistan 0 Angola 0.047
Bangladesh 0 Benin 0
Bhutan 0 Bolivia 0
Burkina Faso 0 Burundi 0.095
Cabo Verde 0 Cambodia 0
Cameroon 0 Central African Republic 0.04
Chad 0 Comoros 0
Congo 0 Democratic Republic of Congo 0
Cote d’Ivoire 0 Djibouti 0
Egypt 0 El Salvador 0
Eritrea 0 Eswatini 0.03
Ethiopia 0 Gambia 0.026
Georgia 0 Ghana 0
Guinea 0 Guinea-Bissau 0
Haiti 0 Honduras 0
India 0 Indonesia 0
Kenya 0.024 Kiribati 0
Korea 0 Kosovo 0
Kyrgyz Republic 0 Lao PDR 0
Lesotho 0 Liberia 0.306
Madagascar 0 Malawi 0.25
Mali 0 Mauritania 0
Micronesia 0 Moldova 0
Mongolia 0 Morocco 0
Mozambique 0 Myanmar 0
Nepal 0 Nicaragua 0
Niger 0 Nigeria 0
Pakistan 0 Papua New Guinea 0
Philippines 0 Rwanda 0
Sao Tome and Principe 0 Senegal 0
Sierra Leone 0.174 Solomon Islands 0
Somalia 0 Sri Lanka 0
Sudan 0 Syrian Arab Republic 0
Tajikistan 0 Tanzania 0
Timor-Leste 0 Togo 0
Tunisia 0 Uganda 0
Ukraine 0 Uzbekistan 0
Vanuatu 0 Vietnam 0
West Bank and Gaza 0 Yemen 0
Zambia 0 Zimbabwe 0
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Table B2: South Sudan and Synthetic South Sudan
U5MR
Year South Sudan U5MR Synthetic South Sudan U5MR % difference
2000 182.9 182.8426 0.03%
2001 173.4 173.9289 -0.31%
2002 164.4 164.7069 -0.19%
2003 155.7 155.6087 0.06%
2004 147.5 146.9793 0.35%
2005 139.7 139.1794 0.37%
2006 132.5 132.06 0.33%
2007 125.7 125.8299 -0.10%
2008 119.2 119.6679 -0.39%
2009 112.9 113.8931 -0.88%
2010 107.1 108.2225 -1.05%
2011 102.1 102.4761 -0.37%
2012 98.6 96.5463 2.08%
2013 96.9 91.4954 5.58%
2014 96.4 86.8374 9.92%
2015 96.4 82.669 14.24%
2016 96.4 79.0279 18.02%
2.6.2 Robustness test results
Similar analysis was conducted excluding Liberia and Sierra Leone from the donor pool,
as these are countries that have implemented a similar health policy as South Sudan. The
pre-intervention trend in U5MR does not closely fit that of South Sudan when we exclude
these two countries, however, the overall trend remains the same. Results are presented
here.
Table B3: Predictor Variables
Predictor Variable Weight
Under-5 mortality rate 0.1327
Domestic health expenditure (2012) 0.0007
Population ages 0-14 0.0548
Crude death-rate 1.60E-01
Probability of dying (2010) 0.1895
Crude Birth-rate 9.87E-03
Life expectancy, female 0.0023
Female labor force participation rate 8.89E-02
Fertility rate, total 0.0732
Literacy Rate, 15-24 females (2008) 0.0075
communicable disease deaths (2010) 0.15355
Lifetime risk of maternal death (%) 0.00015
Survival to age 65, female 0.1230
Prevalence of stunting (2006&2010) 0.0001












Table B5: Predictor Variables
Predictor Variable South Sudan Synthetic South Sudan
Under-5 mortality rate 138.5917 138.0507
Domestic health expenditure (2012) 22.86306 26.99581
Population ages 0-14 44.18048 44.5997
Crude death-rate 14.21 14.24993
Probability of dying (2010) 28.05 28.0265
Crude Birth-rate 40.32167 42.30844
Life expectancy, female 52.61517 52.71315
Female labor force participation rate 48.37935 48.04113
Fertility rate, total 5.75925 5.755696
Literacy Rate, 15-24 females (2008) 29.57762 26.85879
communicable disease deaths (2010) 71.3 70.4794
Lifetime risk of maternal death (%) 5.909626 4.727339
Survival to age 65, female 46.78858 46.7125
Prevalence of stunting (2006&2010) 33.65 0.7088
DPT immunization coverage (2011&2012) 60 62.2325
Table B6: South Sudan and Synthetic
South Sudan U5MR
Year South Sudan U5MR Synthetic South Sudan U5MR



















Paper 3: Contracting primary health care services in
South Sudan: Does type of contract matter?
Abstract
Contracting primary health care services to private providers is viewed as a means of expanding
access to services and strengthening the government’s stewardship role in post-conflict settings.
This is despite that limited capacity of governments is often what necessitates contracting in the
first place, and thus governments may be unable to appropriately monitor performance. There is
need to assess different contracting modalities, to identify innovative ways of rebuilding health sys-
tems in post-conflict settings, taking into consideration public-sector capacity. This paper evaluates
three contracting approaches in the two most populous states in South Sudan, Jonglei and Upper
Nile; contracting-out (C-O) using non-governmental organizations (NGOs), contracting-in (C-I) us-
ing county health departments (CHD) and performance-based contracting (PBC) in select counties.
Using difference-in difference (DD) and DD with propensity score matching, I hypothesized that
contracting-out to NGOs leads to higher performance relative to contracting-in with CHDs, that
performance-based contracting incentivizes health workers, hence PBC counties have higher utiliza-
tion relative to non-PBC counties. However, results suggest that this is not as straightforward. Mean
ANC 1st visits fall by almost 50% in CHD counties, whereas malaria treatment for pregnant women
falls from 14 to 9 mean monthly treatments in NGO counties relative to CHD counties. There are no
significant differences in ANC 4th visits and health facility deliveries. Similarly, there are no statisti-
cally significant differences in the double differences for DPT 1, DPT 3 and diarrhoea. PBC had no
effect on utilization relative to counties where there was no PBC incentive. There is need to identify
contextual factors, the specific implementation activities of providers such that compensation is tied
to level of effort, appropriate incentives (reward) and penalty mechanisms and risk-sharing in order
to accurately judge performance of health providers.
Keywords— Difference-in-Difference; Propensity-score matching; Under-five mortal-




Contracting-out of primary health services to the private sector has been advocated
as a means of accelerating access to health services in lower and middle-income countries
(LMICs) and particularly in fragile and conflict-affected states (Palmer, 2000; Batley and
Mcloughlin, 2010; Kruk et al., 2010; Newbrander et al., 2011; Carpenter et al., 2012; Witter
et al., 2015). Governments in these settings often have limited technical and managerial
capacity to directly provide health services and therefore contracting is seen as a way of
engaging the private sector, which is often perceived as having higher capacity and of being
more efficient. Contracting-out started in developed countries, and has to-date been under-
taken in Latin America (e.g. Bolivia and Guatemala) Asia (e.g. Bangladesh, Cambodia,
Pakistan and India) and Africa (Rwanda, Southern Sudan and the Democratic Republic
of Congo), largely influenced by bilateral and multilateral donor agencies, including the
World Bank.
Contracting involves a formal contractual agreement between two parties with the re-
lationship defined by a contract in which the principal, hereby referred to as the purchaser,
engages an agent or provider to perform services on their behalf, and therefore delegates
some decision-making authority to the agent (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith et al.,
1997). The purchaser is often the government, whose responsibility is providing finan-
cial support and oversight with the overall objective of improving the performance of the
health system, while the providers or agents are typically non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) (Liu et al., 2007). The contract therefore provides a link between public finance
and defined results.
Contracting-out and contracting-in, in the context of fragile and conflict affected coun-
tries was first implemented in Cambodia starting in 1999. Contracting-out (CO) involves
the implementation of the contract by a party outside of the government, typically interna-
tional or local NGOs, whereas contracting-in (C-I) involves the national or central level of
government utilizing local government institutions in the implementation of the contract,
where the health-sector is decentralized (Abramson, 2009; Bhushan et al., 2002; Soeters
and Griffiths, 2003). In both cases, the NGO and the local government is considered the
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provider or agent. Performance-based contracting (PBC) was also implemented in Cambo-
dia, and subsequently popularized in Afghanistan (Sondorp et al., 2009; Newbrander et al.,
2014). PBC is often embedded in contracting, whereby fixed price contracts are based on
pre-specified performance targets and includes a mechanism to reward or penalize perfor-
mance against a pre-specified standard (often measures of quality). PBC therefore depends
on careful monitoring of performance, and fidelity to the design of the approach, in order
to be successful.
South Sudan, a fragile and conflict-affected country, provides a unique opportunity to
assess the results of large-scale contracting for primary health care services. In the two most
populous states, Jonglei and Upper Nile, three different contracting approaches were imple-
mented by a World Bank project; contracting-in, contracting-out and performance-based
contracting (PBC). Contracting-in involved utilizing county-health departments (CHD),
which are formally part of the MoH as the provider, while contracting-out was done with
local and international NGOs. I hereby refer to these as C-I (CHD) contracts and C-O
(NGO) contracts respectively, for simplicity. Performance-based contracting was also uti-
lized in counties where health-worker salaries were paid by the government and not by
the project, as a way of incentivising performance among public-sector employees. PBC
was implemented in all C-I (CHD) counties and select C-O (NGO) counties where health
worker salaries were paid by the state. Therefore, success of the PBC approach will also de-
pend on whether the incentives were adequate to motivate performance of health-workers,
in addition to whether the penalty and reward mechanism was adhered to.
Utilizing the CHD as a provider may increase the sustainability of the contracting
model due to the lower costs associated, as well as the level of ownership the CHD has over
the health facilities and health workers. CHDs may also have a larger sense of responsi-
bility to improve health services being part of the MoH, and this may provide additional
incentive to ensure performance targets are met. However, CHDs may also have limited
human resources capacity to manage large-scale contracts, and this limited technical and
managerial capacity may deter performance and necessitate additional capacity-building
efforts on the part of the purchaser. This can be adduced by the fact that the contracting
127
intervention was introduced due to existing capacity constraints within the public sector,
which would also affect the local government institution.
In South Sudan, NGOs have had a longer experience providing basic health services
as there were no formal government structures during the period of protracted conflict.
NGOs therefore tend to have existing technical, financial and managerial capacity, and
may therefore be able to negotiate and receive larger contracts than CHDs as a result.
NGOs may also have stricter contractual obligations as they may be easier to replace
whereas it may be difficult to replace a non-performing government agency as this may
carry political risk. These differences in contract modalities may matter and hence it
is worthwhile to make comparative assessments of health services utilization of the two
contracting types.
I hypothesize that as C-O (NGO) contracts have greater accountability mechanisms
and verifiable performance measures compared to C-I (CHD) contracts, are often more en-
forceable and may attract higher bids, NGOs have greater incentive to meet contract deliv-
erables, compared to CHDs. Therefore, counties managed by local or international NGOs
will have higher performance, as measured by number of children receiving diphtheria, per-
tussis and tetanus (DPT) vaccines, receiving treatment for malaria and diarrhoea, number
of women with antenatal-care visits, with two or more doses of intermittent presumptive
treatment of malaria during pregnancy with sulphadoxine with pyrimidine (IPT-Sp) and
delivering in the health facilities. These outcome measures are selected as they are priority
indicators for the Ministry of Health and also due to the fact that they are key priority
interventions for reduction of child and maternal mortality. The primary data source is
the district health information database which captures routine health facility utilization
nationwide. I focus on the post-independence period (2011-2015) to assess the effect of the
contracting approaches; comparing C-O (NGO) counties to C-I (CHD) counties to assess
contracting in relative to contracting out, using difference-in difference (DD) and DD with
propensity score matching.
Contract-theory suggests that the provider or agent, in this case the CHDs and NGOs
may not always act in the best interest of the purchaser, unless adequately incentivized
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and there are appropriate monitoring controls. Indeed, the 2016 Nobel Prize in economics
was awarded to Hart and Holmström, for their work on the design of incentives in con-
tracts, underscoring the importance of understanding payment or incentive mechanisms
(Committee et al., 2016). In addition, the purchaser does not directly observe the actions
undertaken by providers which produce the outcome, as is often the case when contracting
in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where monitoring and evaluation mechanisms are
often non-existent. This may lead to a problem of moral hazard: the provider may un-
dertake actions that increase his/her compensation, for example focusing on deliverables
that are carefully monitored at the expense of providing a full complement of health ser-
vices, contrary to the expectations of the provider. To alleviate the moral hazard problem,
the payment structure must therefore be tied to an observable and verifiable performance
measure (Smith et al., 1997; Committee et al., 2016). This is referred to as paying for
performance or results-based financing.
Paying for performance requires contracts that detail the services to be provided, and
performance measures to be used for verification ex ante, as well as the ability to verify
and measure performance, ex post. This is often difficult to achieve, as the performance
measures are typically in the control of the provider, and not the purchaser. In the case
of South Sudan, the DHIS collects monthly routine health facility utilization data from
health facilities nationwide and is relatively independent of provider control, as reporting
is through government channels.
An additional problem with contracts arises when performance depends on factors
largely beyond the provider’s control, and hence well-drawn contracts must balance com-
pensation against risk-sharing. This often results in what Hart refers to as incomplete
contracts, whereby “the contract will specify some actions the parties must take but not
others; it will mention what should happen in some states of the world, but not in oth-
ers(Hart and Moore, 1988).” The result of this may be that parties to the contract act in
ways beneficial to them, but different from the agreement, hence contracts must also spec-
ify penalties when parties fail to meet their obligations. Recognizing the incompleteness
of contracts necessitates understanding the relationship between the parties to the con-
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tract, and the specifics of the contracts as this may determine how the overall contracting
agreement operates(Palmer, 2000).
Performance-based contracting (PBC), is increasingly seen as a way of aligning provider
incentives with health outcomes to address the inherent weakness of incomplete contracts.
PBC is defined as the mechanism by which performance is expressed in a formal agreement
between parties, often by setting a fixed price for the desired output, and that includes
penalties for poor performance or rewards for performance that exceeds the standard de-
fined in the contract (Musgrove, 2011). Thus, PBC rewards providers for achieving pre-
specified performance targets, awards effort toward improving quality of services, while
penalizing poor performance (Miller and Babiarz, 2013; Fritsche et al., 2014). PBC has
been a key feature of contracting-out in a number of LMICs1.
In South Sudan, all C-I (CHD) counties were under PBC, however, this was not true
for all NGO counties, where some implemented PBC while others did not. In order to
assess whether PBC had an effect on increasing utilization, I compare PBC and non-PBC
counties under the hypothesis that PBC counties have higher utilization. Lack of adequate
sample size makes its difficult to compare PBC within NGO counties. The analysis also
uses difference-in difference (DD) and DD with propensity score matching.
This analysis is important for extending elements of contract theory to the health
system research and specifically in conflict affected settings. In an optimal setting, provider
compensation is based solely on the observed and verified performance of the provider. This
performance however, relies on the provider’s effort, as well as factors that may be beyond
their control (referred to as noise). For example, some providers may consistently achieve
good results due to working in easy to operate environments, whereas others may achieve
poor results regardless of effort, if they are working in hostile environments. This is often
the case in fragile and conflict-affected settings, where providers may avoid working in
areas that have high insecurity or are inaccessible.
1While PBC and PBF (performance-based financing) are often used interchangeably, PBF refers
to situations where individual health-workers are paid directly, on achievement of performance
targets of a pre-specified quality. The payments are often per-capita improvements in health facility
utilization. PBC payments are however paid to the providers (who may be NGOs, government
agencies or the health facility)
130
Rewarding the provider based on ‘output’, may thus result in a model which rewards
the noise factors and not actual effort. Hart and Holmström recommend that contracts
be based not only on measurable outcomes ex post, but also on the providers’ effort.
This is the informativeness principle, whereby compensation is tied to level of effort and
this is increasingly observed in existing contracting-out models where providers receive an
equity bonus if they work in difficult environments. Holmström argues that “additional
information is of value because it allows a more accurate judgment of the performance of
the agent; or viewed differently, it provides the same incentives for effort with less loss
of risk-sharing benefits (Holmström, 1979). For South Sudan specifically, the analysis
considers the context in which these contracts are drawn, by accounting for variation in
counties and health facility infrastructure.
Well-designed contracts provide adequate incentives for both parties to gain from the
contractual agreement; are explicit in expectations of both parties, transfer a degree of
management autonomy to the providers and have well defined monitoring mechanisms.
This suggests that the way in which contracts are designed and their specificity as well as
performance monitoring mechanisms are critical determinants for their success (Liu et al.,
2007). In fragile and conflict-affected countries, the services defined in the contract are
often based on a basic package of health services developed by the government/ Ministry
of Health (MoH). This analysis presents an extensive description of the NGO and CHD
contracts, based on a qualitative assessment of contracts received from the implementing
agency. In numerous similar studies, the specifics of the contract are not well explained,
and this has been previously noted as a limitation (Palmer, 2000; Liu et al., 2007).
The degree of management autonomy allows providers to make context-specific deci-
sions to meet their contractual obligations while performance monitoring ensures that the
purchaser’s expectations are indeed met. Often though, contracts in post-conflict settings
do not carry adequate penalties, as the regulatory environment is often weak making it
difficult to enforce contractual obligations ( OECD Partnership for Democratic Governance
(PDG), 2010). Furthermore, there is often lack of competitive bidders making it difficult
to drop non-performing providers. Contract monitoring also depends on the capacity of
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the purchaser- both financial and technical capacity – to adequately manage contracts (Liu
et al., 2007; Arur et al., 2009).
There is limited information on how contracts are managed and monitored especially in
fragile and conflict-affected settings where the capacity of the provider may be limited, and
it is this limited capacity that often informs the need for contracting-out the health sector
in the first place (Witter et al., 2015). This is also a limitation of this analysis; there is
inadequate information on the capacity of the implementing providers and the lead agency
managing the contracts. In addition, there is inadequate information on whether the
penalty and reward mechanism in the contracts is adhered to during the implementation
of the contracts. Despite this, the paper provides useful information in understanding the
contracting modalities in South Sudan with aim of improving how contracts are designed
and managed in fragile and conflict affected settings.
The paper is organized as follows; I first provide a brief history of contracting globally
and in South Sudan, and then extensively describe the contracting intervention in Jonglei
and Upper Nile states, describing the specifics of the contract mechanism, and the con-
tracting environment. I then outline the empirical strategy, difference-in-difference (DD)
and difference in difference with propensity score matching and discuss the results. Finally,
I discuss the policy implications.
3.1.1 A brief history of contracting
Contracting-out as a health-sector reform began in the 1980s primarily in countries
within the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), in response
to the increasing rate of publicly financed health-care. Increased spending was primarily
due to expansion in public insurance but was also associated with increase in the number
of health facilities, medical personnel and healthcare technologies (Oxley and MacFarlan,
1994; Docteur and Oxley, 2003; Maarse, 2006). Due to the expansion of the social insurance
net, health insurance was transformed from a market commodity to a public good, which
resulted in reductions in private spending on healthcare, with concurrent increases in public
spending prior to the initiation of the reforms (Maarse, 2006). Health-sector reforms thus
consisted of efforts to shift healthcare spending back to individuals by increasing private
132
expenditures and reducing costs by reintroducing market principles in efforts to reduce
public expenditure.
In the OECD countries, health services delivery largely consisted of a public-integrated
model whereby health-providers were public sector employees managing publicly owned
health facilities and a public-contract model (also referred to as a public-private model)
whereby the state contracted private healthcare providers and payment for services pri-
marily occurred ex post. Reforms entailed separating the role of purchasers/ funders of
healthcare from that of providers of health services, in effect moving to the public-contract
model, with ownership of provider organizations shifting to the private sector (Docteur
and Oxley, 2003; Vining and Globerman, 1999; Maarse, 2006). The underlying assump-
tion was that competition within the private sector would result in better performance
and efficiency gains, with the government better suited to play a stewardship/regulatory
role within the health sector. Thus contracting happened in a context where government
financing for healthcare was adequate, but rising as a proportion of GDP. For example,
among all OECD countries, total expenditure on health care increased by 1.9 percentage
points in the 1970s before decreasing to 0.2 percentage points between 1980 and 1992 (Ox-
ley and MacFarlan, 1994). In some countries, reforms consisted of efforts to re-introduce
elements of the market into the health care sector and to shift some healthcare costs from
public financing to private insurance. underlying all these reforms, governments largely
had the capacity to provide stewardship to the health sector.
Whereas health reforms in the OECD countries were driven by cost-containment ef-
forts, in the developing world reforms were primarily due to concerns about government
capacity to efficiently manage the health sector (Broomberg, 1994; Mills, 1998; Palmer,
2000) in settings with inadequate government spending on health. The private sector
was largely perceived to be a more efficient provider of basic services. Lack of adequate
information on the rational allocation of resources had also led to an over reliance on his-
torical costs rather than on population needs, resulting in poor quality care, inequitable
health systems and an over-extended state health system that did not deliver as expected
(Broomberg, 1994). The health delivery model in developing countries is similar to the
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public-integrated model in most OECD countries whereby health workers are public sec-
tor employees and health facilities are primarily government owned. The health reform
therefore was a shift to a public-contract model, however unlike the OECD countries,
health facilities remained under ownership of the public sector but managed by local and
international non-governmental organizations (NGOs).
Similar to OECD countries, the underlying assumption of health reforms was that
expanding the role of the private-sector in health-care provision would increase competition,
improve efficiency, reduce costs and extend consumer choice (Mills, 1998; McPake and
Banda, 1994; Broomberg, 1994). The contract was a way to link financial allocations to
health sector outputs and outcomes, and to clarify the roles and responsibilities of parties
to the contract, presumably leading to greater transparency and accountability (Palmer,
2000; England, 2000; Liu et al., 2007). In contrast to the developed world however, these
health reforms were initiated by bilateral and multi-lateral donors with the government
presumed to have the capacity to perform its stewardship role of the health sector.
In fragile and post-conflict settings, contracting-out has been promoted as a health-
system strengthening model where it is viewed as a means of rebuilding the health system,
transitioning from humanitarian aid to developmental aid, and more importantly establish-
ing the legitimacy of the state through strengthening its capacity to provide basic services
(Palmer, 2000; Batley and Mcloughlin, 2010; Kruk et al., 2010; Newbrander et al., 2011;
Carpenter et al., 2012; Witter et al., 2015). The use of contracting-out in a post-conflict
setting was first carried out in Cambodia, and has since been utilized in Afghanistan,
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Liberia and South Sudan (Newbrander et al.,
2011). In these settings, the physical health infrastructure is either significantly impaired
or non-existent, there is a critical shortage of the health workforce, and basic services are
typically delivered by NGOs and financed by international donors. In addition, the govern-
ment often lacks the resources, capacity or legitimacy to ensure security, provide services
and guarantee political or economic stability, resulting in contracting-out often being the
only viable strategy for service delivery. However, due to weak government capacity, there
also often lacks a legal regulatory framework within which to enforce contracts, and it
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is questionable whether the government can adequately monitor the performance of con-
tracted NGOs. ( OECD Partnership for Democratic Governance (PDG), 2010; Witter
et al., 2015).
The purchasers in these settings are typically bilateral and multilateral donors (primar-
ily the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
European Union or United Kingdom’s Department for International Development (DFID))
(Mills, 1998; Palmer, 2000; Sondorp et al., 2009; Newbrander et al., 2011), although fund-
ing might also be channelled through government procurement systems, thus retaining the
classical definition of contracting. The providers or agents are typically NGOs who may or
may not have already been providing services during the conflict period or public providers
(for example government agencies or health departments) responsible for implementing the
contract.
In the cases where the government is also party to the contract as a provider, this
is referred to as “contracting-in” or internal contracting, and often accompanies manage-
ment support to the government by an external agency (Bhushan et al., 2002; Grundy
et al., 2009). Liu 2007 argues that the provider’s status, i.e. whether public or private
may impact the effectiveness of the contracting-out initiative. For example, in Cambodia,
the contracting-out model was found to perform better than the contracting-in model in
expanding access to health services overall by 1.7 contacts per capita compared to 1.2, for
reproductive and child health services specifically (Bhushan et al., 2002). This, however,
may have been due to the contracted-out districts receiving more funding and hence this
may have been due to greater availability of resources due to the higher incentive to achieve
targets and ability to pay higher health worker salaries. It is therefore necessary to under-
stand the contract details to effectively compare contracting approaches as the contracts
directly affect how they are implemented.
Performance-based contracting is increasingly seen as a way of aligning provider incen-
tives with health outcomes to address the inherent weakness of incomplete contracts. The
approach rewards providers for achieving pre-specified performance targets that are tied
to minimum quality standards (Miller and Babiarz, 2013; Fritsche et al., 2014). PBC thus
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incorporates a mechanism that rewards provider’s efforts when they supersede minimum
quality standards or penalties where standards are not met. Performance-based contract-
ing in lower and middle-income countries can be traced to the introduction of contracting
of non-governmental organizations. For example, in Cambodia, contracts between NGOs
and the Ministry of Health were fixed price contracts with payment linked to achievement
of performance targets, primarily for the provision of maternal and child health services
(Van de Poel et al., 2016). In some districts, a performance-based incentive structure
was introduced in contracts signed with individual health workers whereby health-worker
salaries were based on a monthly incentive payment of 55% over 3-month contract periods,
punctuality incentive of 15% based on attendance history and a performance bonus of 30%
for meeting health facility monthly financing targets (Soeters and Griffiths, 2003). In both
cases, incentives were provided at the health facility level with individual staff2 or in con-
tracts with NGOs and were funded by introduction of user-fees in addition to government
subsidies. During the same time period, USAID implemented a performance-based model
in which NGOs received 95% of their budget based on reported expenditures, but were
eligible to earn a 10% bonus on meeting pre-defined targets. Thus NGOs risked 5% of
their budgets for a potential 10% gain (Eichler et al., 2006).
3.1.2 History of contracting in South Sudan
The Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) between Sudan’s National Congress Party
and the Southern region’s Sudan People’s Liberation Movement and Army (SPLM/A) in
2005 led to the formation of the Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS) based in the
semi-autonomous southern region and a Government of National Unity (GoNU) in the
North. Over 30 years of conflict had left the southern region with limited developmental
and economic activities. Infrastructure was virtually non-existent, livelihoods were limited
to subsistence agriculture and the civil service and service delivery structures had to be
developed from scratch (WB and UN, 2005; AFR/OPCS, 2010).
During the conflict period, the health-sector was primarily supported by at least 76
2Where health-workers are compensated directly, this is technically referred to as performance-
based financing (PBF), although PBF and PBC are often used interchangeably (Musgrove, 2011).
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NGOs with humanitarian aid funding from multilateral and bilateral donors and United
Nations agencies. Majority of NGOs were under a consortium established by the United
Nations Children Fund (UNICEF) and the World Food Programme (WFP) known as
Operation Lifeline Sudan (OLS). This resulted in fragmented health services delivery with
most NGOs focussing on specific diseases and specific geographical regions, resulting in a
highly inefficient health sector (Cometto et al., 2010). It is therefore not surprising that
in 2006, a national Sudan Health and Household Survey (SHHS-I) confirmed that the
southern region had some of the worst health indicators in the world; maternal mortality
was 2,054 per 100,000 live births, infant and child mortality of 102.4 and 135.3 per 1,000
live births. Only 2.7% of children were fully immunized by 12 months of age, with 43%
of children in this same age-group had not received any of the recommended vaccinations
whatsoever (South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics(SSNBS), 2006a).
The CPA mandated the formation of the Multi-Donor Trust Fund for Southern Su-
dan (MDTF-SS) to support the implementation of the CPA by international partners,
and as means to identify key priority areas for national focus and international support
( AFR/OPCS, 2010; FAFO, 2013). A key component of state-building was the provision
of basic services, thus the Southern Sudan Umbrella Program for Health Systems Devel-
opment (UPHSD) was designed as a three-year, US$225 million project to be operative in
all 10 states 3 and implemented between 2006 – 2010. The UPHSDP aimed to develop
health sector systems and capacities and to rapidly increase access to basic health services
and high-impact interventions at the primary health care level (World Bank, 2013). These
interventions were outlined in a basic package of health services (BPHS) which prioritized
preventable childhood illnesses, reproductive health, nutrition services and communicable
diseases (Ministry of Health Republic of South Sudan, 2010). The UPHSD adopted a
“contracting-out” approach involving technical lead agencies to oversee the contracts and
non-governmental organizations to support the delivery of services and to build the capac-
ity of local partners. Note that given the limited capacity of the government, contracting
out was also the only feasible mechanism for rapid expansion of health services delivery in
3the ten states are: Western Equatoria, Central Equatoria, Eastern Equatoria, Northern Bahr
el Ghazal, Western Bahr el Ghazal, Lakes, Warrap, Jonglei, Unity and Upper Nile
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the country.
Donors were to finance US$75 million and the GOSS US$150 million, however GoSS
did not meet its obligations, and the project was redesigned as a US$63 million project
covering only 6 counties in the 4 states of Upper Nile, Jonglei, Central Equatoria, and
Eastern Equatoria. Due to delays in MDTF disbursements and in obtaining competitive
bids from NGOs, the first contract signed by the UPHSD was with IMA World Health
in 2008, to support health programs in Upper Nile and Jonglei States of Southern Su-
dan. Subsequent contracts were signed with Norwegian People’s Aid in Central Equatoria
and Health and Life Sciences Partnership in Eastern Equatoria. Phase II of the UPHSD
had similar objectives and design and an explicitly limited geographical scope; the ob-
jectives were; to improve delivery of the BPHS in the four states (Upper Nile, Jonglei,
Central Equatoria, and Eastern Equatoria) with existing contracts; and to strengthen key
stewardship functions of the Ministry of Health including in monitoring and evaluation
and pharmaceuticals management. IMA continued as the lead agency in the two states
through UPHSD-II and subsequently after the independence of South Sudan in 2011, thus
the two states may have benefitted from having continuous support by one lead agency.
Note that the remaining six states had other donors, for example USAID and DFID-UK,
but were largely outside the remit of the MoH as the government did not pool funds into
these health programs.
Geographically-focused donor-funding approach
In 2010, a second Sudan Health and Household Survey (SHHS-II) was conducted to
update information on the health status of children and women of South Sudan and to
generate data to monitor progress towards achieving the Millenium Development Goals
(MDGs) (South Sudan National Bureau of Statistics(SSNBS), 2006b). SHHS-II indicated
that there had been limited improvements in the health status of southerners, despite
the large amounts of external assistance in the transition period. The survey did not
assess maternal mortality and infant and under-five mortality rates were calculated based
on indirect estimation to estimate probability of dying before the first and fifth birthday
respectively. The probability of dying before 1 year of age and 5 years of age was estimated
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at 75 and 105 respectively. There were limited improvements in immunization coverage;
DPT coverage was 25% and 13% for the first and third doses with measles vaccination
coverage of 26.3% lower than the 28% estimate in 2006. Reproductive health indicators
also showed slight improvements; 13% of pregnant women had had antenatal care, with
17% of them receiving care from a skilled provider while 40.3% of women had given birth
under the attendance of at least one skilled personnel, an increase from 2006.
Table 3.1: Select Health Indicators, SHHS
Indicators Value 2010 Value 2006
Under-five mortality rate 106/1000 135/1000
Infant mortality rate 84/1000 102/1000
Maternal mortality ratio 2054/100,000
Water and sanitation
Improved drinking water sources 68.00% 48.30%
Water treatment 9.90% 13.10%
Use of improved sanitation facilities 15.40% 6.40%
Child health
DPT immunization coverage (children 12-23 months) 13.80% 20.20%
Measles immunization coverage (children aged 12-23) 20.60% 27.70%
Fully immunized children (children aged 12-23) 1.80% 2.70%
Anti-malarial treatment 9.00% 47.00%
Proportion children U5 who had diarrhoea 34.40% 42.90%
Proportion children U5 who had fever- malaria 32.00% 45.50%
Reproductive Health
Antenatal care coverage at least once 46.7% 26.20%
Skilled attendant at delivery 14.70% 10.02%
Institutional deliveries 12.30% 13.60%
Progress was however slower than that observed in other post-conflict states and espe-
cially those that had implemented contracting-out. This may have been due to the nature
of the NGO service delivery contracts during the MDTF period, which were short-term
contracts as well as the delays in signing the first contracts suggesting a limited number
of competitive bids(World Bank, 2013). Thus the nature of the contracts may have been
a limitation. In addition, there was a lack of equitable geographical coverage of services
with some areas receiving little to no adequate funding, and others supported by more
than one donor. Therefore in 2011, the Ministry of Health established a geographically
focused financing approach to support the primary health care system across all 10 states
in the country, in order to address the gaps in geographical coverage of services, and to
rapidly improve the health status of primarily women and children in South Sudan, after
the limited progress observed in SHHS-II ((MoH) Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS),
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2010). This also allowed the MoH to play a greater role in stewarding the health-sector,
as donors signed agreements with the government.
The financing architecture primarily relied on three key donor mechanisms; USAID,
World Bank and a Health Pooled Fund led by DFID-UK and consisting of funds from
5 countries. Three health programs were established; USAID-funded Integrated Service
Delivery Program (ISDP), World Bank-funded Rapid Results for Health Program (RRHP)
and the Health Pooled Fund (HPF). The three donors recruited lead agencies, to manage
and coordinate state-level health service delivery and to strengthen the capacity of State
Ministries of Health (SMoH) and County Health Departments (CHD) to oversee the health
system. The lead agencies subsequently established county-wide contracts with one imple-
menting partner in each county, typically a local or international NGOs to cover all the
health facilities in a county.
The overall goal of the MoH was to ensure that all primary health care facilities in
the country received technical and financial support. USAID and HPF health programs
had similar implementation modalities, with NGOs as implementing partners, however,
the World Bank RHHP instituted two unique mechanisms; contracting-in with county-
health departments in select counties in addition to contracting-out and performance-based
contracting (PBC), allowing for a comparison of the different contracting modalities. The
focus of this analysis is thus on the RHHP project. In addition, the RHHP project shared
contract documents, allowing for a deeper insight into the design of the contracts, which as
previously argued, is necessary to understand the strengths and limitations of the contract
design, based on contract-theory.
3.2 Contracting in Jonglei and Upper Nile States
After 2011, the IMA health program was redesigned as the South Sudan Rapid Results
Health Project (RRHP) with funding from the World Bank and drawing from the imple-
mentation lessons of the pre-independence period. The RRHP was established in December
2011, with a grant of US$28 million to the government of South Sudan, to improve health
service delivery in Upper Nile and Jonglei States. The grant was directly administered
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by a Project Financial Management Unit (PFMU) within the Ministry of Finance and
Economic Planning (MOFEP) which provided direct oversight of funds disbursed to the
Ministry of Health. This was another unique element of the RRHP; unlike the other two
donor mechanisms, USAID and HPF which provided funds to lead agencies, the RHHP
used government procurement mechanisms to channel funds to the lead agency (World
Bank, 2012).
The project enabled the MoH to establish a performance-based contract directly with
IMA, which was selected due to its long history supporting primary health care services in
the two states, under the Multi-Donor Trust Fund (MDTF). As the lead agency, IMA was
obligated to submit quarterly reports which were verified by the MoH and a third-party
M&E team, prior to receipt of lump payments from the Ministry of Finance, thus these
contracts were based on a pay-for-performance model. The project developed and piloted
the MoH’s district health information system (DHIS), and as reporting was based on the
results obtained from the DHIS, prioritized strengthening the reporting system.
In Jonglei State, IMA contracted non-governmental agencies (NGOs) to manage all 11
counties4, a contracting-out model, while in Upper Nile State 5 5 counties had contracts
with County Health Departments while the remaining 8 counties were managed in a similar
model as in Jonglei. The CHD is the lowest level of the decentralized MoH system, report-
ing to the State MoH and finally the centralized MoH, and thus represent a contracting-in
model. CHD-managed counties were Renk, Manyo, Melut, Malakal and Akoka. IMA estab-
lished two types of contracts; fixed-price contracts with NGOs, hereby referred to as C-O
(NGOs), and flexible contracts based on a memorandum of understanding (MOU) with
the CHDs, referred to as C-I (CHDs) for simplicity. The contracts specified the catchment
population targeted for health services and the health facilities under the contract. The
smallest health facilities are the primary health care units (PHCUs) serving a catchment
population of approximately 5,000 followed by primary health care centers (PHCCs), which
serve a catchment population of approximately 10,000. The populations are not distinct,
4Counties in Jonglei: Akobo, Ayod, Bor, Duk, Fangak, Nyirol, Pibor, Pigi, Pochalla, Twic East,
and Uror
5Counties in Upper Nile: Akoka, Baliet, Fashoda, Longechuk, Luakpiny/Nasir, Maban, Maiwut,
Malakal, Manyo, Melut, Panyikang, Pibor, Renk, and Ulang
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as they often serve the same populations and provide similar services, however PHCCs
also serve as referral sites for PHCUs. Some contracts also included support for county
hospitals where these existed, as these are referral centers for both PHCCs and PHCU’s.
Health facility ownership remained with the MoH and all health facility staff are gov-
ernment staff, although the contracts allowed for payment of staff salaries and incentives,
and recruitment of additional staff where needed to ensure the right mix of staff as per
MoH guidelines. IMA and the SMOH also established a salary range to mitigate the
differences in salaries between former NGO and MOH supported facilities that existed
prior to the RRHP, and to prevent movement of staff to higher paying areas6. In addi-
tion, there was a performance bonus for county health departments and health facilities
which met or exceeded targets; CHDs received a bonus of up to 4,000 SSP per month
(approximately 1,400US$), PHCCs up to 1,600 SSP (500US$) and PHCUs up to 600 SSP
per month (200US$)7. These bonuses were based on timely submission of health facility
monthly reports, number of structured supportive supervisory visits to health facilities and
achievement of diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus vaccination coverage rates and antenatal
care 1st visit targets. Supervisory visits were based on MoH quantified supervisory check-
lists (QSC), and were meant to assess the quality of services provided, thus implementing
partners also provided minimum QSC scores.
3.2.1 Contracting-out with NGOs: C-O (NGO) Contracts
I received four NGO contracts from IMA in March 2019; two with local NGOs and two
with international NGOs, which I have carefully reviewed. The contracts are standardized
across both local and international NGOs. C-O (NGO) contracts are fixed-price annual
contracts based on a pre-specified scope of work and paid through periodic instalments.
Summary cost details are presented in table 3.2 below for illustration. The scope of work
included supporting the CHDs and strengthening the health system through ensuring avail-
ability of the right mix of health facility staff according to MoH guidelines, ensuring drugs
6For example, the per monthly range for a clinical officer/ medical assistant was 2,119 South
Sudanese Pounds (SSP) – 2,590 SSP (US$ 700-850), for a certified midwife was 1,949 – 2,382SSP
(US$660-800), and community midwife was 1,082SSP – 1322SSP (US$ 360-450), as per IMA in-
ternal documents
71US$ = SSP 2.95 using 2012 exchange rates
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and medical supplies were available at functional health facilities, supporting monitoring
and reporting through monthly review meetings, payment of the monthly operational costs
for CHDs (fuel, repairs and communications) and providing monthly performance incen-
tives to CHD personnel directly engaged in the RRHP. One of the key objectives of the
RHHP was to strengthen the capacity of the local and central MoHs in providing oversight
and management of the health sector, hence this was to strengthen the role of the CHDs
as stewards of the health system.
Implementing partners were also expected to facilitate monthly review meetings be-
tween the CHDs and health facilities staff. In addition, they were expected to conduct quar-
terly supervision visits to health facilities using the MoH quantified supervisory checklist
(QSC) in addition to weekly supervision visits to the health facilities. To increase health
facility utilization, the contract outlines several activities; community mobilization and
health education to increase demand and service uptake, regular discussions with commu-
nity leaders to encourage health services utilization and to promote feedback mechanisms
and active surveillance of vaccine-preventable and other reportable diseases.
Table 3.2: C-O (NGO) Contracts
Type of NGO I-NGO (1) I-NGO (2) local-NGO (1) local-NGO (2)*
County Ulang Fashoda Bor Duk
Target Population 25,342 52,650 304,400 65,588
Total Contract Cost $156,863 $191,813 $384,000 $148,500
Cost per capita (Estimated) 6.19 3.64 1.26 2.26
Type of Contract Fixed Price Fixed Price Fixed Price Fixed Price
Payment installments installments installments installments
Monthly Cost Summary
Total CHD support 900.00 9,166.00 5,234.00
Total PHCC support 9,709.00 5,061.00 28,070.00
Total PHCU support 6,158.00 9,817.00 10,771.00
Program Management 21,204.00 16,119.00 18,793.00
Indirect cost (%) 7% 5% 0%
Indirect Amount 1,484 2,007.13 0
Primary healthcare costs (calculated)
Number of PHCCs 2 2 6
Number of PHCUs 3 7 18
Cost per PHCC 4,854.50 2,530.50 4,678.33
Cost per PHCU 2,052.67 1,402.43 598.39
*I-NGO= International NGO. Duk county contract did not include monthly operational costs
While providers were to implement the complete basic package of health services, tar-
gets were based on five verifiable performance measures; number of children who received
DPT3 before 12 months of age, number and proportion of pregnant women receiving
143
ANC first visit, number and proportion of health facilities submitting standardized HMIS
monthly reports, number and proportion of health facilities with monthly structured super-
vision visits (using QSC) and number and proportion of health facilities having essential
drugs. These performance measures were selected after discussion with the Ministry of
Health (MoH) and are based on MoH priorities. Providers may have had motivation to
focus on these five measures, at the expense of providing the entire basic package of health
services due to compensation being directly tied to these performance measures.
Payment of contracts was after the submission of the following key deliverables; a
two-part monthly report consisting of a technical report and data, payment of monthly op-
erational costs to the CHD, joint monthly supervision visits with the CHD and conducting
community mobilization activities. The contracts do not outline how weekly supervision
visits, performance against targets or community mobilization efforts are verified by the
lead agency. It is also unclear how the results are assessed against the above-mentioned
performance measures; the external M&E agency may have played a verification role, but
this is not clearly specified in the contracts. There were, however, quarterly joint verifica-
tion meetings between the lead agency, MoH and implementing partners. Critically, the
contracts do not stipulate the reward and compensation mechanism (these are outlined in
external project documents, as in the PBC section below). These limitations have implica-
tions on whether the contracts are adequately implemented, given that performance relies
on provider effort (the informativeness principle).
In conclusion, while the contracts outline performance measures, they do not also in-
dicate the means of verifying providers’ effort and may thus be subject to the problem of
moral hazard. Neither do the contracts stipulate associated rewards for exceeding targets,
nor the penalties for poor performance, albeit they may be terminated at will. This may be
a limitation of the contracting approach as implemented in these two states. I argue that
the contracts do not take adequate consideration of the contextual environment; it is pos-
sible that some counties were operationally challenging compared to others and an ‘equity
bonus’ might have provided additional incentives for providers in difficult environments.
The analysis relies on propensity score matching to account for these differences.
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As illustrated in table 3.2, while international NGOs were able to charge indirect costs,
this was not available for local NGOs. It also appears that local NGOs may have received
less compensation despite having to meet the same contractual obligations as international
NGOs. Due to lack of adequate sample size, resulting from the relatively few local NGOs,
it is not possible to determine whether there were performance differences as a result.
Lastly, I was unable to ascertain the number of bids received per county or the overall
bidding process as this information was not available, thus it is difficult to determine the
competitiveness of the contracting environment, and thus allocative efficiency. Should there
have been a lack of bids for contracts, this would have limited the ability of the purchaser to
select the most competent provider for each county, or to replace non-performing providers.
Most NGOs were retained during the entirety of the evaluation period with changes made
in only four counties where contracts were transferred to local NGOs, suggesting that there
may have been a lack of competitive bids. Two of these changes were due to the withdrawal
of international NGOs from the states.
3.2.2 Contracting-in with CHDs: C-O (CHD) Contracts
IMA also contracted County Health Departments (CHD) in Akoka, Manyo, Makal,
Melut and Renk counties in a similar manner to NGOs; to provide health services to select
catchment populations and health facilities. I reviewed C-O (CHD) contracts from Manyo,
Melut, and Renk counties. These contracts are referred to as memoranda of understanding
(MoU) and document the roles and responsibilities of either party, with IMA also playing
an active role in meeting project deliverables and building the capacity of the CHDs to
manage the contracts.
IMA’s obligations were to provide supplies and equipment, jointly supervise and assess
the health facilities with the CHDs, and to pay facility staff salaries and CHD operation
costs. CHD responsibilities included the deployment and recruitment of health workers,
submission of monthly health facility reports, supervision of health facilities, and submis-
sion of reports on operation subsidies allocated to the CHD by IMA. Amendments to the
MOU was by mutual consent and the MOU could be terminated at any time also by mu-
tual consent, but only after meeting remaining contractual obligations. However, as the
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CHD was the acting representative of the government, and the IMA contract was with the
MoH, it is unclear whether IMA had the flexibility to terminate the MOUs, even where
there was non-performance. Indeed, none of the CHD contracts were terminated during
the observation period, and at the end of 2016, Twic East County in Jonglei State also
transitioned from an NGO to CHD contract. Table 3.3 summarizes monthly costs for 3
CHDs.
Table 3.3: C-I (CHD) Contracts
County Manyo Melut Renk
Target Population 46,170 60,377 169,291
Total Contract Cost $ 90,468.72 $ 101,566.56 $ 92,129.96
Cost per capita (Estimated) 1.96 1.68 0.54
Type of Contract MoU MoU MoU
Monthly Cost Summary
CHD costs 90,847.46 77,122.03 82,483.39
County hospital 32,993.56 51,140.00
Health facility incentives 147,137.29 168,885.08 125,787.80
Health facility operations 21,204.00 16,119.00 18,793.00
Primary healthcare costs (calculated)
Number of facilities 5 6 5
Cost per facility 5,779.59 3,436.78 2,474.44
*Costs originally in South Sudanese Pounds (SSP). Exchange rate: 1US$ = 2.95SSP
There were several differences in the C-I (CHD) contracts compared to the C-O (NGO)
contracts. Unlike NGO contracts, CHD contracts did not outline performance measures
and stipulate that the MOUs were an agreement to undertake general responsibilities
agreed by both parties. Amendments to the MOU was by mutual consent and the MOU
could be terminated at any time also by mutual consent. In contrast, NGO contracts were
fixed-price contracts with payments tied to performance.
The CHDs did not directly receive funds from IMA; these were handled by the IMA
according to a monthly budget shared with the CHD. The CHD did receive monthly
operations costs, which had to be accounted for prior to receipt of subsequent funds.
Thus, CHD’s did not have the same incentive as the NGOs to reduce costs in order to
retain any budgetary surplus, neither did they receive a percentage of project funds for
indirect costs.
CHDs also seem to have received less compensation than both local and international
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NGOs and hence has less funding to support primary health facility operations8 (see tables
3.2 and 3.3). Also, while NGO contracts were paid in USD, the CHD contracts were paid
in local currency and hence were subject to exchange rate fluctuations, and once again
CHDs did not benefit from any fluctuations in the value of the local currency.
Lastly, the CHD MOUs were not directly tied to performance targets, instead the CHD
and IMA agreed to work collaboratively to ensure annual work plan activities were carried
out. Nevertheless, as CHD staff were directly accountable to the local population in a way
that NGOs may not have been, they may have had an intrinsic motivation to ensure health
facilities were high performing. However, as health-workers were directly accountable to
the CHD/MoH, the CHDs may have had more flexibility in firing staff for non-performance
and/or adding staff to the government payroll, these contract differences may not have had
an observable impact on performance.
3.2.3 Performance-Based Contracting (PBC)
In counties where health facility staff salaries were paid by the government, RHHP
instituted performance-based contracting to incentivize health facility staff. In counties
where staff salaries were paid by the RHHP, health facility staff received no incentives.
Hence it is unclear if the PBF model was instituted to harmonize state salaries with
project-based salaries of it truly functioned as an incentive. Counties where staff salaries
were paid by the RHHP were Akobo, Twic East, Uror and Maiwut. In two counties (Melut
and Nasir) a few facilities received state-paid salaries however the majority received full
salaries from the project hence these counties are considered non-PBC counties for the
purpose of this analysis. In the remaining counties, health facility staff received state-paid
salaries and were thus eligible for PBC incentives. PBC model is presented in tables 4 and
5.
3.2.4 Monitoring and evaluation (M&E)
IMA used a variety of mechanisms to monitor the sub-contractor’s performance and
progress toward attainment of key deliverables. These included business meetings with
8The lower cost of contracting-in is also noted as a strength of using CHDs as a provider in
several IMA reports
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Table 3.4: County Health Department PBC Payments (SSP)
Target % Paid Amount (SSP)
HMIS report sent to the SMOH
No DHIS report is submitted 0% 0
Report submitted late, 50% of HF reports received 33% 200
Report submitted on time; 50- 74% HF reports received 66% 400
Report submitted on time; >=75% HF reports received 100% 600
IDSR sent to SMOH weekly
No IDSR report submitted during the month 0% 0
Only one report submitted (1 week) 33% 200
Two reports are submitted (2 weeks) 66% 400
Three or more reports are submitted 100% 600
Quarterly QSC
No HFs have been supervised using QSC 0% 0
Less than 1/3 of planned QSC visits are done. 33% 200
Less than 2/3 of planned QSC visits are done 66% 400
Greater than 2/3 of planned QSC visits are done 100% 600
Monthly meetings with minutes held
No meetings are held 0% 0
Only CHD meeting is held 33% 200
CHD plus at least 1 VHC meeting held 66% 400
CHC plus VHC plus coordination meeting held 100% 600
DPT vaccination
No Immunization activity undertaken 0% 0
DPT 3 coverage less than baseline or 250 children for Akobo 33% 200
DPT 3 coverage equal to or more than baseline 66% 400
DPT 3 coverage reaches or above target 100% 600
Table 3.5: Health Facility PBC Payments (SSP)
Target % Paid Amount (SSP)
HMIS report delivered to CHD
No DHIS report or poor-quality data 0% 0 0
Report late but with good quality data 50% 200 75
Report on time with good quality data 100% 400 150
IDSR sent to CHD weekly
No IDSR report submitted 0% 0 0
1-2 IDSR reports submitted 50% 150 75
3-4 IDSR reports submitted 100% 300 150
DPT vaccination
No Immunization activity undertaken 0% 0 0
DPT 3 achievement is less than baseline 33% 100 50
DPT 3 achievement > baseline but less than target 66% 200 100
DPT 3 target is achieved 100% 300 150
Facilities are clean and sanitary
Infrastructure clean in appearance 33% 100 50
Infrastructure Water for hand washing 33% 100 50
Infrastructure Waste disposal system in use 33% 100 50
Facilities provide ANC
ANC not integrated 0% 0 0
ANC achievement less than baseline 33% 100 50
ANC 1 achievement > baseline but less than target 66% 200 100
Target is achieved 100% 300 150
the sub-contract team with feedback from key partners primarily the CHD, site visits,
and review and assessment of periodic work plans, progress reports and quarterly pro-
gram reports. The progress reports and quarterly program reports reviews were based on
quantitative analysis of progress toward attainment of pre-specified targets.
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In addition, there was an annual evaluation of performance with results used to deter-
mine future renewal of contracts. The annual evaluation assessed the quality and time-
liness of deliverables, technical capacity of the NGOs, quality of financial management,
and administration of the subcontract. Unlike the contract between IMA and the MoH,
the subsequent contracts with implementing partners do not specify an external agency
to oversee M&E. However, the annual review would have covered implementing partners’
activities. Overall however, It is difficult to assess the quality of these monitoring mecha-
nisms due to lack of data on their relative effect on performance or reward and incentives
mechanism.
3.2.5 Contract duration and early termination
Contract duration was 12 months, renewable on an annual basis based on performance.
Early termination of the contract was by a 30-day written notification by either IMA or the
provider. In addition, the contract could be terminated by IMA due to non-performance,
but the provider had the right to claim costs incurred up to the date of notification for any
unpaid or incomplete deliverables. However, the contracts did not designate compensations
to either party due to early termination.
The annual renewal process and the quarterly payment schedule may encourage perfor-
mance due to the threat of non-renewal or cancellation. Despite this, lack of competitive
bids may also result in an unwillingness to terminate contracts due to non-performance
and the relatively few changes of county-partners between 2013-2015 suggest that this may
have been the case. The contracts also allowed for delays in meeting project deliverables
due to situations beyond the providers’ control, but with prior notification and approval.
Additional costs incurred in meeting project deliverables were to be borne by the provider
and delays of more than thirty days or those that delayed IMA’s obligation to deliver its
commitments under its government contract would result in termination of the contract.
In conclusion, given that C-O (NGO) contracts have greater accountability mechanism
and verifiable performance measures compared to C-I (CHD) contracts, NGOs may have
had greater incentive to meet contract deliverables, compared to the CHDs. Also, given
that most NGOs were already managing contracts in the counties under the previous
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health program, they may have had more experience in program implementation. Lastly,
CHDs were not directly responsible for managing funds for program implementation and
thus may have had lower incentive to reduce costs, and also had lower technical capacity
compared to the NGOs, which necessitated substantial managerial support from the lead
agency. Thus, I assume that counties supported by local or international NGOs would
have higher performance relative to those contracted-in with the CHDs.
3.3 Methods
3.3.1 Data Sources
Data for the analysis were obtained from several sources. County characteristics, specif-
ically population in 2013, population density, percentage of females enrolled in primary
school (2010), percentage of farming households (2010 baseline) and poverty headcount
(2010) are obtained from the National Bureau of Statistics Statistical Yearbook for South
Sudan with estimates based on the 2008 Sudan Population and Housing Census and the
2009 National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS). Due to limitations in availability of
county-level data, these are the only control variables used in the analysis. There is some
variation across the countries, for example population density in Malakal is 172 per square
kilometre compared to Nasir County (41 per sq. km.), Ulang County (18 per sq. km)
and Renk County (14 per sq.km.) as observed in table 3.6. School enrollment is higher in
Pochalla country (48%) relative to Nyirol (30%), while poverty headcount is 64% in Ayod
relative to Uror (40%). This may have implications in contract performance had NGOs or
CHDs selected better performing counties resulting in selection bias. However, this does
not seem to be the case for example if we compare counties managed by international
NGOs relative to those managed by CHDs.
The primary data-source for health facility data is the District Health Information
Database (DHIS) which aggregates monthly health facility utilization data for all health
facilities across South Sudan. These data are extracted from standardized registers avail-
able at all health facilities and submitted monthly to the county health departments. The
DHIS was first piloted in Jonglei and Upper Nile States and through funding from the
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Table 3.6: County Baseline Data
County Partners Population(2013) Pop Density School enrollment Farming% Poverty
Jonglei
Akobo local NGO 164,231 15 0.35 0.8 0.52
Duk local NGO 78,831 9.5 0.39 0.9 0.54
Pibor* I-NGO 179,011 4.5 0.33 0.5 0.44
Pigi* I-NGO 119,888 22.5 0.39 0.9 0.44
Ayod I-NGO 169,158 10.3 0.38 0.9 0.62
Bor I-NGO 267,696 15.7 0.42 0.8 0.50
Fangak I-NGO 133,027 14.5 0.41 0.9 0.55
Nyirol I-NGO 131,384 15.2 0.30 0.9 0.43
Pochalla I-NGO 80,473 7.9 0.48 0.8 0.56
Twic East I-NGO 103,465 14 0.42 0.9 0.50
Uror I-NGO 215,142 14.7 0.38 0.9 0.40
Total 1,642,306
Upper Nile
Akoka CHD 9,842 4.1 0.29 0.8 0.32
Makal CHD 155,085 171.5 0.48 0.5 0.12
Manyo CHD 46,170 5.7 0.45 0.9 0.19
Melut CHD 60,377 7.1 0.42 0.38 0.21
Renk CHD 169,291 13.7 0.46 0.38 0.22
Baliet I-NGO 59,193 4.1 0.45 0.8 0.32
Fashoda I-NGO 44,986 10.3 0.40 0.9 0.21
Longechuk I-NGO 78,134 9.1 0.37 0.9 0.31
Luakpiny/Nasir I-NGO 258,080 40.8 0.37 0.8 0.32
Maban I-NGO 55,641 3.8 0.43 0.8 0.26
Maiwut I-NGO 97,076 21 0.40 0.8 0.27
Panyikang I-NGO 55,641 8.9 0.46 0.5 0.21
Ulang I-NGO 104,179 17.8 0.41 0.8 0.38
Total 1,193,695
I-NGO = International NGO
Pibor and Pigi County changed ownership from I-NGOs to local NGOs in 2014
UPHSD, all county health departments transmit data electronically to the national DHIS,
as they were equipped with VSAT (Very Small Aperture Terminal) satellite communica-
tions. Regular reporting to the DHIS is part of the contractual requirement for all county
health departments and NGOs in the two states, and for health facilities participating in
PBC hence they have additional motivation to ensure completeness and quality of report-
ing. Note that the DHIS is the best available data on utilization in South Sudan.
The DHIS collects data from 2009, however for the purpose of the analysis, I restrict the
analysis to 2011-2015, allowing for adequate data points both pre and post implementation
of the contracting approach. The analysis begins with 2011 as prior to that, there were
relatively fewer health facilities reporting to the DHIS (as this was during the pilot phase
of the DHIS). The data are aggregated at the state, county and payam 9 levels and health
facilities are distinguished based on whether they are primary health care centers, which
serve a catchment population of approximately 30,000 or primary health care units serving
9payams have a catchment population of approximately 30,000 people
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a catchment population of approximately 10,000. The total number of health facilities in
the two states was three hundred and sixty nine, with 53 health facilities in CHD counties
and 316 in NGO counties. In 2013, this translated to 440,765 people covered in CHD
counties compared to 2,395,236 by NGO partners.
Outcome variables extracted from the DHIS are; number of women with first antenatal
care visit, number with third antenatal care visit, and number with IPT-Sp second dose.
Although these are provided at different stages of a woman’s pregnancy, as the DHIS
does not collect personal longitudinal data it is not possible to assess completeness and
thus quality of antenatal care at the individual level. Additional indicators are number
of deliveries at the health facility, both skilled and unskilled, number of children receiving
their 3rd diphtheria, pertussis and tetanus vaccination, number of children with malaria,
and number with diarrhoea diagnosis captured monthly. As with ANC data, it is not
possible to assess completeness of DPT vaccination by individual child.
Health facility infrastructure data are obtained from a health mapping exercise which
physically surveyed 1,145 health facilities between 2016-2018 with data available on the
MoH website 10 and included as covariates (EU-CGA, 2019). The data-source is selected
due to the limited existence of data covering the observation period. I incorporate data on
physical infrastructure (permanent infrastructure, access to a pit latrine (or flushing toilet),
access to utilities (improved water source and power-source), and diagnosis (room with
auditory and visual privacy for patient consultations) with dummy variables constructed
to indicate availability. Although indicators for equipment (e.g. delivery table, examination
table, delivery kit, blood pressure machines etc.) and health facility staffing are available,
these are not utilized as it is presumed that these are more likely to have changed since
2013, whereas health facility construction is less likely to have occurred since 2013, to
account for the disparity in observation periods.
Comparing CHD and non-CHD health facilities, 25% of CHD facilities had permanent
infrastructure compared to 26% non-CHD facilities, 13% had an improved water source
compared to 25%, 6% had a power-source compared to 3%, 28% compared to 21% had
10www.southsudanhealth.info
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an improved toilet or flushing toilet and 15% compared to 16% had a room with au-
ditory and visual privacy for patient consultations. Analysis matching health facilities
using a propensity score technique is combined with difference-in-difference analysis using
the above variables. Additional covariates include dummy variables for the policy effect
(1>=2013, 0 otherwise), implementing partner (1=county health department, 0 otherwise)
and performance-based contracting (1=PBF, 0 otherwise). This comparison is presented
in table 3.7.
CHD-supported counties (Akoka, Malakal, Manyo, Melut and Renk) are all in Upper
Nile state, however Twic East county in Jonglei state was transferred to CHD at the end of
2016, beyond the period of analysis. In addition, the RHHP also instituted performance-
based contracting (PBC) providing incentives to health facility staff in counties where staff
salaries were primarily paid by the state; counties where staff salaries were paid by the
RRHP received no incentives. PBC covered all counties except Akobo, Twic East, Uror,
Maiwut, Melut and Nasir hence additional analysis will compare PBC health facilities to
non-PBC facilities. Thus health facility staff in 275 facilities were eligible for incentives
while 94 facilities received no incentives.
Table 3.7: Comparison of CHD and non-CHD
counties
CHD Non-CHD Total
Population (2013) 440, 765 2,395,236 2,836,001
Population Density 18.06 13.65 14.18
Total # of facilities 53 316 369
PHCCs 22 71 93
PHCUs 31 245 276
Health Facility Characteristics
Permanent infrastructure 13 (25%) 81 (26%) 94 (25%)
Improved water source 7 (13%) 80 (25%) 87 (24%)
Power Source 3 (6%) 10 (3%) 13 (12%)
Improved toilet 15 (28%) 67 (21%) 82 (22%)
Private consultation room 8 (15%) 51 (16%) 59 (16%)
3.4 Empirical Strategy
Contracted out counties and performance-based health facilities were not randomized.
Instead, the lead agency, IMA selected these counties and I assume that CHD counties
were selected based on capacity to manage the health facilities in the county by the CHDs.
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Note that NGOs are already selected based on existing capacity to manage counties during
the contract bidding process. To address the lack of randomization, the analysis utilizes
a non-experimental approach, difference-in-difference (DD), to assess changes over time in
health facility utilization in CHD-contracted facilities relative to NGO-contracted facilities,
attributing the difference-in-difference to the effect of the policy instituted in 2013.
DD provides an unbiased estimate if the trend over time would have been the same
between the treatment (CHD counties) and the comparison group (NGO counties) in the
absence of the introduction of the policy (Stuart et al., 2014). However, The DD method
used is modified; I assume that prior to the policy, some health facilities were primarily
managed by NGOs, however after the policy change, all health facilities are managed either
by CHDs or NGOs.
I hypothesize that CHDs may have relatively lower capacity and experience in manag-
ing the health facilities compared to NGOs and also due to their relatively more flexible
contracts and lower contracting costs, their performance would also be lower post 2013.
Should their performance be similar to that of NGOs, this has policy implications that may
suggest either that the contracting approach has limitations in improving performance at
the health facility level, or that the assumption of higher capacity of NGOs relative to
CHDs does not necessarily stand. As the comparison groups may differ in ways related to
their trends, propensity score weighting using health facility infrastructure covariates are
used to ensure comparability of the groups. This results in estimation of essentially four
groups; CHD pre, CHD post, NGO pre and NGO post as shown below. The DD estimate




1 ifCHD = 1, andP = 0
2 ifCHD = 1, andP = 1
3 ifCHD = 0, andP = 0
4 ifCHD = 0, andP = 1
PBF and non-PBF groups are constructed similarly. The DD estimator can also be
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illustrated as a simple 2x2 table as illustrated in table C1 in the appendix. To obtain
standard errors and significance levels for the DD estimate, a linear regression model is fit
with the general form;
f(Yit) = α+ βEj + γPt + δEiPt + ϵit (3.1)
Where;
Yit is the outcome (e.g antenatal care first visits) at health facility i at time t;
Ej is the CHD group vs the NGO group and P reflects the time-period (pre (0) vs post
(1) and;
δ is the DD estimator, i.e. the difference in the changes over time between the two groups.
This assumes that in the absence of the policy change in 2013, both groups would have
continued with the same trends across time, and that changes after 2013 are due to the
differences in the contracts between the two groups. Health facility indicators are added
as covariates in the model, which is estimated using the diff program in Stata version 13
(Villa, 2012).
3.4.1 Difference-in-Difference Estimator with propensity-score
matching
As noted in Stuart (2014), there may be changes in group composition across time and
we observe that the number of health facilities varies across time for both the CHD and
NGO contracted counties potentially introducing selection bias.
Propensity scores are used to balance the comparison groups on a set of health facility
infrastructure variables, similar to the approach taken in (Rajkotia et al., 2017). The PSM
approach weights the 4 groups on these health facility infrastructure variables, with the
propensity score defined as the probability of being in group 1 (versus groups 2,3, or 4)
with groups weighted to be similar to group 1 (CHD health facilities prior to 2013). This
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is accomplished using the following weight for health facility i:
Wi = ei(Xi)/eg(X1) (3.2)
where g refers to the group that health facility i was in. Thus, health facilities in Group
1 receive a weight of 1, while facilities in other groups receiving a weight proportional to
the probability being in group 1 relative to the probability of their being in the group they
are actually in. Fitting a weighted regression model using propensity score weights allows
us to obtain consistent estimates of the outcome even in the presence of selection bias due
to the observed covariates across the four groups (Stuart et al., 2014).
I also estimate DD with Kernel-based Propensity Score Matching for repeated cross
sections, using psmatch2 in Stata (Leuven and Sianesi, 2018). However, it is worth noting
that the number of health facility variables included in the estimation may be inadequate
and additional covariates may result in more robust comparisons in future analysis. The
DD and DD with PSM approach is done for comparison of both C-I (CHD) and C-O
(NGO) counties and PBF and non-PBF counties, with bootstrap estimation of coefficients
and standard errors. Thus, for both contracting and PBF, I compare two methods of
estimating the treatment effect following Stuart (2014);
1. A DD model that includes covariates X: Y = α+βEE +βPP +βEPEP +βXX+µ, µ ≈
N(0, 1), whereβEPEP is the DD estimate and;




Maternal health and child health unadjusted mean values comparing NGO and CHD
counties during the period 2011-2012 (henceforth referred to as the baseline) and the period
2013-2015 (the policy period) are presented in table 3.8 and illustrated in figures 3.1 and
3.2. Mean monthly annual utilization is presented in the appendix tables C3 and C4 for
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Figure 3.1: Maternal health by contract group
reference
Table 3.8: Unadjusted Means by Contracting group and year
NGO CHD Diff NGO CHD Diff NGO CHD Diff NGO CHD Diff
ANC 1 ANC 4 IPT2 Deliv
2011-12 16.46 21.47 -5.01** 9.30 11.91 -2.61** 6.17 8.97 2.81*** 4.68 3.00 1.68***
2013-15 17.05 16.68 0.38 5.84 9.39 -3.55*** 6.57 6.37 0.20 3.54 2.63 0.92***
Avg. 16.67 19.97 -3.30*** 8.06 11.13 -3.07*** 6.30 8.16 -1.86*** 4.30 2.89 1.42***
DPT1 DPT3 Mal Diarr
2011-12 25.03 16.95 8.08*** 18.95 14.55 4.40** 55.61 38.82 16.79*** 36.44 27.66 8.78***
2013-15 10.43 8.43 2.0 6.54 5.63 0.91 61.75 39.58 22.17*** 42.99 31.57 11.43***
Avg. 20.15 14.29 5.87*** 14.80 11.76 3.04*** 57.66 39.06 18.60*** 38.66 28.89 9.76***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Diff= Difference, Deliv=Delivery, Mal=Malaria, Diarr = Diarrhoea
Maternal health utilization for antenatal care 1st and 4th visits, and deliveries is higher
in CHD counties compared to NGO counties during the baseline period by approximately
5, 2.6 and 2.8 mean monthly visits while deliveries are higher in NGO counties by 1.7
mean deliveries. However, after the policy is implemented, all maternal health utilization
indicators fall across both contract types, except for IPT-Sp which increases slightly for
NGO counties.
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Figure 3.2: Child health by contract group
During the policy period, there is no difference in ANC 1st visits and IPT-Sp between
NGO and CHD counties, but statistically significantly lower ANC 4th visits in NGO coun-
ties, as ANC 4th visits fall faster in NGO counties compared to CHD counties. Health
facility deliveries also decrease further in NGO counties relative to CHD counties, with the
difference between the two decreasing to less than 1 mean delivery per month.
Child health baseline means shows a different pattern compared to unadjusted maternal
health means; whereas CHD counties had higher baseline means compared to NGO counties
for maternal health variables, NGO counties have higher mean child health values relative
to CHD counties. In CHD counties, DPT 1st and DPT 3rd dose, malaria and diarrhoea
cases are lower by 8, 4, 17 and 9 mean monthly utilization relative to NGO counties during
the baseline.
DPT 1st and 3rd doses fall substantially during the policy period in both types of
contracts, resulting in statistically similar results, implying that DPT coverage falls fur-
ther in NGO counties relative to CHD counties. Malaria and diarrhoea cases, however,
increase during the policy period for both contract types, with utilization in NGO counties
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remaining much higher than at CHD counties.
It is unclear why the pattern of utilization would be different for mothers and children
and this may be worthy of further research. These results do suggest that the policy had
a negative effect on maternal health and child health utilization- except for malaria and
diarrhoea treatment - which is contrary to expectation. For CHD counties, it has a more
negative effect across all maternal health utilization indicators, whereas for NGO counties,
it has a more negative effect for DPT coverage.
A similar comparison is done comparing counties that implemented performance-based
financing and those that did not with results presented in table 3.8 and illustrated in figures
3.3 and 3.4. Mean monthly annual utilization is presented in the appendix table C4 for
reference.
Table 3.9: Unadjusted Means by PBF group and year
nPbf Pbf Diff nPbf Pbf Diff nPbf Pbf Diff nPbf Pbf Diff
ANC 1 ANC 4 IPT2 Deliv
2011-12 16.27 17.87 -1.60** 8.99 10.14 -1.16*** 6.63 6.66 -0.03 4.48 4.36 0.12
2013-15 15.09 17.80 -2.71*** 6.65 6.26 0.40 6.50 6.56 -0.06 3.92 3.19 0.72***
Avg. 15.88 17.85 -1.97*** 8.21 8.74 -0.53 6.59 6.63 -0.04 4.30 3.96 .34**
DPT1 DPT3 Mal Diarr
2011-12 20.83 24.89 -4.05** 15.09 19.57 -4.47** 47.76 54.93 -7.17*** 33.35 35.70 -2.35***
2013-15 8.67 10.68 -2.02 6.30 6.43 -0.13 51.37 60.96 -9.59*** 38.79 42.20 -3.41***
Avg 17.04 20.08 -3.04*** 12.35 15.13 -2.77*** 48.88 56.97 -8.08*** 35.07 37.93 -2.86***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Diff= Difference, nPbf=No Pbf, Deliv=Delivery, Mal=Malaria, Diarr = Diarrhoea
For maternal health utilization, ANC 1st visits are statistically significantly higher in
PBF counties at baseline and during the policy period by 2 and 3 mean visits respectively,
while ANC 4th visits are higher only during the baseline, by 2 mean visits. IPT-Sp
provision is similar across both sites both during and after the policy, whereas deliveries
are lower in PBF counties, being significantly higher during the policy period by 1 mean
delivery per month.
Child health utilization is also higher in PBF counties for DPT 1st and DPT 3rd dose
but only statistically significantly higher during the baseline period. Similar to contracting
types, DPT 1st and 3rd doses falls during the policy period for both PBF and non-PBF
sites. This suggests that the policy had a negative effect on immunization coverage, regard-
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Figure 3.3: Maternal health by PBF group
Figure 3.4: Maternal health by PBF group
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less of contract type and the performance-based financing. Malaria and diarrhoea cases,
however, increase during the policy period, relative to baseline, with PBF counties having
higher utilization overall.
3.5.2 Propensity score matching analysis
Propensity score matching analysis largely confirms the DD results as observed in Table
3.10; only ANC 1st and IPT-Sp are significantly higher at NGO counties relative to CHD
counties by 9.3 and 5.6 on average, respectively. There is a similar pattern of decline after
2013 as noted above. However, it is difficult to conclude that NGO counties consistently
achieve higher results relative to CHD counties. Note that while ANC 1st visits decline
dramatically in CHD counties, there is a higher drop in IPT-Sp in NGO counties relative to
CHD counties. The lack of statistically significant differences in ANC 4th visits and health
facilities deliveries also suggests that both regions experience challenges in increasing health
facility utilization, that may be related to context-specific issues. Without a thorough
review of the activities providers undertook to expand access to health services (e.g through
community mobilization), it is difficult to make a conclusive determination.
Panel B compares PBF versus non-PBF counties, utilizing the same analytical ap-
proach. For all maternal health indicators, the double difference is statistically significantly
lower for PBF counties, relative to non-PBF counties, however when we match using PSM,
ANC 1st visits and IPT-2 Sp are similar across both types of counties. Once again, the pre-
2013 means are higher for both groups compared to the post 2013 means, except for facility
deliveries which increase from 1.5 to 1.9 mean deliveries at non-PBF counties compared to
the decline of 3.3 to 1.6 at PBF counties in the DD analysis.
These results are surprising as they suggest that PBF may not have had much impact
on performance, contrary to other settings (Rajkotia et al., 2017; Basinga et al., 2011).
This may be due to the design of the PBF approach in the two states; as noted earlier,
PBF health facilities where in locations where health workers received salaries from the
state, and hence might have begun with lower salaries compared to facilities where NGOs
paid health-workers salaries. Thus the PBF incentive may have merely harmonized salaries
across the counties, without necessarily providing additional motivation to improve health
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facility utilization.
Table 3.10: Maternal Health Indicators
Difference in Difference with covariates Kernel Propensity Score Matching
VARIABLES ANC1 ANC4 IPT2-Sp Deliveries ANC1 ANC4 IPT2-Sp Deliveries
CHD Contracts relative to NGO Contracts
Diff-in-diff -10.72*** -3.633 -4.617** -0.366 -9.927*** -4.310 -5.648** -0.224
(2.760) (2.777) (2.183) (0.595) (3.503) (2.833 ) (2.269) (0.767)
Observations 4,103 4,103 5,080 5,080 3,926 3,926 4,718 4,718
R-squared 0.141 0.089 0.059 0.046
Mean control t(0) 9.177 7.269 4.329 2.803 17.53 11.36 6.572 4.693
Mean treated t(0) 30.32 18.16 14.11 2.129 37.39 21.57 16.26 4.281
Diff t(0) 21.14 10.89 9.781 -0.673 19.86 10.21 9.692 -0.412
Mean control t(1) 5.855 2.602 3.853 1.876 12.86 6.820 6.617 3.434
Mean treated t(1) 16.28 9.860 9.017 0.837 22.79 12.72 10.66 2.798
Diff t(1) 10.42 7.258 5.164 -1.039 9.935 5.900 4.044 -0.636
PBC relative to non PBC
Diff-in-diff -2.616** -2.897*** -1.280** -2.205*** -1.678 -2.409** -1.073 -1.845***
(1.241) (1.062) (0.587) (0.384) (1.331) (1.110) (0.766) (0.418)
Observations 4,103 4,103 5,080 5,080 4,103 4,103 5,080 5,080
R-squared 0.109 0.076 0.042 0.051
Mean control t(0) 5.369 3.797 2.187 1.501 15.51 9.673 5.724 3.085
Mean treated t(0) 13.09 9.774 5.893 3.305 21.44 14.28 8.318 4.996
Diff t(0) 7.724 5.978 3.706 1.805 5.937 4.611 2.594 1.911
Mean control t(1) 2.002 0.332 1.857 1.957 10.83 5.538 5.452 3.257
Mean treated t(1) 7.110 3.412 4.283 1.558 15.09 7.741 6.972 3.324
Diff t(1) 5.108 3.080 2.426 -0.400 4.259 2.203 1.520 0.0661
Standard errors in parentheses
Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Child health results adjusted for health facility infrastructure variables are presented
in table 3.11 and also show a marked difference from the maternal health indicators. Com-
paring CHD and NGO counties, there are no statistically significant differences in the
double differences across DPT 1, DPT 3 and diarrhoea, however for children seen for
malaria treatment, NGO counties have a statistically significantly higher mean of 10 mean
monthly visits per child, relative to CHD counties. Once again, we observe the decline
in health facility utilization after 2013 across all child health indicators, similar to that of
maternal health indicators.
Of note, comparing means prior to 2013, NGO and CHD counties have relatively similar
averages across all indicators, except for diarrhoea. For example, mean DPT1 and DPT3
for NGO counties prior to 2013 is 19.43 and 17.34 while that of CHD counties is 22.34 and
19.59. This is also true for malaria and diarrhoea; mean values for CHD counties are 42.39
and 21.33, while for NGO counties 42.10 and 29.30. Child health results may therefore
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provide a more robust comparison of performance, as they are not biased by baseline levels,
compared to the maternal health results.
Matching by propensity scores provides similar results to the DD analysis, except there
are no differences comparing NGO and CHD counties across all indicators except diarrhoea
cases which are higher in CHD counties relative to NGO counties. However, NGO counties
start at higher means in 2013, relative to CHD counties (38.79 compared to 29.93), but
experience a sharper decline in health facility utilization after 2013 (28.51 compared to
27.91). Baseline mean values across other indicators are similar.
Comparing PBF and non-PBF counties, there are no differences in health facility uti-
lization for children under five years. This is despite that DPT-3 is an incentivized indicator
for all counties. These results suggest that there may be remaining contextual challenges
in improving health facility utilization for children under-five years and additional research
on innovative ways to improve utilization is needed. Lastly, it may be that incentives di-
rectly provided to the clients (e.g. voucher schemes to mothers who bring children to the
health facility) may be a more effective way of improving access to health services in this
context.
3.6 Discussion
The study findings are surprising in a number of ways. They contrast other stud-
ies where a geographically focused financing approach, contracting-out through NGOs,
contracting-in with government agencies and performance-based financing showed increases
in health facility utilization. In Rwanda and Mozambique, PBF was associated with in-
creases in maternal and child health service utilization (Basinga et al., 2011; Rajkotia
et al., 2017) and specifically for post-conflict settings, results from Afghanistan show that
contracting-out was associated with overall increase in health facility utilization for both
women and children (Arur et al., 2009; Newbrander et al., 2011). However, these stud-
ies primarily compared contracted regions with non-contracted regions whereas I compare
across contracting approaches. As contracting typically involves an increase in financial
and technical support to health facilities, I argue that this should naturally follow increases
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Table 3.11: Child Health Indicators
Difference in Difference with covariates Kernel Propensity Score Matching
VARIABLES DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea DPT1 DPT3 Malaria Diarrhoea
CHD Contracts relative to NGO Contracts
Diff-in-diff 2.440 4.559 -9.564** 2.311 0.925 2.950 -6.898 8.253***
(2.950) (3.454) (4.246) (2.745) (3.081) (3.277) (5.675) (2.168)
Observations 5,080 5,080 5,080 4,881 4,718 4,718 4,718 4,533
R-squared 0.022 0.020 0.044 0.056
Mean control t(0) 19.43 17.34 42.10 29.30 22.38 19.29 54.05 38.79
Mean treated t(0) 22.32 19.59 42.39 21.33 25.49 21.17 54.86 29.93
Diff t(0) 2.893 2.251 0.283 -7.972 3.108 1.883 0.811 -8.853
Mean control t(1) 9.072 8.137 37.44 26.09 12.34 10.58 45.71 28.51
Mean treated t(1) 14.41 14.95 28.16 20.43 16.37 15.41 39.62 27.91
Diff t(1) 5.333 6.810 -9.281 -5.661 4.033 4.833 -6.087 -0.600
PBC relative to non PBC
Diff-in-diff 0.459 -0.0480 3.537 0.501 0.102 0.425 4.169 0.838
(2.458) (1.815) (3.160) (1.964) (2.456) (2.138) (3.324) ( 2.250 )
Observations 5,080 5,080 5,080 4,881 5,080 5,080 5,080 4,881
R-squared 0.026 0.025 0.060 0.054
Mean control t(0) 13.94 11.89 30.11 26.84 18.64 16.23 41.16 31.51
Mean treated t(0) 20.64 18.48 44.59 29.08 25.14 21.59 55.57 35.72
Diff t(0) 6.705 6.590 14.48 2.244 6.495 5.356 14.42 4.212
Mean control t(1) 3.421 3.120 21.63 23.56 8.543 7.010 33.26 27.88
Mean treated t(1) 10.58 9.662 39.64 26.30 15.14 12.79 51.85 32.93
Diff t(1) 7.164 6.542 18.01 2.745 6.596 5.781 18.59 5.050
Standard errors in parentheses
Means and Standard Errors are estimated by linear regression
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
in health facility utilization compared to regions which lack similar investments hence it
may be more informative to compare across regions that receive similar investments in
order to assess the utility of different contracting approaches to determine which works
best.
The underlying assumption to date has been that building the capacity of NGOs rapidly
accelerates access to health facility utilization, but increasingly several studies have noted
lack of adequate information on the alternative; contracting using government agencies
e.g. (Palmer, 2000). In addition, the assumption that the government, which is deemed to
lack capacity to provide health services, can provide oversight to NGOs despite the lack
of capacity that necessitated the contracting in the first place, may be excessive and this
analysis sought to assess this assumption.
In Upper Nile, South Sudan, the contracting-in approach involved establishment of an
external management unit that supported the government agency (CHD) in its implemen-
tation and management of the health facilities. This may have contributed to the second
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surprising finding; comparing CHD-contracted and NGO-contracted counties, there were
no statistically significant differences in health facility utilization by children-under five
years, except for malaria (DD analysis) and diarrhoea (DD with PSM analysis).
For maternal health indicators, the statistically significantly higher double differences
were observed in antenatal care and IPT-SP largely due to the large drop in health facility
utilization in CHD counties relative to NGO counties, despite that CHD counties started
at a higher baseline values; whereas child health indicators were relatively similar pre-2013
across all counties. While one can argue that drop in utilization may have been due to
conflict, as it occurs in both NGO and CHD contracted sites, I argue that it does not
explain the large drop in antenatal care in the CHD counties. It may suggest that NGOs
were better able to mitigate against the effect of conflict than the CHDs, or may be due
to lack of capacity on the side of the CHDs to support maternal health services. However,
note also that while C-O (NGO) contracts directly stipulated performance measures, which
included indicators for antenatal care, C-I (CHD) contracts did not. Therefore this may
also be due to NGOs prioritizing achieving antenatal care targets (moral hazard). I argue
that this does not fully explain it as diptheria, tetanus and pertussis vaccination was also
a verifiable performance measure and there were no differences in performance.
There is a need to understand the contextual factors that may have led to this variation
as it is not observed in results child health results where CHDs and NGOs have similar
performance, as this may have policy implications in future. For example, it may be that
CHDs require additional support to address maternal health service delivery constraints.
Without additional research in the "efforts" of both NGOs and CHDs to attain perfor-
mance targets, it is difficult to provide meaningful explanations of these results. This is
worthy of further analysis. Also worth noting is that NGOs received higher compensation
for managing the health facilities relative to the CHDs, and the expectation is that higher
compensation results in higher performance. This does not appear to be the case as over-
all, the performance of both contracting models is remarkably similar, or stated otherwise,
the differences are not remarkable. This makes it difficult to argue for either contracting
approach; as CHDs achieve similar performance to NGOs despite receiving lower compen-
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sation, it may be more cost-effective to utilize CHDs instead of NGOs. This would also
aid in meeting the objective of strengthening the capacity of the MoH especially where an
external management unit is established.
The third surprising finding is that PBC may not have affected the motivation of
health-workers to increase health facility utilization as there were no differences compared
counties that implemented PBC, relative to those that did not. However, careful reading
of the PBC model highlights several weaknesses. PBC was implemented in counties where
health-workers were primarily paid by the government and not by the RHHP thus, the
PBC incentive may have merely harmonized salaries across all counties to deter health-
workers from relocating to higher-paying facilities (as noted in IMA quarterly reports). As
previously noted, this underscores the importance of understanding payment or incentive
mechanisms; the incentive should be adequate to ensure that health-workers place addi-
tional effort in meeting performance targets, and this may have not been the case in this
PBF model. In addition, it is unclear what the penalty was for missing performance-based
targets, or the reward for meeting these in difficult settings. Thus, the contracts may
not necessarily have rewarded providers’ efforts as they were not tied to level of effort, as
argued by Hart and Holmström. Perhaps a model that rewarded health-workers based on
number of clients seen per month at the health facility (as in the case in Rwanda) may
have been more successful. Therefore perhaps a different PBC model may have replicated
the results obtained in other settings.
Lastly, it is also worth noting that the RRHP program had the lowest per capita
spending on health in South Sudan, approximately 5 US$ compared to for example US$8
in some regions. This was despite Jonglei and Upper Nile states being the most conflict-
affected and thus the most difficult to work this and the most logistically expensive due to
geographical inaccessibility. As an example, the program implemented dry season immu-
nization campaigns due to large areas of both states being inaccessible in the rainy season
which lasts for six months in some areas11. Thus the contracts themselves may have lim-
ited the number of competitive bids from implementing partners, which may then have
11This is noted in several IMA quarterly reports
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restricted the purchaser’s ability to penalize non-performance and lastly may have been
inadequate in meeting the costs for the expansion of service delivery. I would argue that
future contracts in Jonglei and Upper Nile states would need to be much higher than that
provided by the project. Understanding the historical costs of the RHHP would provide
data for the design of a future, adequately funded project.
3.6.1 Study Limitations
The study has several limitations, primarily, the inability to compare cost-effectiveness
of CHD versus NGO counties. This was due to lack of adequate information on PBF pay-
ments schedules as well as contracts penalty and rewards mechanisms for NGOs and CHDs.
This information would have provided additional data for a more robust comparison.
Limited health facility variables was another limitation. The health facility service
availability and readiness survey was conducted after the analysis period, between 2017-
2018. As a result, health facility variables were limited to infrastructure as this is less likely
to have varied from the period of the analysis, to 2018 considering that the contracting ap-
proach had limited funding for reconstruction. However, data on availability of equipment
and supplies, staffing levels at each facility, and service availability would have allowed a
more vigorous matching of health facilities, but were excluded as these may have changed
in the 2 years after the analytical period. There was also limited data on county-specific
socio-demographic variables that may have further strengthened PSM.
The analysis relies primarily on data from the District Health Information System
(DHIS) database. Thus, analysis is dependent on whether health facilities report into the
DHIS, and not necessarily on whether people do access health facilities. Results may be
subject to poor reporting by health-workers, despite increases in health facility utilization.
Annual health facility reporting per county is presented table 2 in the appendix. These
results indicate that 5 counties experienced reduced reporting by health facilities in 2014.
It is unclear whether this may have affected payments to implementing partners, or sub-
sequently, reimbursements to the purchaser, which may have incentivized implementing
partners to identify innovative ways to continue service delivery. The drop in utilization
post 2013, which indicates relative elasticity to conflict, suggests that data was not in-
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flated in order to obtain contract payments and may also indicate that DHIS data is fairly
accurate.
This analysis does not control for conflict. However, I have assumed that conflict
affected both NGO and CHD counties and therefore mitigating for the effect of conflict
is related to effort made in achieving performance targets. Further analysis may show
that conflict may have affected some regions more than others. Exploratory analysis of
number of health facilities reporting in each county between 2011-2015 indicate that the
counties with highest reduced reporting were Luakpiny/Nasir and Panyikang counties;
other counties also saw a drop in reporting in 2013, with some recoveries in 2014.
3.6.2 Conclusions
This is the first study to assess the implication of different contracting modalities in
South Sudan. The study finds a limited effect on both contracting-in and contracting-out
approaches in South Sudan, and no effect of performance-based financing on expanding
access to health services in Jonglei and Upper Nile States. This may be due to several
factors; the design of the PBF mechanism which may have been inadequate in incentiviz-
ing performance, and mainly acted as a means of harmonizing salaries for public sector
employees relative to private sector health workers, as well as the fact that PBF was not
directly tied to health facility utilization. Contracting-in with NGos has higher results,
however in the post-period, the CHDs had greater success in mitigating for the effect of
conflict, as observed by the relatively lower reduction in health services utilization com-
pared to the NGOs. Given that CHD contracts were also lower in costs, and CHDs did not
have the ability to directly manage funds, this suggests that prioritizing implementation by
CHDs may be just as effective as utilizing NGOs, with changes in the contracting modali-
ties. This would necessitate establishing management contracts with external agencies to
continuously build the capacity of CHDs to manage and oversee the health system. Future
research should focus on establishing the cost-benefits of contracting-in and contracting-out
in South Sudan and to assess approaches in ensuring continuous health services delivery
where regions are affected by conflict.
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3.7 Appendix
Table C1 below is an illustration of difference in difference estimation.
Table C1: Illustrative DD design
Treatment (CHD) Comparison(NGO) Difference
Pre ȳ1, pre ȳ0, pre ȳ0, post -ȳ0, pre
Post ȳ1, post ȳ0, post ȳ1, post - ȳ0, post
Change ȳ1, post - ȳ1, pre ȳ0, post - ȳ0, pre ∆ = (ȳ1post - ȳ1pre) - (ȳ0post - ȳ0pre) = (ȳ0pre -ȳ0pre) - (ȳ1post - ȳ0post)
Table C2 shows reports received from health facilities annually. This is presented to
show how reporting rates differ across the years. For Jonglei State, the highest number
of facilities reporting was in 2013, with 161 sites submitting reports, while for Upper Nile
State, reporting rates vary from 138, 132 and 135 in 2011, 2012 and 2013 before dropping
to 100 sites in 2014, possibly as a result of conflict that started in December 2013.
Table C2: Health Facility Reporting
Partner 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Jonglei
Akobo County 16 15 15 14 13 14
Ayod County 15 18 15 11 9 7
Bor County 24 29 27 21 22 22
Duk County 13 13 15 10 3 7
Fangak County 13 14 19 19 19 19
Nyirol County 14 15 15 11 11 11
Pibor County 6 8 7 2 11 4
Pigi County 6 7 11 0 6 6
Pochalla County 9 9 8 8 8 8
Twic East County 20 18 16 16 8 8
Uror County 13 13 13 12 8 8
Total 149 159 161 124 118 114
Upper Nile
Akoka County 4 4 3 3 3 3
Baliet County 8 7 7 4 4 0
Fashoda County 10 9 9 12 11 11
Longechuk County 12 12 13 12 12 11
Luakpiny/Nasir County 17 18 18 0 9 2
Maban County 13 9 14 14 13 13
Maiwut County 11 11 10 10 12 11
Malakal County 9 10 10 4 6 2
Manyo County 10 10 10 10 4 5
Melut County 9 9 9 9 9 7
Panyikang County 12 11 11 1 4 4
Pibor County 1 0 1 1 1 0
Renk County 14 15 13 13 9 9
Ulang County 8 7 7 7 12 10
Total 138 132 135 100 109 88
Figure 3.5 illustrates ANC 1st visits and deliveries across the counties and by supporting
partner (NGO or CHD) in Upper Nile State. These graphs largely show that the difference
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Figure 3.5: Maternal health by contract group
between NGO supported and CHD supported counties is not distinct, suggesting that
performance may not be related to type of contract, but more dependent on county-context.
ANC 1st visits are chosen as these have been highest in utilization across all maternal health
utilization indicators, while deliveries have been lowest.
Figure 3.6 illustrates ANC 1st visits and deliveries comparing across the counties and
by performance-based financing in Upper Nile State, for similar reasons as above.
Mean monthly annual utilization is presented in tables C3 and C4 for contracting group
and by PBF group.
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Figure 3.6: Maternal health by PBF group
Table C3: Unadjusted Means by Contracting group
NGO CHD Diff NGO CHD Diff NGO CHD Diff NGO CHD Diff
ANC 1 ANC 4 IPT2 Deliv
Annual
2011 16.01 21.98 -5.96*** 10.82 14 -3.18*** 5.63 7.79 -2.16*** 6.03 3.53 2.50***
2012 15.98 22.64 -6.66*** 9.40 10.61 -1.21 6.76 9.03 -2.28*** 4.60 3.10 1.51***
2013 17.23 20.23 -3.00*** 8.02 11.62 -3.60 6.07 9.70 -3.63*** 3.68 2.57 1.10***
2014 17.18 16.09 1.09 5.87 8.46 -2.59*** 6.10 6.20 -0.10 3.33 2.28 1.06***
2015 16.97 17.31 -0.33 5.82 10.40 -4.58*** 6.94 6.56 0.36 3.71 3.06 0.65
DPT1 DPT3 Mal Diarr
Annual
2011 26.99 14.19 12.80*** 20.65 11.29 9.35*** 51.73 36.07 15.66*** 38.13 21.48 16.65***
2012 27.95 17.35 10.60*** 20.90 14.28 6.62*** 56.96 41.87 15.09*** 36.88 29.40 7.48***
2013 20.89 18.42 2.47 15.87 16.92 -1.05 57.50 37.98 19.51*** 34.76 30.29 4.46***
2014 10.03 7.34 2.69 6.40 5.69 0.71 51.46 42.14 9.32*** 34.94 35.01 -0.08
2015 10.74 9.77 0.97 6.64 5.56 1.08 69.67 36.44 33.23*** 49.21 27.63 21.57***
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Diff= Difference, Deliv=Delivery, Mal=Malaria, Diarr = Diarrhoea
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Table C4: Unadjusted Means by PBF group
nPbf Pbf Diff nPbf Pbf Diff nPbf Pbf Diff nPbf Pbf Diff
ANC 1 ANC 4 IPT2 Deliv
Annual
2011 15.78 17.55 -1.78 10.60 11.68 -1.08 5.47 6.21 -0.73 4.96 5.98 -1.02***
2012 15.04 18.20 -3.17*** 7.67 10.59 -2.92*** 6.77 7.34 -0.56 4.09 4.45 -0.36
2013 17.79 17.82 -0.03 8.97 8.60 0 .37 7.50 6.41 1.09*** 4.44 3.09 1.35***
2014 17.39 16.74 0.65 6.83 6.11 0.72 6.19 6.09 0.10 3.60 2.90 0.69***
2015 12.84 18.45 -5.61*** 6.49 6.351 0.13 6.83 6.91 -0.08 4.27 3.41 0.86***
DPT1 DPT3 Mal Diarr
Annual
2011 20.44 27.23 -6.78** 14.73 21.37 -6.64*** 43.46 52.15 -8.69*** 34.17 36.23 -2.06
2012 22.56 27.66 -5.10 16.387 21.25 -4.86** 46.68 57.73 -11.05*** 31.94 37.36 -5.42***
2013 19.54 20.81 -1.27 14.20 16.82 -2.63* 52.49 54.60 -2.11 33.96 33.96 0.001
2014 11.50 8.54 2.96 8.45 5.20 3.25*** 44.18 52.33 -8.15*** 33.53 35.66 -2.13
2015 5.56 12.27 -6.71*** 3.94 7.344 -3.41*** 59.26 67.34 -8.09*** 44.56 46.96 -2.40
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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